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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECT OF MEMORY FOR SERIALLY PRESENTED CAUSAL
INFORMATION ON JUDGMENTS OF CONTINGENCY
by
Christopher A. Barnes
University o f New Hampshire, December, 2005
Four experiments investigated whether memory errors might account for errors in
contingency judgments. Participants viewed contingencies one event at a time, later
recalled the frequencies o f the four event types, and judged the extent that they were
related. Contingency judgments were more highly correlated with participants’ memory
of the contingency than with the actual contingency (Experiments 2 & 4); thus implying
that inaccurate mental representations o f the contingency contribute to erroneous
judgments. Decreasing the time to view each event (i.e., from 3 to 5 s) increased the
perceived difficulty o f recalling event frequencies (Experiments 1 & 2), decreased the
percentage o f correct frequency estimations (Experiment 1), and increased the likelihood
of a differential pattern o f errors when recalling event frequencies (Experiment 1).
Participants’ knowledge o f the total number o f events (Experiments 2), their knowledge
of the distribution o f the four event types (Experiments 1-4), and the actual frequency o f
the event types were found to bias recalled event frequencies (i.e., in Experiments 3 and
4); the latter of which was also responsible for the differential pattern o f errors when
recalling event frequencies. In closing, the appropriateness o f using a statistic calculated
on one’s memory o f the contingency to assess judgment accuracy was discussed.

xi
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INTRODUCTION

Sensitivity to variable relatedness permits a variety o f cognitive inferences. For
example, an individual might foresee the occurrence o f a future event after having
observed a predictive event. Such foresight might permit the individual to delay, prevent,
or prepare for the yet-to-occur event. Sensitivity to relatedness is especially useful in
situations when the future event is potentially harmful. Upon viewing how events are
related, an individual might make inferences about the cause o f an event. Inferences due
to sensitivity to variable relatedness have played a significant role in the lives o f humans.
Research has revealed that humans are sensitive to the direction and strength o f relations
(e.g., Allan & Jenkins, 1983; Ward & Jenkins, 1965; Wasserman & Shaklee, 1984).
However, under many circumstances errors do occur when judging variable relatedness.
Many factors contribute to inaccurate judgments o f variable relatedness (see
Crocker, 1981, for a detailed discussion). Experimenters have primarily assessed whether
individuals use accurate or error prone strategies to judge relatedness (e.g., Piaget &
Inhelder, 1958; Shaklee, 1983; Ward & Jenkins, 1965). I argue here that memory errors
contribute to inaccurate judgments o f relatedness. Participants are able to distinguish
positive, negative, and unrelated relations (e.g., Ward & Jenkins, 1965; Wasserman &
Shaklee, 1984). The relevant information is the only way that a judge can successfully
determine the strength and direction o f a relation. Therefore, some representation o f the

1
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relevant information is needed to form a veridical judgment. A representation is even
more important when the individual must recall the relevant information from memory.
The experimental investigation follows a discussion o f the research relevant to the
role o f memory forjudging relatedness. First, the typical experimental paradigm will be
discussed to highlight two procedures that differ in memory demands. Second, prior
research will be reviewed that highlights crucial procedural factors that impact judgment
competency. Third, three models will be discussed that can account for judgments of
relatedness. The discussion o f the models will be followed by an analysis of their
assumptions pertaining to memory. Fourth, two areas o f the research will be reviewed
(i.e., subjective cell importance and order effects) which suggest that memory impacts
judgments o f relatedness. Last, the extant research relevant to memory and judgments of
relatedness will be discussed.
The current review is limited to experiments that (1) require participants to judge
the extent that two binary variables are related and (2 ) have implications relevant to the
role o f memory forjudging relatedness. Several considerations influenced limiting the
inclusion of experiments. First, the majority o f prior research has investigated the extent
that two binary variables are related. Second, the limitation minimizes the potential
problem of comparing results obtained from different experimental paradigms (see
Dennis & Ahn, 2002). Therefore, the limitation should facilitate an integrative discussion
of experimental results. Last, no prior research has discussed the role o f memory for
judging relatedness using more than two binary variables.

2
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The Experimental Paradigm
Several terms used throughout the literature must first be described. Event states
refer to four forms o f information, collectively referred to as causal information, that
define the extent that variables are related. Causal information can be summarized in the
cells o f a 2 x 2 contingency table, as depicted in Figure B1 (labeled cells a, b, c, and d).
The first of the two variables, Variable 1, is present in the cells on the top row (i.e., cells
a and b) and absent in the cells on the bottom row (i.e., cells c and d). A similar rule
holds for Variable 2 in the left (i.e., Variable 2 is present in cells a and c) and right
columns (i.e., Variable 2 is absent in cells b and d). Cells a and d, collectively referred to
as confirming cases, correspond to event states in which Variables 1 and 2 are either
simultaneously present or absent and they serve to strengthen a positive relationship.
Cells b and c, collectively referred to as disconfirming cases, correspond to event states in
which only one o f the variables is present at a time and they serve to strengthen a
negative relationship. Each event state, and thus each cell o f the contingency table,
represents a unique combination o f the presence and absence o f the two variables.
The terminology that describes the variable relatedness must also be addressed.
The extent that the two variables are related has been referred to as the relationship,
relatedness, covariation, and contingency. Although each term is arguably
interchangeable, the latter will be used throughout this discussion. Contingency also
refers to the value o f a statistic that quantifies the extent that two variables are related,
referred to as delta p or Ap. Delta p is expressed by the following equation:
Ap = [ A I { A + B ) } - [ C I ( C + D ) ]

3
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(1)

where A, B, C, and D correspond to the frequencies o f the similarly labeled event states
(i.e., cells a, b, c, and d). The value of delta p is restricted to a range o f +1.0 to -1.0. A
contingency o f + 1 . 0 indicates that the presence o f one variable perfectly predicts the
presence of the other (i.e., a relation consisting only o f a and d event states), while - 1 . 0
indicates that the presence o f one variable perfectly predicts the absence o f the other (i.e.,
a relation that consisting only o f b and c event states). A value o f 0.0 indicates that no
relationship exists between the two variables. Because delta p is calculated by to taking
the difference between two conditional probabilities, a given contingency can be created
using various combinations of conditional probabilities (or frequencies o f causal
information).
Researcher may choose from one o f two procedures frequently used to present
causal information. The two procedures, trial-by-trial (TBT) and summarized (SUM),
differ in a variety o f ways. The most important difference, at least for this discussion,
pertains to the procedures’ demands on memory.
The TBT procedure places a large burden on memory when judging contingency.
Causal information is presented one event state at a time. Judgments are formed in the
absence o f all or the majority o f the causal information. Variables 1 and 2 are often
referred to as the input and output o f the relation. Judges can passively observe the input
and output (e.g., Jenkins & Ward, 1965) or actively initiate or withhold the input (i.e., the
frequency of Variable 1) and observe its effect (i.e., the presence or absence o f the
output; e.g., Jenkins & Ward, 1965; Shanks, 1985; Wasserman & Shaklee, 1984). The
active TBT procedure samples two probability generators to determine a trial’s outcome if
a response is initiated or withheld.

4
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The SUM procedure greatly minimizes the burden on memory when judging
contingency. The SUM procedure simultaneously displays all o f the causal information.
Judgments are formed in the presence of the summarized causal information, which
greatly reduces and may even eliminate memory demands. Causal information has been
summarized using a variety of methods, which includes a contingency table (e.g.,
Smedslund, 1963; Wasserman, Domer, & Kao, 1990, Experiment 2), timeline
(Wasserman & Shaklee, 1984), and statements that indicate the frequencies o f each event
state (e.g., Crocker, 1982; Wasserman, Domer, & Kao, 1990, Experiments 1 & 3).
Researchers have investigated whether the TBT or the SUM procedure produces
more accurate judgments. The consensus is that judgments are more accurate when using
the SUM procedure (e.g., Ward & Jenkins, 1965; Wasserman & Shaklee, 1984). I argue
that misremembering contributes to the poorer performance in the TBT procedure. The
likelihood that the causal information is misremembered in the SUM procedure is greatly
reduced because it is present when judging the contingency.
The dependent measures used to obtain judgments o f relatedness have also
differed. Instmctions have requested, among other things, that participants judge the
relationship (e.g., Maldonado, Catena, Candido, & Garcia, 1999), likelihood of future
events (e.g., Shaklee & Tucker, 1983), control (e.g., Jenkins & Ward, 1965; Ward &
Jenkins, 1965), influence and connection (e.g., Allan & Jenkins, 1980). Interest in
terminology has faded because early research failed to demonstrate that it influenced
contingency judgments (see Allan & Jenkins, 1983; Jenkins & Ward, 1965). The scales
used to record judgments have either been unidirectional or bidirectional (see Allan,
1993). Unidirectional scales only provide information pertaining to the strength of the

5
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judgment. Therefore, positive and negative judgments can not be distinguished using
unidirectional scales. Bidirectional scales provide information pertaining to both the
strength and direction o f the judgment. Numeric scales can be used to compare the value
of the judgm ent to that o f the contingency, which is not possible with nominal scales
(e.g., less likely, more likely, etc.).

Early Research
Early research failed to demonstrate that humans produce veridical judgments of
contingency (e.g., Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Jenkins & Ward, 1965; Smedslund, 1963).
Inhelder and Piaget (1958) conducted one o f the first experiments that utilized two binary
variables to investigate contingency judgment. Their primary focus was to assess the
development of the concept o f correlation in children. Interviews with the children, aged
12-15 years, suggested that they used a variety o f erroneous rules to judge contingency.
The older children were able to distinguish between confirming and disconfirming cases
but their concepts o f correlation were incomplete and frequently led to inaccurate
judgments. The authors speculated that adults, due to a more complete concept of
correlation, would produce more accurate judgments.
Inhelder and Piagefs (1958) speculation motivated the work o f Smedslund (1963).
Nursing students viewed cards that depicted either the presence or absence o f a symptom
and whether the patient was later diagnosed with a disease. Participants judged the
contingency, estimated the frequencies o f causal information, and rank ordered
contingencies according to their strength. Participants performed poorly on all of the
tasks. Experiment 2 removed peripheral cues from the cards and permitted participants
more time to examine the causal information, which did not improve their performance.

6
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Thus, another experiment suggested that humans are unable to form veridical judgments
of contingency.
Jenkins and Ward (1965) also set out to determine whether individuals could
accurately judge contingency. In three experiments, participants judged the extent that
their responses (i.e., the active group) or those o f another participant (i.e., the passive
group) had on the occurrence of the output. The experiment was explained to participants
as either a scoring task, in which responses could produce points, or a control task, in
which they predicted a trial’s outcome before responding. Judgments were inaccurate and
uncorrelated with contingency in both the score and control conditions. The best
predictor of participant^ judgments, which also served as a bias, was the frequency o f cell
a event states (i.e., obtaining a "point" or producing the predicted outcome). Experiments
2 and 3 investigated whether participants had an improper understanding of control and
improving their understanding o f it would improve judgment competency. Explicit
training reduced the bias associated with the frequency o f cell a event states but failed to
improve judgment accuracy.
Ward and Jenkins (1965) assessed whether different procedures impacted
judgment competency. Contingencies were presented to groups using either the TBT,
SUM, or both procedures. Participants that viewed the SUM procedure were more likely
to produce veridical judgments than those that viewed the TBT procedure or both
procedures. Their experiment demonstrated that judgment competency is improved if the
SUM procedure is used (e.g., Jenkins & Ward, 1965; Smedslund, 1963), which suggested
that conditions do exist in which humans can provide veridical judgments o f contingency.

7
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Researchers’ failure to obtain veridical judgments o f contingency was also
influenced by variable symmetry. Variable symmetry refers to whether the binary states
o f either the input or output correspond to one or two variables. The two states of an
asymmetric variable correspond to the presence or absence o f a single variable, while
those o f a symmetric variable correspond to the presence o f distinct events (i.e., blue or
brown eyes). Because variable symmetry can be independently applied to the input (I)
and output (O), it distinguishes four types o f problem sets:
21

/2

0

11

/1

0

,

/

11 2 0

, 2 1 / 1 0 , and

.
Allan and Jenkins (1980; 1983) conducted an exhaustive investigation o f the four

types o f problem sets defined by variable symmetry. Four aspects o f their research
prompted researchers to use asymmetric variables in later research. First, they concluded
that variable symmetry contributed to the not p-not q assumption (Allan & Jenkins,
1980). The 21/10 problem sets prohibited participants from observing the result of not
responding (Allan & Jenkins, 1980), which led participants to erroneously conclude that
no outcome will occur if no response is emitted. Therefore, participants used an
inappropriate baseline when contrasting observations and forming their judgments of
contingency. Second, they demonstrated that asymmetric variables are one way to
mitigate the bias associated with the frequency o f cell a event states (Allan & Jenkins,
1980; 1983). Third, Allan and Jenkins (1983) argued that if the input and output are not
similarly defined by variable symmetry that the problem sets is not causally compatible.
Biases were minimal when the input and output variables were similarly defined (i.e.,
11/10 or 21/20) and it was concluded that they were causally compatible. Causal

8
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incompatibility interfered with and biased participants’ contingency judgments. Fourth,
judgments were the most veridical with 11/10 problem sets (Allan & Jenkins, 1983).

Explaining Contingency Judgment
The need for a theoretical account became apparent as the body o f research
investigating contingency judgments increased. Three models o f contingency judgment
will be discussed. Following their introductions, each theory’s assumptions pertaining to
memory will be discussed. The rule-analysis technique (Shaklee, 1983) will also be
discussed immediately following the introduction o f the first model.

Rule Based Model
Claims that judgments are formed according to a rule based strategies can be
traced back to the first investigation o f binary contingency judgments (Inhelder & Piaget,
1958). Although judgments may mimic a pattern predicted by a given rule, it does not
eliminate the possibility that they are formed by another mechanism. This point is
stressed because many researchers do not wish to imply that participants follow these
rules when judging contingency (e.g., Wasserman, Elek, Chatlosh, & Baker, 1993).
Cell A Rule. The cell a rule states that participants form contingency judgments
by comparing the number of cell a event states to those o f the remaining cells. A relation
is judged as positive if the frequency o f cell a is the higher than each o f the remaining
cells, as negative if it is lower than each o f the remaining cells, and as noncontingent if it
is equal to each o f the remaining cells.
A-Versus-B Rule. The a-versus-b rule compares the number o f times the output
variable occurs in the presence and absence o f the input. In other words, it compares the
frequency o f cell a with that o f cell b to distinguish among positive, negative, or

9
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noncontingent relations. A relation is judged as positive when cell a occurs more
frequently than cell b, as negative when it occurs less than cell b, and as noncontingent
when they are equal as frequent.
Use o f these rules was thought to be an indication o f immature reasoning. Neither
the cell a or the a-versus-b rule requires a distinction between confirming and
discontinuing cases. In addition, the a-versus-b rule does not rely on cell information
from the entire contingency table. Use o f a rule used all four cells and required
distinguishing between confirming and disconfirming cases was thought to be an
indication o f mature reasoning (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Shaklee, 1983; Shaklee &
Mims, 1982).
Sum-of-Diagonals Rule. The sum-of-the-diagonals rule incorporates all four cells
and distinguishes between confirming and disconfirming cases (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958).
The difference between the sums o f the confirming and disconfirming cases, both its
value and sign, are used to judge the relation. A relation is judged as positive if the
difference is positive, as negative if the difference is negative, and as noncontingent if the
difference is zero.
Conditional Probabilities Rule. The conditional probabilities rule or delta rule is
the only rule that always leads to the correct strength and direction (Ward & Jenkins,
1965). The equation for the delta rule is the same as that used to define contingency (See
Equation 1). The delta rule takes the difference between two conditional probabilities: (1)
the probability o f the output in the presence o f the input (i.e., A l [A + B]) and (2) the
probability of the output in the absence o f the input (i.e., C! [C + DJ). A relation is judged

10
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as positive if the difference is positive, as negative if the difference is negative, and as
noncontingent if the difference is zero.
Rule-Analysis Technique. The rule-analysis technique (Shaklee, 1983) can
determine which a participant used to judge contingency. The rule-analysis technique
uses

1 2

contingencies that differ in the four rules success determining the direction o f the

contingency. The rule-analysis technique exploits the flaws the three lesser sophisticated
rules to create four subsets o f problems. The four subsets are created, one set for each
rule, in a way that they can only be solved by a rule of equal or greater sophistication.
The four rules, listed from the lowest to the highest level o f sophistication, are as follows:
cell a, a-versus-b, sum-of-the-diagonals, and conditional probabilities. The cell a subset
can be correctly judged by all of the rules, the a-versus-b subset can only be correctly
judged by the three more sophisticated rules, and so forth. Therefore, a judge's pattern of
success across subsets can be used to determine the rule likely used to judge contingency.
Shaklee and colleagues have demonstrated the generality and reliability of the
rule-analysis technique. The likelihood that children are categorized as having used a
more sophisticated rules increases with age (Shaklee & Mims, 1981), which is consistent
with that suggested by Inhelder and Piaget (1958). The rule-analysis technique also
consistently assigns the majority o f participants to moderately sophisticated rules (i.e.,
they use either the sum-of-the-diagonals or the a-versus-b rule; Shaklee & Hall, 1983;
Shaklee & Mims, 1981; 1982; Shaklee & Tucker, 1980), which is consistent with
individuals’frequent tendency to produce inaccurate judgments. However, it is possible
that a participants pattern o f success is not consistent with the hierarchical arrangement o f
the problem sets. Such a participant might be using more than one rule or an unidentified

11
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rule. Inspections o f participants’judgments that can not be categorized by the ruleanalysis technique have not identified a new rule (Shaklee & Hall, 1983; Shaklee &
Mims, 1981; 1982; Shaklee & Tucker, 1980).
The rule-analysis technique has several advantages over other techniques used to
determine a participants rule to judge contingency. First, it is not based on self-reports.
Shaklee and Hall (1983) showed that self-reports, which have been used in the past (e.g.,
Smedslund, 1963), are not consistent with participants' success when judging the subsets.
The one exception was that participants categorized as having used the delta rule
provided explanations consistent with their patterns o f success. Second, it is not based on
the correlations between participants’judgments and that predicted from each o f the rulebased strategies. Participants are said to have used the rule that predicts a pattern of
success that is most highly correlated with the success o f his or her judgments (Ward &
Jenkins, 1965). This technique is problematic because the patterns o f success o f the four
rules are highly correlated with one another and researchers often do not report the
correlations between the other rules (Shaklee, 1983).

Associative Model
Three factors likely contributed to the use o f the Associative Model to account for
contingency judgments. First, researchers became increasingly reluctant to state that
participants cognitively compute contingency judgments (e.g., Wasserman et al., 1993).
Second, the Associative Model could easily account for cue competition effects which
could not be explained by the existing models at that time (De Houwer & Beckers, 2002).
Third, there are similarities between the results obtained in Pavlovian conditioning
experiments and those in the contingency judgment literature (Alloy & Abramson, 1979;
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Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984; Shanks, 1985; Shanks & Dickinson, 1987). The similarities
become apparent if the input is considered equivalent to the conditioned stimulus (CS),
the output as equivalent to the unconditioned stimulus (US), and the strength o f the
contingency judgment as equivalent to the strength o f the conditioned response (De
Houwer & Beckers, 2002; Shanks, 1985). Therefore, the Rescorla-Wagner model
(Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), which explains Pavlovian conditioning, can also serve as a
model o f contingency judgment:
AVn = aP(X -SY n.,)

(2)

The model holds that AVn is the change in the predictive strength that occurs on the
current trial, a and P are leaming-rate parameters that depend on the saliency o f the input
and output, respectively, X is the maximum amount o f predictive strength supported by
the output, and £V n_i is the algebraic sum o f the predictive strengths o f all stimuli that are
present on each trial.
The model predicts a negatively accelerating learning curve for the increase in
predictive strength (AVn) o f the input variable. Predictive strength will eventually reach
an asymptote (X), at which point judgments will be the most accurate and future changes
in AVn will be miniscule. The model suggests that stimuli (EV„-i), which includes the
context, actively compete for the limited amount o f predictive strength (X) on each trial
(see the portion o f Equation 2 in parentheses). Therefore, the predictive strength o f the
input variable only increases on trials when it is present. The competing stimuli obtain
predictive strength when the input variable is absent. Because cue competition is a core
feature o f the Associative Model it can easily account for a number o f retrospective
revaluation effects. Retrospective revaluation effects refer to a variety o f phenomena that
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alter the predictive strength o f the input variable on trials in which it is absent.
Retrospective revaluation effects will not be discussed here in detail because experiments
typically include more than two variables and recent reviews are available elsewhere
(Allan, 1993; De Houwer & Beckers, 2002; Shanks, 1993).

Belief Revision Model
The B elief Revision Model consists o f two distinct mechanisms that collectively
function as an anchor-and-adjust judgments o f contingency (Catena, Maldonado,
Candido, 1998; Catena, Maldonado, Megias, & Frese, 2002). The two mechanisms of the
Belief Revision Model, the information-computing and information-integrating
mechanisms, operate in a serial fashion.
The information-computing mechanism, which calculates the value o f causal
information, is activated first. Judgments o f the causal information can be accounted for
using the following equation:
NewEvidence = (wi * a + W2 * 6 + W3 * c + W4 * d) / (a + b + c + d)

(3)

where a, b, c, and d again correspond to the frequencies o f causal information and w*
corresponds to the subjective weights given to each form o f causal information. Although
the subjective weights are free parameters in the model, they are restricted to a range that
is consistent with previous research (i.e., | a \ > \ b \ > \ c \ > \ d | ; see Kao & Wasserman,
1993; Wasserman, Domer, & Kao, 1990).
The information-integrating mechanism combines the unique contribution o f the
causal information with causal knowledge. Causal knowledge is assumed to be a function
of the recently judged causal information as well as cognitive, motivational, and
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emotional factors. The information-integration mechanism incorporates NewEvidence
using the following equation:
Ji = Ji-1 + (3 (NewEvidence-Jj-1)
where

Jj

(4)

corresponds to the resulting contingency judgment on the current trial, J,- 1

corresponds to relevant causal information and causal knowledge, and |3 corresponds to a
learning rate parameter. The Belief Revision Model can account for order effects, which
neither the Rule Based or Associative Models can account for, because o f its anchoring
information-integrating mechanism (e.g., Catena, Maldonado, & Candido, 1998; Catena,
Maldonado, Megias, & Frese, 2002). However, the Belief Revision Model is limited in
that it, like the Rule Based Model, cannot account for retrospective revaluation effects.
The Belief Revision Model is consistent with the intent o f an integrative theory of
contingency judgm ent proposed by Alloy and Tabachnik (1984). Their theory attempted
to explain the interaction between prior expectations and causal information. The Belief
Revision Model is superior to Alloy and Tabachnik’s theory because it consists of a
testable model instead o f a theory driven review o f the literature, which later received
harsh criticism (Goddard & Allan, 1988).

The Models and Memory
The importance o f memory for the models ranges from crucial to irrelevant
(Baker, Murphy, & Vallee-Tourangeau, 1996). The following discussion highlights each
theory’s assumptions pertaining to memory.
The Rule Based Model assumes that contingency judgments rely heavily on the
memory of causal information. Contingency judgments are a function of the rule used,
the raid's inputs (i.e., causal information), and one’s competency when computing the rale’s
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output (i.e., a judgment). To arrive at a veridical judgment o f contingency the judge must
have perfect episodic memory of causal information (Baker, Murphy, & ValleeTourangeau, 1996). Therefore, failure to produce a judgment predicted by a rule-based
strategy might reflect errors in estimating the frequencies o f causal information.
The Associative Model assumes that episodic memory is o f no importance to
contingency judgments (Baker, Murphy, & Vallee-Tourangeau, 1996). Judgments are
influenced by the empirical properties o f the input and output (e.g., their temporal
contiguity and proximity). Observing the empirical properties serve to strengthen their
association and the resulting judgment is an indication of the strength o f the association.
Memory and an understanding o f covariation are noticeably absent from the Associative
Model because it was originally a model of animal conditioning (Alloy & Tabachnik,
1984). Researchers studying animal conditioning often challenged the existence of
cognitive representations and would be extremely hesitant to assume that animals have
them.
The Belief Revision Model assumes that memory serves two roles. First, the
information-computing mechanism relies on memory o f causal information in a manner
similar to that described for the Rule Based Model. Second, the information-integrating
mechanism relies on memory of causal knowledge (Maldonado et al., 1998). Judgments
are the result o f integrating causal knowledge and causal information. Memory o f causal
knowledge serves as the model’s“anchof and has the greatest impact on resulting
judgments. Causal information also influences the resulting judgment but to a lesser
extent; that is, assuming that the learning rate parameter is assigned a value greater than
0.0 but less than or equal to 1.0. The restriction on the learning parametefs range is
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necessary for any learning to occur (i.e - , P > 0 .0) and for the impact o f the current causal
information to “adjust’, not dominate, the resulting judgment (i. e., P < 1.0).

Memory and Contingency Judgment
Few researchers have addressed the relationship between memory and
contingency judgments. Two bodies of research are reviewed which suggests that
memory impacts contingency judgments: subjective cell importance and serial order
effects. In addition, several reviews of the literature are highlighted that have discussed
the role o f memory forjudging contingency (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Baker,
Murphy, & Vallee-Tourangeau, 1996; Crocker, 1981; Wasserman, Elek, Chatlosh, &
Baker, 1993). Last, experiments that have investigated the role o f memory forjudging
contingency are reviewed (e.g., Shaklee & Mims, 1982; Yates & Curley, 1986).

Existing Bodies of Research
Two bodies o f research suggests that memory plays a role in judging contingency.
Research pertaining to subjective cell importance is discussed first and is followed by a
discussion o f order effects in contingency judgment. The former body o f research is
relevant to the encoding and recalling o f causal information, while the later is relevant to
the role o f memory o f past judgments.
Subjective Cell Importance. Research investigating subjective cell importance has
many implications for the role o f memory forjudging contingency. Subjective cell
importance can be defined as beliefs about the causal information necessary forjudging
contingency (Wasserman, Domer, & Kao, 1990). Delta p is calculated on the frequencies
of all four forms of causal information. However, participants do not similarly believe
that all forms o f causal information are equally important forjudging contingency
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(Crocker, 1982; Maldonado, Catena, Candid, & Garcia, 1999; Mandel & Lehman, 1998;
Wasserman, Domer, & Kao, 1990; Wasserman & Kao, 1993; White, 2003).
Crocker (1982) was the first to demonstrate that participants differentially weight
the importance of causal information. Participants indicated which forms of information
were both necessary and sufficient to judge contingency (e.g., the relation between
practicing and the outcome of a tennis match). Participants had a strong tendency to rate
the importance o f causal information in the following order: a > b > c> d. However, the
rank order switched when instructions explicitly requested what information was relevant
forjudging the likelihood o f practicing and losing a match (i.e., b > a > c> d). Crocker
discussed the importance o f using unambiguous dependent measures. Wasserman,
Domer, and Kao (1990; Experiments 1 and 3) later replicated her finding and showed
that the differential ratings holds when the order that participants rate the causal
information is counterbalanced.
Wasserman, Domer, and Kao (1990; Experiment 2) also sought to determine how
causal information is used when judging contingency. A set o f 25 contingency tables was
constructed with combinations o f three cell frequencies (i.e., 5, 10, or 20). The tables
were constmcted so that a set of three tables existed that only differed in the frequency of
one cell. For example, a table defined by 10a, 106, 10c, 10d could be compared to one
defined by 15a, 106, 10c, 10c? and 20a, 106, 10c, 10c?. Therefore, any differences in
judgment could be attributed to the use o f cell a. The differential use o f causal
information was consistent with the differential ratings o f cell importance (e.g., Crocker,
1982). Wasserman et al. (1990) concluded that participants must transform the values of
causal information either prior to or while judging contingency.
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Kao and W asserman (1993) assessed the subjective weighting o f cell information
through two parameter fitting techniques. First, the weighting parameters for each cell
could be allowed to vary while fitting them to participant^ judgments. Therefore, one
could assess which rule accounted for the most variance in participants’judgments.
Second, restricting the range of parameters in accordance to the predictions o f the four
rules might help determine the rule used by participants. For example, the a-versus-b rule
disregards cells c and d so their respective parameter weights can be assigned a value of
0.0. Participants would be said to have used the a-versus-b rule if their parameters for
cells a and b each approximated .50. The two parameter fitting techniques were not
successful predicting rule use. However, the resulting parameters did suggest a pattern of
differential cell use consistent with the rank order o f each cell’s importance (e.g., Crocker,
1981; Wasserman, Domer, & Kao, 1990).
Maldonado, Catena, Candid, and Garcia (1999, Experiments 4A & 4B)
demonstrated that the subjective weights assigned to the event states are not fixed. Their
rating scale differed from those used in previous experiments in that it was bidirectional
(cf. Crocker, 1982; Wasserman, Dorner, & Kao, 1990), which permitted an indication of
the magnitude and direction of each cells contribution to a judgment. The rank order of
the absolute values replicated previous research (i.e., | a \ > \ c | > | b \ > | d | ; see
Crocker, 1982; Wasserman, Domer, & Kao, 1990); however, the ratings for cells b and c
were negative in sign. Their experiment also indicated that preexposure to a
noncontingent relation significantly reduced ratings o f cell importance for cell a. Their
finding is important because researchers did not previously entertain the concept of
malleable cell weights.
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The idea that subjective cell importance may influence memory o f causal
information has not been discussed in the literature. Researchers have primarily
entertained the idea that participants do not equally weight the causal information when
forming their judgments (Maldonado et al., 1999; Wasserman, Domer, Kao, 1990).
Crocker (1982) mentioned that participants might opt not to integrate recalled causal
information due to beliefs about cell importance, but she did not entertain the notion that
one’s beliefs might influence memory. I argue that subjective cell importance might
influence the encoding and/or recalling o f causal information. Alloy, Crocker, and
Tabachnik (1980; as cited by Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984) reported similar evidence when
they demonstrated that prior expectations and biased information seeking can account for
errors when recalling causal information. However, the question remains whether beliefs
about the importance o f cell information influences memory o f it when no strong prior
expectations exist.
Order Effects. Research investigating order effects is also relevant for the role of
memory forjudging contingency. Order effects can be defined as any reliable difference
in contingency judgments that result solely from the order o f presenting causal
information. Order effects are important because the order o f event states has no impact
on the value o f the resulting contingency. When using the TBT procedure, event states
that can be arranged in multiple orders. Dennis and Ahn (2002) criticized experiments
because they consisted o f evenly distributed causal information, which fails to simulate
real-life exposure. One interpretation o f order effects is that individuals are more likely to
forget causal information portrayed either at the beginning, middle, or end of a problem
set. A second interpretation is that participants use memory o f past judgments
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(Maldonado, Catena, Candid, & Garcia, 1999) and causal information (e.g., Dennis &
Ahn, 2002) as the reference point for forming contingency judgments.
Experiments investigating order effects in contingency judgm ent can be grouped
into two categories. First, several experiments have demonstrated a primacy or recency
effect (Dennis & Ahn, 2002; Wasserman, Kao, Van Hamme, Katagiri, & Young, 1996;
Yates & Curley, 1986). A primacy effect is defined as the initial causal information
having a greater impact on contingency judgments, while a recency effect is defined as
the causal information experienced towards the end o f a sequence having the greatest
impact. Second, experiments have demonstrated that judgments are sensitive to the last
event state encountered (Catena, Maldonado, & Candido, 1998; Catena, Maldonado,
Megias, & Frese, 2002) and the type o f contingency previously judged (i.e., a positive,
negative, or noncontingent relation; Maldonado, Catena, Candid, & Garcia, 1999).
Therefore, the current discussion will separately review experiments pertaining to
memory effects (i.e., primacy and recency effects) and judgment sensitivity (cf. the
interpretation of order effects proposed by Lopez, Shanks, Almaraz, & Fernandez, 1998).
Memory Effects. Yates and Curley (1986) found evidence o f a primacy effect in
contingency judgments. Participants judged a contingency composed o f two blocks that
differed only in their sign (i.e., Block 1 = .428; Block 2 = -.428). The two blocks were
presented as one continuous sequence o f 28 events using the TBT procedure. H alf o f the
participants were told that they would later recall the cell frequencies to maintain a high
level o f attention throughout the problem set. Estimates o f the two conditional
probabilities required for the delta rule were used to determine contingency judgments,
which showed evidence o f a primacy effect in the forewarned and naive conditions.

21

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

However, the primacy effect only reached statistical significance in the naive group. The
authors concluded that forewarning participants of the recall task increased the likelihood
that they attended to the entire problem set (see also Anderson & Hubert, 1963) and, as a
result, reduced the magnitude o f the primacy effect.
Dennis and Ahn (2001) investigated judgments o f a noncontingent relation when
the causal information was disproportionally distributed throughout the problem set.
Participants judged a noncontingent relation that unevenly distributed an equal number of
confirming and disconfirming cases. That is, 90% o f the confirming cases were presented
in either the first or second half o f the problem set. Judgments were positive for
participants that experienced the bulk o f the confirming cases first and negative for those
that experienced them in the second half. The authors claimed that a belief-updating
model o f contingency judgment could account for their data. They mentioned that the
model should assume that participants disproportionally weight initial information, that
initial information is used to form specific beliefs about the contingency, and that these
beliefs are less influenced by causal information encountered after the specific beliefs are
well formed. However, the Belief Revision Model was not mentioned as a suitable
candidate or even cited in the experiment.
Judgment Sensitivity. Catena and colleagues (Catena, Maldonado, & Candido,
1998; Catena, Maldonado, Megias, & Frese, 2002) demonstrated that the frequency-ofjudgment effect occurs when using a repetitive-judgment procedure1. The repetitivejudgment procedure requires that participants judge a problem set multiple times as more
of the causal information is continually encountered. The frequency-of-judgment effect
1 Catena and colleagues refer to the repetitive-judgment procedure as the trial-by-trial procedure. The name
o f the procedure was modified due to the term trial-by-trial referring to the method o f presenting events, as
is the norm in the literature.
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refers to the tendency for participants’ judgments to be sensitive to a confirming case if
viewed prior to forming a judgment. The frequency-of-judgment effect has proven to be
reliable, greatest after encountering a cell a event state, and has been demonstrated using
summary tables (Catena et al., 2002, Experiment 2).
Catena and colleagues (i.e., Maldonado et al., 1999) also demonstrated that
judging noncontingent relations affects later judgments o f contingency. Judgments of
positive and negative contingencies were lower when participants previously judged a
noncontingent relation. The decrease in judgments for the negative contingency resulted
in participants’ judgments more closely approximating the actual contingency (thus
replicating Maldonado, Martos, & Ramirez, 1991). However, a similar decrease in
judgments for the positive contingency resulted in less accurate judgments. The
researchers intended to replicate a similar phenomenon found in the animal literature
referred to as learned irrelevance (e.g., Baker & MacKintosh, 1977; 1979), which is a
retardation in the learning o f relations upon preexposure to a noncontingent relation.
However, the current experiment suggested that preexposure to a noncontingent relation
facilitated the learning of a negative contingency. As a result, the authors argued that the
Associative Model is flawed in its account o f contingency judgment.
In conclusion, the research investigating order effects favors the second proposed
interpretation. That is, that memory serves as the basis from which additional judgments
are integrated. However, support for the second interpretation does not rule out the first.
That is, it is still possible that the likelihood o f forgetting causal information is also
influenced by its position. The failure to support the first interpretation may be due be
cause it is close to impossible to know exactly which event states are forgotten because

23

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

repeat occurrences o f causal information are indistinguishable. Therefore, it is not
possible to test the first interpretation using the typical procedures used in contingency
judgment experiments. Therefore, researchers might wish to assess memory of past
judgments. Past judgments are thought to be integrated with causal knowledge and
beliefs (Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984; Shanks, 1991; Maldonado et al., 1999), which might
make it difficult to obtain a pure assessment o f past judgments.

Reviews of the Role of Memory
Several reviews have addressed the role of memory forjudging contingency (e.g.,
Baker et al., 1996; Crocker, 1982). The most comprehensive review is Crocker’s (1982)
six-step model of contingency judgment. Individuals are susceptible to biases that might
contribute to inaccurate judgments at each step o f Crocker’s model: (Step 1) deciding
what data are relevant, (Step 2) sampling cases, (Step 3) classifying instances, (Step 4)
recalling the frequencies o f causal information, (Step 5) integrating the evidence, and
(Step 6) using the covariation estimate for future judgments. The following discussion
will only review the steps that are most relevant to the role o f memory forjudging
contingency.
First, Crocker (1982) argued that a judge must determine the appropriate forms of
causal information (Step 1). She argued that participants actively seek out information
that confirms the question asked, which might improve the likelihood that participants
accurate recall the frequency o f cell a. Seeking out cell a might improve memory o f it
due to the pursuit itself, intrinsic rewards, increased attention, or the increased likelihood
of successful encoding. In summary, the process o f determining the relevant information
may affect the later recall o f causal information.
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Second, individuals must also correctly categorize causal information (Step 3).
Correctly categorizing causal information might be particularly difficult for
disconfirming cases, which are not as visually distinct as the confirming cases.
Confirming cases, unlike the disconfirming cases, are easily distinguishable because the
'y

cues are either simultaneously present (cell a) or absent (cell d) . As a result,
disconfirming cases may be more likely to be erroneously encoded into memory. If
disconfirming cases are erroneously categorized (i.e., 7a, 5b, 1 lc, 9d might be perceived
instead as 7a, 7b, 9c, 9d), it would alter the perceived contingency (i.e., 0.03 versus 0.00,
respectively) and potentially influence the resulting judgment. Therefore, judgment
errors might also be caused failures to correctly categorize causal information.
Third, individuals must recall all of the causal information when judging
contingency (Step 4). Shaklee and Mims (1982) found evidence that the magnitude of
errors when recalling cell frequencies increased as subjective cell importance decreased.
(The magnitude o f errors was as follows: d > c > b > a.) In addition, Crocker argued that
causal information consistent with prior expectations might have an advantage of being
successfully recalled (Crocker & Taylor, 1978; as cited by Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984).
Therefore, judgment errors might be due to only a subset o f the causal information being
available when judging contingency.

2 Cell d is represented by the absence o f two variables when the output is asymmetrical.
3 If the above described categorization error occurred, notice that it would differentially affect individuals
that use different rule-based strategies to judge contingency. For example, conditional probabilities rule
users should perceive a slightly more positive relation, sum o f diagonals rule users should similarly
perceive a noncontingent relation, a-versus-b rule users should instead perceive a negative relation, and it is
unclear what type o f judgment a cell-a rule user would perceive. The judgment o f cell-a rule user can not
be predicted because the remaining cells are both higher and lower in frequency. It could be argued that if a
cell-a rule user were required to provide a judgment it would be done with very little confidence (See Alloy
& Tabachnik, 1984, p .115, fora similar explanation for judgments when both situational and prior
expectations are low).
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Fourth, individuals will likely use the judgment for future use (Step 6). Memory
of past judgments may deteriorate, change in direction, become exaggerated, or
attenuated as time passes. The accuracy o f past judgments is particularly relevant to the
Belief Revision Model, which holds that it serves to anchor judgments o f contingency
(Maldonado et al., 1998). If past judgments are subject to forgetting or are altered as time
passes, the resulting judgments would also be affected.

Assessments of Memory
Experimenters assessing the role o f memory forjudging contingency have done
so either directly or indirectly. Direct assessments require participants to recall the
frequencies o f causal information, while indirect assessments require mental
computations based on causal information. It is impossible to know whether errors in the
indirect assessments are the result o f faulty computations or discrepancies between the
actual and used cell frequencies—that is, unless cell estimates are also recorded.
Direct Assessments. Shaklee and Mims (1982) conducted two experiments that
required participants to recall cell frequencies. Their experiment was the first that
reported detailed information about the recalled frequencies o f causal information (cf.,
Smedslund, 1963; Yates & Curley, 1986). Previous experiments either did not distinguish
between event states (Yates & Curley, 1986), only summarized the tendency to over- or
underestimate cell frequencies (Smedslund, 1963), or did not require estimates of the
entire contingency table (Arkes & Rothbart, 1985).
Shaklee and Mims (1982) required participants to recall the cell frequencies o f 12
problem sets. In Experiment 1, one group recalled the cell frequencies and judged
contingency. Estimates o f the cell frequencies were not perfect. Judgments were recorded
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on a nominal scale which prevented an assessment o f whether discrepancies between the
actual and recalled contingency could account for errors in contingency judgments.
Indirect Assessments. Jenkins and Ward (1965, Experiment 2) indirectly
addressed the role o f memory forjudging contingency. Participants estimated the
conditional probabilities required to for the delta rule, which were used to calculate a
subjective Ap (i.e., Aps)- The estimated conditional probabilities were not reported and
the resulting Aps values were not consistent with participants’ judgments or with the
contingencies.
W asserman et al. (1993) also required that participants estimate the conditional
probabilities, from which they calculated Aps- Wasserman et al. (1993) required that
participants estimate the likelihood that their responses on a key produced or did not
produce an outcome (i.e., light flash). The actual conditional probabilities derived from
participants’ responses were not consistent with their estimates. Judgments were reported
to be more influenced by [A /(A + B)\ then by [C !{C + £))]. They argued that a weighting
coefficient for [C /(C + D)] could improve the fit but would be ad hoc and not warranted.
I argue that the subjective cell importance literature validates such a modification. Their
data were used as evidence against the Rule-Based Model and a lengthy discussion stated
a desire to abandon its account o f contingency judgment.

Summary
The current investigation aims to start a systematic investigation of the role of
memory forjudging contingency. Many explanations for erroneous judgments have been
proposed in the literature. However, the possibility that memory contributes to inaccurate
contingency judgments has received little attention. The argument for the role of memory
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forjudging contingency consisted o f a review o f early research in the literature. Two
existing bodies of research, subjective cell weighting and order effects, were also
discussed. In addition, three models o f contingency judgment and two variations o f the
typical procedure were discussed due to their relevance to memory demands when
judging contingency. Last, the existing research pertaining to o f the role of memory for
judging contingency was discussed.
The following experimental investigation will consist o f two phases. The first
phase, Chapters I and II, aims to replicate and extend the results obtained by Shaklee and
Mims (1982). The second phase, Chapters III and IV, aims to introduce a task distinction,
popularized by Hastie and colleagues (Hastie & Park, 1986; Hastie & Pennington, 1989),
to the contingency judgment literature. Its contents are dedicated to increasing our
understanding o f the role of memory forjudging contingency.
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CHAPTER I

EXPERIMENT 1: THE EFFECT OF SLIDE DURATION

Memory o f the events that define a relation seems intuitively necessary to form a
veridical judgment o f contingency. Contingency (Ap) is the extent that two variables are
related, which is mathematically expressed by:
Ap=[AI (A + B ) ] - [ C I{ C +D)}

(1)

where A, B, C, and D are the frequencies o f the event states. Event states, collectively
referred to as causal information, are the four types o f instances that can define the extent
that two variables are related (See the cells labeled a, b, c, and d in Figure B l). Memory
o f causal information is especially important when judgments are formed in their
absence, which is often the case. A discrepancy between contingency and a contingency
judgment may be due, in part, to an inaccurate mental representation. That is, the judge
may believe that the contingency is defined by a different set o f events than it actually is.
Consider an individual shown a problem set defined by: l a, 5b, 1c, 5d. If he or she
believes that a different set o f event states was presented, their judgm ent would be
expected to differ from that based on the actual set. The greater the discrepancy between
the actual and perceived causal information, the greater the expected discrepancy
between contingency and the judgment o f contingency.
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Many factors may result in a discrepancy between actual and perceived causal
information. First, beliefs about the importance o f causal information might bias
encoding. Second, beliefs about the importance o f causal information might bias its recall
(Crocker, 1982). Third, participants might have difficulty distinguishing the four event
states (Crocker, 1981). Last, the amount of causal information might exceed an
individual’s memory span. Each o f the previously stated possibilities strongly suggests
that the mental representation o f causal information is not perfect.
The current investigation is not concerned with whether memory errors occur, but
how they occur. A systematic pattern of errors might suggests one o f two things: (1) that
some forms o f causal information are more salient than others and have a greater chance
of being correctly recalled or (2) that beliefs about the importance o f causal information
influences their likelihood o f being correctly recalled. It would also be particularly
relevant if an inaccurate mental representation o f causal information can account for
judgment errors. If memory errors can account for judgment errors, judgments should be
more consistent with the perceived contingency than with the actual contingency. The
perceived contingency (Ap ’), or inferred contingency, is the extent that the causal
information stored in memory is related. The value o f Ap ’ is calculated using the same
equation as Ap (see Equation 1); however, a participant’s estimates o f the frequencies of
causal information are used instead o f their actual frequencies.
Shaklee and M ims’ (1982) procedure serves as a good starting point to begin the
current investigation. In their experiment, participants recalled the frequencies of causal
information that defined problem sets using a trial-by-trial (TBT) procedure. A TBT
procedure presents causal information sequentially and one event state at a time. Both o f
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their experiments demonstrated that the magnitude o f errors increased across cells a, b, c,
and d. However, the trend was not supported by significant differences in Experiment 2.
It is not possible to determine whether Shaklee and M ims’ (1982) data are
consistent with past research. The majority o f past research has failed to report detailed
analyses. For example, Smedslund (1963) and Crocker and Taylor (1978; as cited by
Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984) reported only on the tendency to over- and underestimate cell
frequencies. One experiment reported no consistent trend (Smedslund, 1963), while the
other reported that judges overestimated information that was consistent with their
expectations and underestimated information that was inconsistent with their expectations
(Crocker & Taylor, 1978; as cited by Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984). Yates and Curley
(1986) reported a statistical index (i.e., the sum o f the deviations) that did not distinguish
between event states. Alloy et al. (1980; as cited by Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984) never
published their experiment indicating that biases in recall and information search can
account for judgment errors, which prevents a detailed analysis it results. It is also likely
that the sources o f the errors in the Alloy’s et al. (1980; as cited by Alloy & Tabachnik,
1984) and Shaklee and M ims’ (1982) experiment are different. Alloy et al. (1980)
assessed beliefs about the contingency itself, whereas the results reported by Shaklee and
Mims’ (1982) are consistent with beliefs about what information is important forjudging
contingency.
The limited research from which to compare Shaklee and Mims' (1982) results is
problematic. A pilot study in my laboratory failed to replicate their results. However, the
pilot study differed from their experiment in a number o f ways. First, the pilot study used
abstract cues to depict the input and output (i.e., Variables X and Y). Shaklee and Mims
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used contextual cues that depicted plausible relations, which may have activated specific
beliefs (e.g., Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984; Shanks, 1991). Second, Shaklee and Mims
(1982) required that participants view 12 problem sets. The pilot study only required that
participants view one problem set. The pattern o f errors may have emerged only after
averaging data or judging several problem sets. Third, Shaklee and Mims (1982) used 24
event states to define problem sets. The pilot study only used 18 events states. A
difference o f 6 event states is small; however, its inclusion may have increased task
difficulty and the need for a strategy to encode and/or recall causal information. Last, the
pilot study did not require that participants judge the problem sets. Participants were only
required to recall the cell frequencies. If the pattern o f errors is due to beliefs about
judging contingency, then the absent judgment task might explain why no pattern
emerged in the pilot study. That is, participants may have viewed the pilot study as a
memory task and equated the importance o f causal information.
The proposed experiment more closely replicated the procedure used by Shaklee
and M ims’ (1982). Both abstract and contextual cues depict event states and the problem
sets are identical to those used by Shaklee and Mims. Finally, cell estimates and
judgments are required for each problem set. However, the current experiment also
included a manipulation to impact the likelihood that strategies are used to aid memory.
That is, the duration that each event state is shown varies across conditions. Event state
duration was manipulated because statements from participants in the pilot study
suggested that they adopted strategies to aid recall.
Several hypotheses are proposed in the current experiment. First, it is expected
that the pattern o f errors replicates that reported by Shaklee and M ims’ (1982). That is,
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the magnitude o f errors is expected to increase across cells a, b, c, and d. Second, it is
expected that the magnitudes o f errors are exaggerated in the condition with the shorter
event state duration (i.e., 3 s). Third, participants exposed to the shorter event state
duration are expected to perceive the longer event state duration as an easier task and vice
versa. Last, it is expected that judgments are more highly correlated with tsp ’ than with
Ap .

Method
Participants
One hundred twenty students (27 males and 93 females, mean age = 18.71)
enrolled in lower-level psychology courses at the University o f New Hampshire
participated in the current experiment. All participants received course credit for their
participation. O f the participants, 70% were freshman and 10 % were upper classmen
(i.e., 7.5% were juniors and 2.5% were seniors).

Design
A mixed design was used that consisted o f a within-subjects factor (Cell) and
three between-subjects factors (Block Order, Type o f Cue, & Slide Duration).
Cell (4 levels), the within-subjects factor, refers to participants’ estimates o f the
four forms o f causal information. Estimates o f causal information were subtracted from
their actual frequencies to determine the absolute and signed cell deviations for each cell.
Mean cell deviations, both absolute and signed, were calculated for each cell across the
12 problem sets. The Comparison Set was not included in the calculation o f the means.
The 12 problem sets were borrowed from Shaklee and M ims’ (1982; Experiment 1);
however, an oversight by the author resulted in one problem set failing to match that used
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by Shaklee and Mims (i.e., 8a, 5b, 9c, 2d was used instead o f the intended 9a, 5b, 1c, 3d).
Table A l displays the actual frequencies of causal information and the Ap values for each
problem set.
Twelve o f the problem sets were arranged in three blocks o f four. The order of the
problem sets within blocks is listed in Table A l. Block Order (3 levels) refers to the order
in which participants viewed the blocks: 1-2-3, 2-3-1, or 3-2-1. The Comparison Set was
presented to all participants last, regardless of block order.
Type o f Cue (2 levels) refers to whether the slides depicted abstract or contextual
cues. In the abstract condition, cues defined the relation between Variables X and Y. In
the context condition, cues defined the relation between plant watering and plant growth.
The input and output in both conditions were asymmetric, meaning they corresponded to
the presence or absence o f a single event (Allan, 1993), and were displayed within a
white box in the center of the slide. The input, if present, was depicted on the upper half
of the rectangular box, while the output, if present, was depicted on its lower half. Cues
in the abstract condition were typed in Times New Roman font, while cues in the context
condition were hand drawings. Each slide contained peripheral cues that were unrelated
to the contingency (The abstract condition contained a broken line that separated the top
and bottom halves o f the slide; the context condition contained the boot of the farmer that
either watered or did not water the plant). Microsoft PowerPoint software displayed the
slides via a PC compatible LCD projector.
Slide Duration (2 levels) refers to the event state duration. That is, the rate that
slides advanced from one event state to the next. Event states either advanced at a rate of
one slide every 3 s or one every 5 s. The 12 problem sets borrowed from Shaklee and

34

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Mims (1982) used the same event state duration. However, the Comparison Set used the
event state duration of the alternative condition.
Table A2 displays the number of participants in each experimental condition.
Sessions were conducted in groups that ranged from 2 to 10 participants. Assignments to
experimental conditions were random with the only restraint being that it did not result in
a condition exceeding a total o f 11 participants.

Measure and Items
Each measure contained a short description o f the cues that defined the relation.
The short description in the abstract condition read as follows:
Some events occur as a result of another’s presence. For example, observing
Variable Y might be more likely when Variable X is also present. However,
some events occur as a result of another’s absence. For example, Variable Y
might be more likely to occur when Variable X is absent. Still other events might
be equally likely to occur whether or not another Variable is present. Use these
slides to decide whether Variable Y is an event that is more likely to occur when
Variable X is present, absent, or if it doesn’t matter whether it is present or
absent.
The short description in the context condition read as follows:
Some plants need water to stay healthy. For example, their growth would depend
on whether they received water each week. However, some plants need no water
at all and will not grow if they are given water. These plants would be healthiest
when given no water each week. Still other plants will grow regardless of
whether they are watered or not. Use these slides to decide whether this plant is
one that stays healthiest when watered, not watered, or if it doesn’t matter
whether they are watered each week.
Each measure required that participants estimate the frequencies o f causal
information, judge the relative likelihood of the output variable, judge the strength o f the
relation, and indicate their certainty in their previously completed judgments and cell
estimates. There was also an item included only on the Comparison Set measure.
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First, participants estimated the frequencies o f causal information and entered
their estimates into a blank contingency table. Below each table the following sentence
could be read: There are a total o f 24 events in this problem set.
Second, participants judged the relative likelihood o f the output given the
presence o f the input. Judgments of relative likelihood were recorded on a scale ranging
from +3 (much more likely) to -3 (much less likely). The following is an example o f the
relative likelihood item:
For this relation, the slides indicate that the presence of the input resulted in the output
being
+3
much
more
likely

+2
somewhat
more
likely

+1
a bit
more
likely

0
just
as
likely

-1
a bit
less
likely

-2
somewhat
less
likely

-3
much
less
likely

than when the input is absent. Circle the scale number that best completes the sentence.
The terms “relation”, “input”, and “output” were appropriately changed to match the cues
used in the problem set.
Third, participants judged the strength o f contingency. Judgments of strength
were recorded on a unidirectional scale that ranged from 0 to ±100. Labels were located
at the scale’s 30, 70, midpoint (50), and two endpoints (0 and ±100).
Fourth, participants reported their perceived certainty in the accuracy o f their cell
estimates and judgment o f strength. Certainty ratings were recorded on a Likert Scale
ranging from 1 (just guessing) to 10 (absolutely certain).
Last, participants indicated the relative difficulty when recalling the cell
frequencies in the Comparison Set. That is, whether recalling cell frequencies was easier,
harder, or just as easy/hard as the other problem sets. The scale ranged from +2 (much
easier than) to -2 (much harder than) and read as follows:
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After viewing the slides in this comparison set, recalling the number of instances were
+2
m uch
easier
than

+1
som ew hat
easier
than

0
just as
easy / hard
as

-1
som ew hat
harder
than

-2
much
harder
than

the previous sets completed in this experiment.

Procedure
Participants received a packet that included an informed consent form,
abbreviated experimental instructions, debriefing form, and 13 multiple-item measures
when they arrived. The experimenter began the session by reading the extended version
of the experimental instructions, which read as follows:
Our world is filled with things that go together, things that are influenced by one
another, or things that relate to one another. We encounter these things in our
everyday life. For instance, things may occur more frequently with one another.
One example would be that taller people also tend to be heavier people. Things
may also occur less frequently with one another. For instance, it is less likely to
rain when it is currently sunny outside. Things may occur just as frequently in the
presence or absence of something else. For instance, a car is just as likely to run
out of gas whether it is painted red—or green—or whether you are driving alone
or with a passenger. The paint job and passenger have no effect on running out of
gas. In this experiment you will be given information about hypothetical events
that may or may not go together—be influenced by one another—or relate to one
another.
For example, you may be asked the likelihood of it snowing and seeing a bird
outside your window. Each time you look out your window, you may find that it
is snowing and a bird is perched outside your window —which will look like this
{Show slide of cell a}. Notice that this information corresponds to Cell A, in the
table in front of you, both the snow —first row—and the bird—first column—are
present. You might find that it is snowing, but there is no bird perched outside
your window—which will look like this {Show slide of cell b). Notice that this
information corresponds to Cell B, the snow is present—it is still in the first row—, while the bird is absent—second column. You might also find that it is not
snowing and that a bird is perched outside your window—which will look like
this {Show slide of cell c}. Notice that this information corresponds to Cell C,
the snow is absent—in the second row—, while the bird is present—first column.
And lastly, you might find that it is not snowing and that there is no bird perched
outside your window—which will look like this {Show slide of cell d}. Notice
that this information corresponds to Cell D, both the snow—in the second row—
and bird—second column—are absent.
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After viewing 24 such instances, which may or may not be about snow and birds,
you will be asked to recall the number of each type of instance. In the provided
table similar to the one labeled with A, B, C and D, you will be asked to enter the
number of times each of four event types occurred. In other words, you will be
shown 24 events of any combination of the four possibilities just discussed. You
will then be asked to recall from memory the number of times each of the four
event types were observed—in other words—how many times you remember
seeing each of the four events—and enter them into the blank table provided.
We ask that you put any writing utensils down while viewing the events. I think
we all know that memory is not perfect, we wish to learn how memory works—
so pay close attention and be sure to refer only to your memory—not that of your
neighbors.
You will also be asked to {refer to the scale item} judge the relation between the
two events. A value of positive three indicates that the events always occurred
together—meaning that every time you looked out the window it was snowing
and a bird was perched outside your window {Show slide of cell a}—or it wasn’t
snowing and no bird was perched outside your window {Show slide of cell b}—
in other words, they were either always simultaneously present or absent—this
would be a strict positive relationship. Snowing and seeing a bird were perfectly
related.
A value of negative three indicates that the events never occurred together—
meaning that every time you looked out the window it was snowing and no bird
was perched outside your window {Show slide of cell c}—or it wasn’t snowing
and a bird was perched outside your window {Show slide of cell d) —in other
words, they never simultaneously both occurred—this would be a strict negative
relationship. Snowing and never seeing a bird were perfectly related.
A value of zero indicates that you were equally likely to see a bird outside your
window whether it was or wasn’t snowing—no relationship. Snowing had no
effect on seeing a bird
As you might have guessed, we will not show you a strict relationships—that
would be too easy—the relationships will be somewhere in the middle of the two
extremes.
You will also be asked {refer to the scale item} to mark a numeric value on a
scale ranging from 0 to 100 to describe the strength of the relation between the
two events. Our primary interest with this item is your perceived strength of the
relationship. Strict relationships come in two forms, both of which would receive
a rating of 100. It may be that the events always occurred together. It may be that
the events never occurred together. Both of which would receive a value of 100.
If it didn’t matter whether it was snowing, the rating should be zero. With this
item we are not concerned with whether it is a positive or negative relationship—
we simply want a measure of the strength of the relationship.
If you have any questions concerning the procedure described thus far, please ask
them now. Remember—this is not a competition and you should not talk to,
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consult with or observe the work of others. And remember to place your pencils
down when viewing each set of slides.
Hyphens indicated points at which the experimenter paused to facilitate participant’s
comprehension o f the instructions.
The consent form was administered after the recital o f the extended instructions
and before presenting the first problem set. All participants choose to participate in the
experiment.
The type o f cues (abstract or context), order o f blocks (Block Order 1-2-3, 2-3-1,
or 3-1-2), and slide duration (3 or 5 s) all varied to define the 12 experimental conditions.
Participants were given as much time as they needed to complete each measure and were
told to look at the screen to inform the experimenter that they were ready for the next
problem set. Upon completing the comparison Set, participants completed the set of
demographic items. All participants were thanked for their participation, told to take the
debriefing form, and were offered to stay after to receive an informal debriefing.

Results
Cell Deviations
The discrepancies between participants’ estimates and the actual cell frequencies
were used to create three distinct variables. First, absolute cell deviations were calculated
to test the first hypotheses. Second, signed cell deviations were calculated to provide
different, but equally important, information about participants’ estimates. Mean absolute
cell deviations provided information about the magnitude o f errors, while mean signed
cell deviations provided information about whether the magnitude o f errors were greater
for over- or underestimations. Errors due to over- and underestimations similarly affected
the mean absolute cell deviations; however, they did not similarly affect the mean signed
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cell deviations because their respective signs were used to calculate them. Last, mean
signed unit errors were calculated to provide information about the general tendency to
over- or underestimate cell frequencies4.
All data, means, and analyses were based on the 12 judged problem sets. Pairedsamples t tests were used to determine whether differences existed between cells in the
mean absolute and mean signed cell deviations. The planned set o f t tests contrasted cells
a and b, cells b and c, and cells c and d. In addition, tests were calculated on the data
when collapsed across all conditions and separately for each slide duration condition.
Mean Absolute Cell Deviations. Mean absolute cell deviations are displayed in
the top panel of Table A3. When collapsed all across conditions, the mean absolute cell
deviation for cell a was significantly different than that obtained for cell b, t{\ 19) = -2.24,
M se = 0.06,/? < .05. The remaining tests revealed no significant difference between cells
b and c or between cells c and d (all p s > .66). Therefore, two additional follow-up t tests
were used that contrasted cells c and d with cell a. The mean absolute cell deviation for
cell a was significantly different than those obtained for cells c and d, cell c, t(l 19) = 2.29, M se = 0.05; cell d, t(l 19) = -2.19, M se = 0.05, all p s < .05.
The t tests indicated different patterns in the slide duration conditions. In the 3-s
slide duration condition, the results were similar to that when the data were collapsed.
The mean absolute cell deviation for cell a was significantly different than that obtained
for cell b, t(\ 19) = -2.19, M se = 0.09,/? < .05 level. The remaining tests again revealed no
significant difference between cells b and c or between cells c and d (all ps > .28).

4 Participants’ estimations o f the actual cell frequencies were coded using the following conventions to
calculate signed unit errors: overestimations were given a value o f 1.0, underestimations were given a value
o f -1.0, and correct estimations were given a value of 0. The above described convention permitted an
assessment of participants’ tendency to overestimate or underestimate cell frequencies.
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Therefore, two additional tests contrasted cells c and d with cell a. The mean absolute
cell deviation for cell a was significantly different than those obtained for cells c and d,
cell c, t( 119) = -2.79, MSE = 0.09; cell d, t( 119) = -1.91, MSE = 0.08, all p s < .05. In the 5s slide duration condition, no significant differences existed between cells in any o f the
planned or follow-up t tests (all ps > .10).
The mean absolute cell deviations for the cells in the top row o f the contingency
table, cells a and b, were contrasted with those in the bottom row, cells c and d. Pairedsamples t tests were conducted when collapsed across all conditions and separately for
both slide durations; neither o f which reached statistical significance (all ps > .093).
Mean Signed Cell Deviations. The mean signed cell deviations are displayed in
the bottom panel o f Table A3. When collapsed across all conditions, the mean signed cell
deviation for cell a was significantly different than that obtained for cell b, /(119) = -4.32,
M se

= 0.08, p < .05. The remaining tests revealed no significant difference between cells

b and c or between cells c and d (allp s > .36). Therefore, two additional follow-up tests
were used that contrasted cells c and d with cell a. The mean signed cell deviation for cell
a was significantly different than those obtained for cells c and d, cell c, t(l 19) = 3.51,
M se = 0 M , p < .05; cell d, t( 119)

=

2.55, MSE= 0 .0 9 ,p < .05.

In the 3-s slide duration condition, the analysis revealed a similar pattern. The
mean signed cell deviation for cell a was significantly greater than that obtained for cell
b, t{ 119) = 2.76, M se —0.14,/? < .05 level. The remaining tests revealed no significant
difference between cells b and c or between cells c and d (all p s > .31). Therefore, two
follow-up tests contrasted cells c and d with cell a. The mean signed cell deviation for
cell a was significantly different than that obtained for cell c, t(l 19) = 2.93, M se = 0.96, p
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< .05. However, the mean signed cell deviation for cell a was not significantly different
than that obtained for cell d, t(\ 19) = 1.71, M se = 1.10,/? = .09.
In the 5-s slide duration condition, the mean signed cell deviations were quite
different. The mean signed cell deviation for cell a was significantly greater than that
obtained for cell b, /(119) = 3.53, M se ~ 0.08,/? < .05. Again, the remaining tests revealed
no significant difference between cells b and c or between cells c and d (all p s > .10).
However, the follow-up tests were not both significant. The mean signed cell deviation
for cell a was not significantly different than that obtained for cell c, t( 119) = 1.95, M se =
0.96, p = .06. Like the other analyses, the mean signed cell deviation for cell a was
significantly different than that obtained for cell d, t{ 119) = 2.02 M se = 0.10,/? < .05.
The mean signed cell deviation for the cells in the top row o f the summary table
were also contrasted with that for the cells o f the bottom row. Paired samples t tests were
conducted when the data were collapsed across all conditions and separately for both
slide durations; neither o f which reached statistical significance (all p s > .13).
Signed Unit Errors. Signed unit errors were calculated to determine the
percentage o f estimates that were over-, under-, and correct estimations (Table A4). The
mean percentages o f correct estimations were calculated across the four forms of causal
information. An independent samples t test indicated that the difference in the mean
percentages o f correct estimations in the two slide duration conditions was significant,
t{6) = -9.64, DiffSE= 1.85,/? <.01.
Mean signed unit errors are also displayed in Table A4. Mean signed unit errors
can range from -1.0 to +1.0. Positive values indicate that errors were more likely to be
overestimations, while negative values indicate that errors were more likely to be
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underestimations. There were no hypotheses or planned comparisons for the mean signed
unit errors. Therefore, the data will be reviewed in the Discussion.

Multivariate Analyses
A multivariate analyses o f variance (MANOVA) determined whether there was
any effect o f Slide Duration (2 levels), Type o f Cue (2 levels), and/or Block Order (3
levels) on the mean absolute cell deviations. Slide Duration had a significant main effect
on all four forms o f causal information, cell a, F (l) = 6.84, MSe - 3.83,p < .05; cell b,
F(\) = 14.37, MSe = 7.02 , p < .05; cell c, F (l) = 15.91, MSe = 11.07,/? < .05; and cell d,
F(\ ) = 8.94, MSe = 6.34,/? < .05. However, neither Type o f Cue nor Block Order had a
significant main effect on any o f the mean absolute cell deviations. In addition, no
interaction with any combination o f factors reached statistical significance.

Relative Difficulty in Recall
An independent-samples t test was conducted on the relative difficulty item to
determine whether differences existed in the two slide duration conditions. The difference
between the 3-s and 5-s slide duration conditions approached but did not reach
conventional significance, t(6) = 1.79, DiffsE “ .51,/? = .08.

Judgments
Rule-Analvsis Technique. Problem sets were designed so that one’s success
judging their directions can determine the rule used to judge contingency. That is, a
participant’s pattern o f success judging contingencies can be used to facilitate the ruleanalysis technique. A participant was said to have correctly judged a problem set if they
correctly determined its direction. Meaning that a participant chose one of the positive
options when judging a positive contingency (i.e., “much more likely”, “somewhat more
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likely”, or “a bit more likely”), one o f the negative options when judging a negative
contingency (i.e., “much less likely”, “somewhat less likely”, or “a bit less likely”), or
“just as likely” when judging a noncontingent relation.
The rule-analysis technique categorized participants as having used a rule-based
strategy if the following requirements were fulfilled: (1) at least two o f the three
problems from a rule’s subset were correctly judged (i.e., cell a subset; a versus b subset;
sum o f diagonals subset; and conditional probabilities subset) and (2) at least two of the
three problems o f all subsets o f lesser sophistication were also correctly judged.
Participants were categorized as having used the rule o f the greatest sophistication of
which the previously mentioned requirements were met.
The design o f the rule-analysis technique (see Shaklee, 1983 for a detailed
description) makes it unlikely that a participant using one o f the lesser sophisticated rules
can successfully judge a contingency from a more sophisticated subset5. Participants
whose success judging subsets does not conform to the design o f the rule-analysis
technique may have done one o f two things: (1) they may have used multiple rules to
judge contingency or (2) they may have used an unidentified rule. It is impossible to
determine which possibility applies to such a participant; therefore, they are categorized
as unclassifiable. Participants who do not correctly solve at least two problems from any
o f the subsets are categorized as having used strategy 0.
The percentages of participants categorized as having used the various rules are
displayed in Table A5. There were no hypotheses or planned comparisons proposed for
the rule-analysis technique. Therefore, the data will be reviewed in the Discussion.

5 It is even less likely that a participant using a rule o f lower sophistication can correctly judge two o f the
three problems from a rule’s subset that is higher in sophistication.
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Judgments. Pearsons correlation coefficients (r) were calculated to determine the
relation between judgments of strength, Ap, and Ap ’ (Table A6). The judgment of
strength scale was unidirectional, which made it more appropriate to use the absolute
values o f Ap and Ap ’ to calculate r values. When data were collapsed across all
conditions, judgments o f strength were significantly correlated with Ap, r = .06, n = 1420,
p < .05. Judgments o f strength were also significantly correlated with A p ’, r = .06, n =
1415, p < .05. The difference between the two previously mentioned correlations was
minuscule. The strongest relationship, by far, was the relationship between Ap and Ap ’, r
= .83, n = 1431,/? < .05.

Discussion
Cell Deviations
Mean Absolute Cell Deviations. To test the first hypothesis, a set o f planned
paired-samples t tests were performed on the mean absolute cell deviations. The general
trend across cells was not consistent with that reported by Shaklee and M ims’ (1982; i.e.,
the magnitude o f errors did not increase across cells a, b, c, and d) in any of the reported
analyses (see Table A3). Therefore, the planned tests did not adequately characterize
differences in the mean absolute cell deviations and, as a result, additional follow-up tests
were conducted.
The follow-up tests indicated that the magnitude o f the errors for cell a was
significantly less than those for the remaining three cells. This trend occurred in all but
the analyses conducted on the 5-s slide duration condition, which suggested that it was a
reliable effect. The lack of any significant differences in the 5-s slide duration condition
suggests that participants may have adopted strategies to aid recall. Participants also
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might have adopted strategies in the 3-s slide duration condition; however, time might not
have permitted efficient use. Unfortunately, the strategy that participants may have used,
if at all, can only be speculated.
Mean Signed Cell Deviations. The mean signed cell deviations revealed that the
magnitude o f errors for cell a was greatest for overestimations. The exact opposite was
true for the remaining cells. This trend resulted in the mean signed cell deviations for cell
a being, for the most part, significantly greater than those for the remaining three cells. It
may be that cell a, the co-occurrence of two variables, is a more salient cue that results in
its frequency being consistently overestimated. A tendency to overestimate cell a might
also account for the tendency to underestimate the remaining cells. The experimental
instruction clearly stated that problem sets were defined by 24 events. Therefore, an
effort to ensure that estimates totaled 24 events would force an overestimation of cell a
result in at least one underestimation o f the remaining cells.
Signed Unit Errors. The signed unit errors helped determine whether differences
existed in the likelihood of correctly estimating cell frequencies in the two slide duration
conditions. The independent-samples t test indicated that the percentage of correct
estimations were significantly greater in the 5-s slide duration (M = 68.23, SD = 1.30)
condition than in the 3-s slide duration condition (M = 50.43, SD = 3.46). The signed unit
errors also indicated that, for the most part, more than 50% o f the cell estimates for each
cell were correct. Two exceptions occurred in the condition with the shorter event state
duration for cells c (46.9%) and d (48.4 %).
The mean signed unit errors were also examined because its sign can be used as
an index of the tendency to over- or underestimate cell frequencies. Participants were
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more likely to overestimate cell a and underestimate the remaining cells in all but the 5-s
slide duration condition (Table A4). The signs o f the mean signed unit errors and mean
signed cell deviations were consistent with one another; the one exception occurred in the
5-s slide duration condition for cell d (Ms = .03 and -.02, respectively; SDs = .69 and 56,
respectively). The reported trend in the mean signed unit errors differed from
Smedslund’s (1963) experiment; in which, no trend existed. However, the data reported
by Smedslund (1963) were not averaged across multiple problem sets like they were in
the current experiment.

Multivariate Analyses
A MANOVA was conducted on the mean absolute cell deviations to test the
second hypothesis. O f particular interest was the main effect o f Slide Duration. Type of
Cue and Block Order were also assessed; however, no differences were expected and
their inclusion served as manipulation checks. The MANOVA indicated that only Slide
Duration had a significant main effect on any o f the four mean absolute cell deviations.
As expected, mean absolute cell deviations were higher in the 3-s slide duration condition
(Table A3). Block Order and Type o f Cue served as manipulation checks; therefore, their
lack of significance is an indication that they did not have an effect on the mean absolute
cell deviations.

Relative Difficulty of Recall
To test the third hypothesis, responses on the relative difficulty item were
compared in the two slide duration conditions. The difference in participant’s perceived
difficulty recalling cell frequencies was in the predicted direction; however, the
difference failed to reach statistical significance. Participants indicated that it was easier
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to recall cell frequencies when given more time to view event states (M = .25, SD = .80)
and that it was harder to recall the cell frequencies given less time (M = -.02, SD = .79).
This topic will be discussed further in the Conclusions.

Judgments
Rule-Analysis Technique. The percentage o f participants categorized as having
used each rule is in many ways similar to that reported by Shaklee and Mims (1982).
First, Shaklee and Mims (1982; Experiment 2) found, as did we, that about a third o f the
participants (i.e., 27 % when collapsed across all conditions of their experiment) were
unclassifiable. This trend proved to be true in the current experiment when the data were
collapsed across all conditions and in each slide duration condition (3-sec: 37.7%; 5-sec:
32.2%; combined: 35%). Second, very few participants were categorized as having used
the delta rule. The infrequent assignment o f the delta rule suggests that participants are
modest judgers’ o f contingency. Third, participants were more likely to use simpler rules
to judge contingency when task difficulty was increased. Shaklee and M ims’ (1982)
increased task by adding an additional counting task, while the current experiment
manipulated the event state duration. Nevertheless, the percentage o f participants that
used the cell a rule in the 3-s slide duration condition (i.e., 27.9%) was more than twice
that in the 5-s slide duration condition (i.e., 13.6%).
Bivariate Correlations. To test the fourth hypothesis, Pearsons correlation
coefficients (r) were calculated on the absolute values o f judgments o f strength, Ap, and
Ap The resulting r values were low (Table A6), which may have resulted from misuse
of the judgment of strength scale. Several measures o f central tendency suggest that
participants misused the judgment o f strength scale and awarded noncontingent relations
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a value o f 50 (M = 49.40, Mdn = 50, Mode = 50.0; note that Ap = 0.0). Even participants
that correctly estimated the frequencies o f the 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d contingency misused the
scale (n = 44 , M = 53.50, Mdn = 50, Mode = 50.0). Misuse o f the unidirectional scale
resulted in weak correlations because o f the minimal changes in judgments that resulted
from changes in Ap. That is, the mean judgments for the noncontingent problem sets were
just as high as those for the positive and negative contingencies (see Table A l).

Conclusions
To summarize, two bodies o f evidence suggested that participants differentially
make errors when recalling the frequencies o f causal information. First, the magnitude of
errors for cell a was less than those for the remaining cells. The relative magnitude of
errors for cell a is consistent with its ranking o f cell importance (i.e., cell a > cells b, c,
and d; see Crocker, 1982; Maldonado, Catena, Candid, & Garcia, 1999; Mandel &
Lehman, 1998; Wasserman, Domer, & Kao, 1990; Wasserman & Kao, 1993; White,
2003); however, the magnitude of errors did not increase across all four cells (cf. Shaklee
& Mims, 1982). Some evidence did suggests that the magnitude o f errors increased
across cells a, b, and c; however, only the difference between cells a and b was
significant. Perhaps the difference in beliefs about cell importance is greater between
cells a and b than between cells b, c, and d.
Second, the magnitudes o f overestimations were greatest for cell a and the
magnitudes o f underestimations were greatest for the remaining cells (i.e., as indicated by
the mean signed cell deviations). The mean signed unit errors also indicated that
participants’ estimates were more likely to be overestimations for cell a and
underestimations for all remaining cells. The shared signs in the previously mentioned
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variables suggest that participants were not only more likely to overestimate cell a but the
magnitude o f those errors were likely to be greater than those for the underestimations.
The exact opposite can be said o f the latter three cells.
Two factors associated with the use o f the unidirectional scale likely contributed
to the nonsignificant correlations in the current experiment. First, the unidirectional scale
made it more appropriate to use absolute values when calculating the correlations. The
absolute values restricted the range o f the included values (e.g., with Ap the range was 0
to .62 instead o f -.62 to .62). Perhaps if negative values were used the resulting
correlations would have been stronger. Second, misuse o f the unidirectional scale
resulted in judgm ent insensitivity (discussed in greater detail in the Discussion).
Peterson (1980) also proposed an explanation that might account for the misuse of
the unidirectional scale. He argued that erred judgments o f noncontingent relations may
be due to participants expecting to judge a relation between events, not the lack o f a
relation. It seems unlikely that Peterson’s (1980) explanation accounts for the erroneous
judgments in the current experiment because the concept o f unrelated events was made
explicitly clear, which he found was one way to remove this problem in naive
participants. Therefore, it is more likely that participants failed to understand the scale
and not that they failed to understand the concept o f unrelated events.
The difference in the mean relative difficulty item was not significant. Responses
were as expected; however, the difference failed to reach statistical significance. That
failure may have been due to the placement o f the Comparison Set. Perhaps after having
judged 12 problem sets, participants had already adopted a strategy to aid their recall.
Therefore, the impact o f adding or removing 2 s from each event state may have been
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attenuated. Perhaps if the Comparison Set was included earlier in experiment, the
difference would have been greater in magnitude. That is, before repeated practice
estimating cell frequencies permitted efficient strategy use.
The exact strategies that participants may have used to aid recall, if any at all, can
only be speculated. Even if qualitative feedback had been obtained, research suggests that
humans are extremely biased and are often inaccurate when commenting on their own
mental processes (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Therefore, analyzing
the data might serve as a more appropriate means to determine whether strategies were
used to aid recall.
A re-analysis o f the data suggested that participants used the total number of
event states to aid their recall. First, a high percentage o f participants’ estimates for each
problem set totaled 24 (see % Correct Sum in Table A7). Second, the mean sum o f
participants’ estimates (2/s in Table A7) closely approximated 24 for each of the 12
problem sets. Last, the mean sum of the signed deviations (^Deviations in Table A7)
closely approximated zero for each problem set. If the sum o f the signed deviations
equals zero, it implies one o f three things: (1) that no errors occurred, (2) that
underestimation errors were offset by an equal number o f underestimation errors, or (3)
vice versa. None of the previously mentioned statistics can be used to imply that any o f
the cell estimates were correct; however, they do suggest that the majority of participants’
estimates were governed by the total number o f event states. Therefore, it is uncertain
whether the estimates in the current experiment reflect what participants actually stored
in memory.
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Several concerns raised from the current experiment will motivate modifications
made in Experiment 2. First, providing participants with the total number of event states
seemed to have promoted strategy use. Therefore, attempts will be made to reduce the
likelihood that participants use similar strategies to aid recall. Second, the unidirectional
scale proved to be problematic. Therefore, a bidirectional scale will be used with hopes
that it improves judgment competency. Last, placement o f the Comparison Set will be
manipulated to determine whether its impacted the relative difficulty of recalling cell
estimates.
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CHAPTER II

EXPERIMENT 2: KNOWLEDGE OF PROBLEM SET TOTALS

Participants may have used strategies to aid their recall o f event states in
Experiment 1. Event states, collectively referred to as causal information, are the four
forms o f information that define the extent that variables are related. First, participants
may not have encoded the occurrences o f a particular event state when encoding causal
information. All o f the problem sets were defined by 24 events. Therefore, a participant
could determine the frequency o f the event state that was not encoded by subtracting the
sum of three encoded estimates from 24. If the sum o f the three estimates equals the sum
of their actual frequencies, the frequency o f the disregarded event can be correctly
determined.
Second, participants might have adjusted their cell estimates to ensure that they
totaled the correct number of events. Participants made an average o f 3.4 errors per
problem set6. However, more than 80% of participants’ estimates totaled 24 events
within problem sets. These statistics suggest that participants made an effort to ensure
that their estimates totaled 24 events (see Table A7 for more supportive statistics).

6Errors refer to the sum of the deviations between the actual and recalled frequencies of causal
information.
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However, adjusting cell frequencies in this manner does not guarantee an improvement in
cell accuracy.
Third, participants might have used their hands to aid memory o f causal
information. Experimenters frequently observed participants counting on their hands
when observing problem sets. One participant shared that she counted the cell
frequencies on her four knuckles and immediately entered them into the contingency
table. Shaklee and Mims (1982) made no mention o f whether participants were permitted
to count on their hands or whether they did so. If a participant used his or her hands
effectively, the task should more appropriately be viewed as a counting task and not the
intended recall task.
The possibility that participants used strategies to aid recall is a concern because
they are unlikely to occur in naturalistic settings. Consider a police officer who, after a
long day, wishes to assess the likelihood that sports cars are driven by college students. If
the officer’s assessment is limited to the observations made throughout that day, it is
unlikely that he or she would know the total number o f cars in the sample. It is also
unlikely that the officer would have used his or her hands to count the instances as they
occurred earlier in that day.
Two modifications in the current experiment were made in an effort to reduce
strategy use. First, participants were told to rest their hands while viewing slides. It is
possible that the first manipulation might suggest how to count cell frequencies to
participants who might not have normally thought o f such a strategy on their own.
Therefore, participants were only told to rest their hands and not why they were to rest
their hands (i.e., so they would not count cell frequencies on their hands). Second, the
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current experiment manipulated whether participants are told the total number of event
states. To ensure that the second manipulation is maximally effective, the total number of
event states varied across problem sets (M = 23.69 Events).
The Comparison Set in Experiment 1 was not as successful as hoped. The time to
view each event state in the Comparison Set was either longer or shorter than that used
for the 12 problem sets. Participants rated the change in relative difficulty of recalling the
cell frequencies o f the Comparison Set with that o f the problem sets. The placement of
the Comparison Set was thought to have resulted in the failure to obtain significant
differences between conditions. Therefore, the placement o f the Comparison Set will be
manipulated in the current experiment. That is, participants will either view the
Comparison Set early or late in the experimental sequence.
Three hypotheses are proposed for the current experiment. First, it is expected that
the mean absolute cell deviations replicate the pattern o f differential errors reported by
Shaklee and Mims (1982). Second, it is expected that the sum o f participants’ estimates
are more variable in the condition that they are not told the total number of events. Last,
it is expected that responses on the relative difficulty scale are more extreme when
participants view the Comparison Set early in the experiment.

Method
Participants
Fifty-seven students (14 males and 43 females, mean age = 19.19) enrolled in
lower-level psychology courses at the University o f New Hampshire participated in the
current experiment. All participants received course credit for their participation. Fifty-
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six percent o f the participants were freshman and eight percent were upperclassmen (i.e.,
6 and 2%s were juniors and seniors, respectively).

Design
A mixed design was used that consisted o f a within-subjects factor (Cell) and two
between-subjects factors (Set Placement & Set Information). Cell (4 levels), the withinsubjects factor, refers to participants’ estimates o f the four forms o f causal information.
The problem sets from Shaklee and Mims’ (1982, Experiment 1) experiment were
modified so that the cell frequencies were not all defined by 24 events in such a way that
they still permitted the rule-analysis technique. Table A8 displays the cell frequencies,
total number o f events, and Ap for each problem set. Problem Sets 1 through 12 are listed
in Table A8 in the order experienced by participants. Problem sets presented slides using
a 3-s event state duration. Abstract and contextual problem sets were depicted using the
same cues from Experiment 1.
Set Placement (2 levels) refers to whether participants viewed the Comparison Set
early or late in the experiment. The Comparison Set, which had a 5-s event state duration,
occurred either after the first problem set (i.e., the early condition) or after the 11th
problem set (i.e., the late condition). The cues that defined the Comparison Set (Context
II in Table A8) depicted the relation between snowing and seeing a bird perched outside a
window.
Set Information (2 levels) refers to whether participants were told the total
number of event states that defined each problem set. Participants in the known set
information condition were told this information, while those in the unknown set
information condition were not.
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Data were collected in groups that ranged in size from 4 to 15 participants. Three
o f the four experimental conditions were completed in one session. However, the lateunknown condition was completed in two experimental sessions. As a result, assignments
to experimental conditions were determined by the session that participants attended.
Table A9 lists the number of participants in each experimental condition.

Measure and Items
Measures were identical to those used in Experiment 1 with several exceptions.
First, the short description for the Comparison Set read as follows:
Some birds flourish when it snows. For example, seeing these birds would most
likely depend on whether it was snowing outside. However, some birds migrate
in the winter and will not be seen when it snows. These birds would most likely
be seen when it is not snowing. Still some other birds are likely to be seen
whether or not it is snowing or not. Use these slides to decide whether this bird is
one that is most likely seen when it is snowing, not snowing, or if it doesn’t
matter whether it is snowing.
Second, judgments o f contingency were recorded on a measure that obtained the
strength, direction, and relative likelihood o f the output variable with one response.
Judgments o f contingency were recorded on a bidirectional scale ranging from -100
(much less likely) to +100 (much more likely). The following is an example o f the
judgment o f contingency item:
When the plant was watered (as depicted in the slides), it was
-100

-60
I

much
less
likely

|

-30
I

somewhat
less
likely

|

I

±0
| ------, -------|

a bit
less
likely

+30
I

just
as
likely

+60

+100

| ------- , ------ | ------- ] -------| ------ i -------| -------I -------|

a bit
more
likely

somewhat
more
likely

to also see plant growth. Draw a line on the scale that best completes the sentence.
Items were modified to reflect the cues depicted in the abstract problem sets and the
Comparison Set.
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much
more
likely

Last, the measures used in the set information conditions differed from one
another. The following sentence could be read beneath each contingency table in the
known set information condition: There are a total o f x events in this problem set. Where
x is the total number of event states in that problem set. This sentence was not present in
the unknown set information condition.

Procedure
The experimenter read the instructions at the start o f the session which,
Deviations from Experiment 1 began in the second paragraph and read as follows:
After viewing a set of instances—which may—or may not be about snow and
birds— you will be asked to recall the number of each type of instance. In a
blank table—like the one labeled A, B, C and D on the first page—you will be
asked to enter the number of times each of the four event types occurred. In other
words—you will be shown a problem set—that consist of any combination of the
four types of instances just discussed. You will then be asked to recall from
memory the number of times each of the four event types were observed—(in
other words)—how many times you remember seeing each of the four events—
and enter those numbers into the provided blank table.
We ask that during the viewing of slides that you put any writing utensils down
and rest your hands while viewing the problem set. I think we all know that
memory is not perfect—we wish to leam how memory works—so pay close
attention and only refer to your memory—not that of your neighbors.
You will also be asked to judge the relationship between the two events. For this
item—we ask that you draw a line on the scale that best describes the relationship
between the events in question. A value of positive 100 indicates that the events
always occurred together—meaning that every time you looked out the window—
-it was snowing and a bird was perched outside your window {Show slide of cell
a}—or it wasn’t snowing—and no bird was perched outside your window {Show
slide of cell b}—this would be a perfect positive relationship. Snowing and
seeing a bird always occurred together.
A value of negative 100 indicates that the events never occurred together—
meaning that every time you looked out the window—it was either snowing and
no bird was perched outside your window {Show slide of cell c}—or it wasn’t
snowing—and a bird was perched outside your window {Show slide of cell d}—
this would be a perfect negative relationship. Snowing and seeing a bird never
occurred together.
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A value of zero indicates that you were equally likely to see a bird perched
outside your window—whether it was snowing or not. In other words—snowing
had no effect on seeing a perched bird.
As you might have guessed—we will not show you a strict relationships—that
would be too easy—the relationships in this experiment—will be somewhere in
the middle of the two extremes.
If you have any questions concerning the procedure described thus far, please ask
them now. Remember—this is not a competition—you should not talk to—
consult with—or observe the work of others. Please do not look back at
previously completed problems. You will complete a total of thirteen problems
throughout the experiment. And remember—we ask that while viewing the slides
that you—put down any writing utensils down and rest your hands.
Hyphens and underlined font were points at which the researcher paused or emphasized
statements to facilitate participants’ comprehension. All other aspects o f the experiment
were conducted in the same manner described in Experiment 1.

Results
Cell Deviations
The discrepancies between the actual cell frequencies and participants’ estimates
were used to create three variables that provide different information about the data:
mean absolute cell deviations, mean signed cell deviations, and signed unit errors (See
Results in Chapter I for more details). Two sets o f paired-samples t tests contrasted mean
cell deviations, absolute and signed, to determine whether the pattern o f cell differences
replicated Experiment 1 (i.e., a ^ b ; a ^ c ; a ^ d ; S e t 1) or Shaklee and M ims’ (1982)
experiment (i.e., a i- b; b ^ c; c 4- d: Set 2). Tests were conducted on the data when
collapsed across all conditions and separately for each set information condition.
Mean Absolute Cell Deviations. Prior to conducting the planned comparisons, a
multivariate analysis o f variance (MANOVA) was conducted on the mean absolute cell
deviations. The independent variables (i.e., set placement and set information) served as
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the MANOVA’s factors. Set Information, Set Placement, and their interaction had no
effect on any o f the four cells (all p s > .34).
Mean absolute cell deviations are displayed in the top panel o f Table A10. When
data were collapsed across conditions, the first set o f tests revealed that the mean absolute
cell deviation for cell a was not different than those obtained for cells b or d, cell b, t(56)
= -1.12, M se = 0.07. p = .27; cell d, t{56) = -0.86, M se = 0.08, p = .39. However, the mean
absolute cell deviation for cell a was significantly less than that obtained for cell c, 1(56)
= -2.49, M se = 0.09,/? < .05. The second set of tests indicated that the mean absolute cell
deviation for cell b was not different than that obtained for cell c, t(56) = -1.73, M se =
0.09, p = .09. However, the mean absolute cell deviation for cell c was significantly
different than that obtained for cell d, t(56) = 2.00, M se = 0.08,/? = .05.
The patterns of significant differences were different from one another in the set
information conditions. In the known set information condition, the pattern was similar to
that reported when data were collapsed across all conditions. That is, the first set o f tests
indicated that the mean absolute cell deviation for cell a was not different than those
obtained for cells b and d, cell b, t(28) = -1.74, Mse —0.09,/? = .092; cell d, t(28) = -0.98,
Mse = 0.10,/? = .34. The mean absolute cell deviation for cell a was, again, significantly
different than that obtained for cell c, t{56) = -2.57, Mse = 0.14,/? < .05. The second set of
tests indicated that the mean absolute cell deviation for cell b was not different than that
obtained for cell c, t(56) = -1.60, M se = 0.119,/? = .121. However, the mean absolute cell
deviations for cell c was significantly greater than that obtained for cell d, t(56) = 2.44,
Mse = 0.101,/? < .05. In the unknown set information condition, none o f the tests
indicated that cells were significantly different from one another (all p s > .39).
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Mean Signed Cell Deviations. A MANOVA was also calculated on the mean
signed cell deviations, which again served as a manipulation check. Set Information had a
significant main effect on cell b, F( 1) = 5.63, M se = 2.14, p = .02. Set Placement also had
a significant main effect on cell b, F (l) = 7.08, M se = 2.69, p

=

.01.

Mean signed cell deviations are displayed in the bottom panel o f Table A10.
When data were collapsed across all conditions, the first set o f test indicated that the
mean signed cell deviation for cell a was significantly different than those obtained for
the remaining three cells, cell b,
cell d, t( 56)

=

56) = 3.86, M se = 0.13; cell c, t(56) = 6.42, M se = 0.12;

5.15, M se = 0.14; all p s < .05. The second set o f tests revealed that the

mean signed cell deviation for cell b was significantly different than that obtained for cell
c, t{56) = 2.36, M se = 0.12,p < .05. However, the mean signed cell deviations for cell c
was not different than that obtained for cell d, t(56)

=

-.58, M se = 0.13, p = .56.

In the known set information condition, the first set o f tests revealed that the mean
signed cell deviation for cell a was not significantly different than that obtained for cell b,
t(28) = 1.67, M se = 0.16 ,p = . 11. However, the mean signed cell deviation for cell a was
significantly different than those obtained for cells c and d, cell c,
0.17; cell d, t(28) = 4.07, M se = 0.167, all p s

<

28) = 4.05, M se =

.05. The second set o f tests revealed that

the mean signed cell deviation for cell b was significantly different than that obtained for
cell c, t{28)

=

2.81, M se = 0.154, p

<

.05. However, the mean signed cell deviation for

cell c was not different than that obtained for cell d, t(28) = -.12, M se = 0.171, p = .90.
In the unknown set information condition, the first set o f tests revealed that the
mean signed cell deviation for cell a was significantly different than that obtained for
each o f the remaining three cells, cell b, t(27) = 3.73, M se = 0.21; cell c, t(27)
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=

5.00, M se

= 0.18; cell d, t(21) = 3.31, M se = 0.22; all p s < .05. The second set o f tests revealed that
no significant differences existed between cells b and c or between cells c and d, cells b
and c, t(27) = .63, M se = 0.17; cells c and d, t(27) = -.66, M se = 0.21,allp s > .52.
Signed Unit Errors. Table A ll displays for each cell the percentage of estimates
that were over-, under-, or correct estimations. An independent-samples t test indicated
that the percentages o f correct estimations in the set information conditions were not
significantly different from one another, t{6) = 0.54, DiffsE ~ 2.47,p = .33.
Table A 11 also displays the mean signed unit errors, which can range from -1.0 to
+1.0. Positive values indicate that errors were more likely to be overestimations, while
negative values indicate that they were more likely to be underestimations. No
hypotheses or planned comparisons were proposed for the mean signed unit errors.
Therefore, the data will be reviewed in the Discussion.

Sum of Estimates
The mean sum o f participants’ estimates was calculated within problem sets,
hereafter referred to as the sum o f estimates (labeled as Actual in Table A12). Table A12
lists the minimum and maximum of the sum o f estimates (labeled as Min and Max in
Table A12, respectively). The minimum and maximum for each problem set were used to
calculate its range, hereafter referred to as the range of the sums. An independent samples
t test indicated that the range o f the sums was significantly different from one another in
the set information conditions, t{24) = -5.85, DiffsE = 1.63,/? < .05.
The percentage o f participants whose sum o f estimates totaled the correct number
o f event states are also listed in Table A12 (labeled as % Correct Sum). A second t test
indicated that the percentage o f participants whose sum o f estimates totaled the correct
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number o f events were significantly different from one another in the set information
conditions, f(24) = 19.07, DiffsE - 3.10, p < .05.

Relative Difficulty in Recall
Responses on the relative difficulty item were used to determine whether
differences existed in the set placement conditions. An independent-samples t test
indicated that the values in the set placement conditions were not significantly different
from one another, t( 41) = 1.73, DiffsE = .28, p = .09.

Judgments
Multivariate Analysis o f Variance. A third MANOVA, again serving as a
manipulation check, determined whether the independent variables had an effect on the
judgments o f contingency. Only Set Placement indicated that it had a significant main
effect on the judgments o f contingency for Problem Set 12, F( 1) = 4.57, M se = 7140.90,/?
< .05. No other main effects were significant.
Rule-Analvsis Technique. Judgment accuracy for the rule-analysis technique was
determined in a slightly different manner. Participants were said to have successfully
judged a problem set if they correctly determined its direction. However, the direction of
participants’ judgments was determined by the judgment o f contingency item instead of
relative likelihood item (cf. Experiment 1). All other aspects o f the rule-analysis
technique were performed as described in Experiment 1.
Bivariate Correlations. Table A14 lists the resulting r values o f the correlations
between judgments o f contingency, Ap, and Ap

When collapsed across all conditions,

judgments o f contingency were significantly correlated with Ap, r = 0.23, n = 657, p <
.05. Judgments o f contingency were also significantly correlated with A.p’,r = 0.29, n =
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652, p < .05. The difference between the two previously mentioned correlations
approached, but failed to reach, conventional significance, t(676) = -1.35,/? = .08 [one
tailed test]. Last, Ap and Ap ’ were also significantly correlated with one another, r = 0.82,
n = 619,p < .05.
In the known set information condition, a similar pattern o f results was found.
Judgments o f contingency were significantly correlated with Ap, r = 0.21, n = 341 ,P <
.05. Judgments o f contingency were also significantly correlated with A/? ’, r = 0.27, n =
339, p < .05. However, the difference between the two previously mentioned correlations
was significant, t(343) = -1.76,/? < .05 [one-tailed test]. Last, Ap and A/?’ were also
significantly correlated with one another, r= 0.81, n = 346,/? < .05.
In the unknown set information condition, a similar pattern o f results was also
found. Judgments o f contingency were again significantly correlated with Ap and with
A/?’, Ap, r = 0.24, n = 316; A/?’, r= 0.31, n = 313, all ps < .05. The difference between the
two previously mentioned correlations was also significant, t(333) = -2.42,/? < .05 [one
tailed test]. In addition, Ap and Ap ’ were also significantly correlated with one another, r
= 0.83, n = 333, p < .05.

Discussion
Cell Deviations
Mean Absolute Cell Deviations. Two sets o f paired-samples t tests tested the first
hypothesis. The two sets o f tests determined whether the data supported the results of
Experiment 1 or Shaklee and M ims’ (1982) experiment. For the most part, there were no
significant differences in the magnitudes o f errors between cells in the current
experiment. Two exceptions being that the magnitude o f errors for cell c was
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significantly higher than those obtained for cells a and d in all but the unknown set
information condition. Like Experiment 1, the magnitude o f errors increased across the
first three cells o f the contingency table (i.e., cells a, b, and c).
Mean Signed Cell Deviations. Mean signed cell deviations for each cell were
examined to determine whether the magnitude of overestimations was greater than that
for underestimations, or vice versa (see bottom panel of Table A10). Like Experiment 1,
participants consistently overestimated the frequency o f cell a to a greater extent than
they underestimated its frequency and the exact opposite was true for the remaining three
cells. Differences in the mean signed cell deviations between cell a and each o f the
remaining three cells were significant. However, there was one exception to the
mentioned trend. The magnitudes o f errors for cell b were greatest for overestimations in
the known set information condition and, as a result, the difference between cells a and b
was not significant.
The MANOVA revealed two significant main effects. First, the mean signed cell
deviation for cell b was higher in the unknown set information condition (M = .15, SD =
.55) than in the known condition (M = -.21, SD = .73). Second, the mean signed cell
deviation for cell b was higher in the late set placement condition (M = .18, SD = .70)
than in the early condition (M = -.24, SD = .57). Further analysis indicated the late-known
condition was the only one in which the mean signed cell deviations were positive (M =
.41, SD = .57). The mean signed cell deviations in the remaining three conditions (i.e.,
late-unknown, early-known, early-unknown) were all negative (Ms = -.04, -.09, & -.42,
respectively). It is not apparent why the mean signed cell deviations were positive for
only one experimental condition. However, it does suggest that the tendency for the
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magnitude o f errors for cells b, c, and d to be greatest for underestimations is a robust
effect.
Signed Unit Errors. The signed unit errors were used to determine if any
differences existed in the likelihood o f correctly estimating cell frequencies in the set
information conditions. There was no difference in the percentages o f correct estimations
between the two set information conditions, which suggests that knowledge of the total
number o f event states was not used in a way to improve cell accuracy. Ensuring that cell
estimates totaled the correct number of events does not guarantee an increase in cell
accuracy. The data from the current experiment are consistent with that notion.
The mean signed unit errors were also examined because its sign can be used as
an index of the tendency to over- or underestimate cell frequencies. Participants were
more likely to overestimate confirming cases and underestimate disconfirming cases
(Table A l l ) . The one exception occurred for cell b in the known set information
condition (M = .03, SD = .77). The signs of the mean signed unit errors and the mean
signed cell deviations were consistent with one another for cells a, b, and c. However, the
mean signed unit errors were positive for cell d and negative for the mean signed cell
deviations. Their differences indicate that although participants were more likely to
overestimate the frequency o f cell d the underestimations were o f greater magnitude. This
difference may at first seem problematic; however, the present investigation is the first to
report mean signed unit errors. As a result, it is not known whether any consistent trends
are to be expected with this variable.
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Sum of Estimates
To test the second hypothesis, independent-samples t tests were performed, across
set information conditions, the range o f the sums and the percentages o f participants
whose sum o f estimates totaled the correct number o f event states (see Table A12). First,
the range o f the sums was significantly larger in the unknown set information condition
(M = 14.00, SD = 4.42) than in the known set information condition (M = 4.46, SD =
3.89). Second, the percentage o f participants’ whose sum o f estimates totaled the correct
number o f events was significantly higher in the known set information condition (M =
88.88, SD = 5.50) than in the unknown set information condition (M = 29.94, SD = 9.74).
Collectively, the t tests suggest that the sum o f estimates were more variable when
participants did not know the total number o f events.
Evidence that participants adjusted the frequencies o f their estimates was o f
interest in the current experiment. Other than significant differences in the likelihood that
estimates totaled the correct number of events, no other differences were found between
the set information conditions. There was no difference in the percentage of correct
estimations and both set information conditions produced the same trend across cells in
the mean absolute and the mean signed cell deviations. Therefore, it is unlikely that the
differential patterns o f errors reported in Experiment 1 were due to participants adjusting
cell frequencies.

Relative Difficulty of Recall
To assess the third hypothesis, participants’ responses on the relative difficulty
scale were examined. The difference between the early (M = .78, SD = .85) and late (M =
.30, SD = .98) conditions was in the predicted direction. However, the difference failed to
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reach statistical significance. The data suggest that by the time participants viewed the
Comparison Set late in the experiment they had learned to efficiently use a strategy to aid
their recall. The data also suggest that early in the experiment participants either have not
adopted a strategy yet or have not learned to use it efficiently enough to decrease the
perceived difficulty o f the recall task.
The lack o f a significant difference between the set placement conditions on the
relative difficulty item may have been due to the size of the scale. The relative difficulty
item, a 5-point Likert scale, may have been too small to obtain a significant difference
across conditions; that is, especially considering that values were expected on the positive
end o f the scale in both conditions. Had one condition rated an increase in perceived task
difficulty and the other condition a decrease, as in Experiment 1, perhaps a significant
difference would have been obtained. In retrospect, had the Comparison Sets been
implemented earlier in Experiment 1, as in the current experiment, perhaps a significant
difference would have been obtained then.

Judgments
Rule-Analysis Technique. The percentage o f participants categorized as having
used each rule is in many ways similar to that reported by Shaklee and Mims (1982;
Experiment) and Experiment 1 (see Table A 13). First, approximately one third o f the
participants were deemed as unclassifiable. Second, participants were more likely to use
simpler rules to judge contingency. Third, the percentages o f participants categorized as
having used the delta rule were rare. However, the majority o f participants in the current
experiment were categorized as having used the a-versus-b rule and not the cell-a rule
(cf. Experiment 1).
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Bivariate Correlations. Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated on
judgments o f contingency, Ap, and Ap ’ to test the last hypothesis. The differences in the
correlations were in the predicted directions. Indicating that the correlations between
judgments and Ap ’ were significantly stronger than those between judgments and Ap.
However, the difference in correlations did not reach statistical significance when the
data were collapsed across all conditions. This effect will be discussed in greater detail in
the Conclusions.

Conclusions
To summarize, the failure to obtain significant differences in the mean absolute
cell deviations suggests that the differential pattern o f errors is a weak effect. However,
the failure to replicate the effect with significant differences is reminiscent o f what
occurred in Shaklee and M ims’ (1982) experiments. Significant differences between cells
were not consistently obtained in their two experiments. In fact, only two comparisons
were reliably significant across experiments. First, the magnitude o f errors for cell a was
less than that obtained for cell b. Second, the magnitudes o f errors for the cells in the top
row were less than those in the bottom row. However, a monotonic increase in the
magnitude o f errors was found in both experiments. Therefore, the failure to support the
first hypothesis through significant differences might not be o f great concern.
It was argued in Experiment 1 that the same of pattern of results in two of the
three reported analyses was an indication o f the robustness o f the effect (i.e., when data
were collapsed across conditions and in the 3-s slide duration condition). Similar results
were also found in the current experiment (i.e., when the data were collapsed across
conditions and in the known set information condition) and the consensus is now that the
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differences in the magnitude of errors is a weak effect. Therefore, it is more likely that
the effect in one o f the experimental conditions was responsible for the shared trend when
data were collapsed across conditions.
The fact that participants were more likely to overestimate confirming cases and
to underestimate disconfirming cases may be consistent with that reported by Crocker
and Taylor (1978; as cited by Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984). As suggested by Peterson
(1980), participants arrive at experiments with strong expectations that they will judge a
relationship between the depicted events. It might also be that participants expect to judge
a positive relationship, especially when contextual cues are used that depict real world
relations. Crocker and Taylor (1978; as cited by Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984) reported that
participants consistently overestimated the frequencies o f information that were
consistent with their expectations and underestimated information that were inconsistent
with their expectations. If participants expected to judge a positive relation, then the
confirming cases are the expectation consistent information and the disconfirming cases
are the expectation inconsistent information. A re-analysis of the data indicated that
participants overestimated confirming cases and underestimated disconfirming cases for
contextually defined problem sets (Ms = .11, -.07, -.07, and .07 for cells a, b, c, and d).
The means indicated a different pattern across cells when the problem sets were defined
by abstract cues (Ms = .17, .06, -.03, and -.04 for cells a, b, c, and d). However, the
question remains as to why a similar tendency was not reported in Experiment 1 for the
participants that viewed 12 contextually defined problem sets.
As predicted, the correlations between contingency judgments and Ap ’ were
significantly higher than those between judgments and Ap. This effect suggests that
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judgments are more consistent with that stored in memory than with what actually
occurred. This effect is the biggest contribution o f the current investigation. Therefore, an
extended discussion o f its results and implications will be conducted.
The resulting r values might have been artifacts o f pooling data across the set
information conditions. Further analyses, reported here for the first time, revealed that the
correlations between judgments and Ap ’ (i.e., rs for A / 7 ’ equaled .36, .52, .44, & .52) were
stronger than those between judgments and Ap in each experimental condition (i.e., rs for
A/7 equaled .27, .45, .35, & .42 in the early-known, late-known, early-unknown, and lateunknown conditions, respectively). Each experimental condition was a separately
conducted experimental session; therefore, each session can be viewed as independent
replication (Baron & Perone, 1998; Sidman, 1988).

The r values obtained in the current experiment were relatively weak in
comparison to previous research (cf., Allan & Jenkins, 1980; 1983; Wasserman et al.,
1993; Wasserman, Domer, & Kao, 1990). One might argue that the weak r values are an
indication o f poor experimental control; however, a closer look at the data suggests that
this not the case. Problem sets were borrowed from Shaklee and Mims’ (1982; see also
Shaklee & Tucker, 1980) experiment and were designed for the rule-analysis technique,
which exploits the circumstances in which the rule-based strategies produce inaccurate
judgments. Problem sets designed in such a manner may be particularly difficult to judge.
If the problem sets are difficult due to their design, then the correlations between
judgments and A/7 should become progressively weaker as the subset’s sophistication
increases.
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Table A15 lists the resulting r values between judgments o f contingency, A/?, and
Ap ’ for the four subsets o f the rule-analysis technique in the order o f increasing
sophistication. The r values between judgments and Ap for the cell a and a-versus-b
subsets are consistent with that reported in previous research (cf. Allan & Jenkins, 1980;
1983). However, the correlations between judgments and Ap progressively decreased and
became negative as sophistication increased. The negative r value in the Ap subset is
consistent with what one would expect because the rule-analysis technique defined
judgment accuracy by the direction o f participants’ judgments (Shaklee & Mims, 1982;
Shaklee, 1983). Therefore, the overall weak correlations obtained in the current
experiment can be accounted for by the use o f the problem sets from the rule-analysis
technique.

The results o f the current experiment are most consistent with a rule-based
account of contingency judgment. The associative model o f contingency judgment
assumes that memory o f causal information is irrelevant forjudging contingency (Baker,
Murphy, & Vallee-Tourangeau, 1996) and that judgments are formed through an
experiential mechanism. It is unclear how the associative model can account for a
tendency for judgments to be more consistent with memory o f events than with their
actual frequencies. According to the associative model, there is no reason for the
relationship between judgments and Ap ’ to be stronger than that between judgments and

Ap .
The results o f the current experiment also suggest that rule-based strategies, or at
least an approximation o f them, are used to judge contingency. It is unlikely that a strict
adherence to any rule is used by participants to judge contingency. However, it is likely
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that individuals use a set o f questions that, upon being answered, permits an
approximation of that which is predicted by the rule-based strategies. The fact that
judgments are more highly correlated with a rule based on one’s memory, which is an
approximation in its self, suggests that rough estimates o f rule-based strategies are used
to judge contingency.
The results o f the current experiment might also suggest that Ap ’ is a more
suitable index from which to assess the accuracy o f participants’ judgments. Many
researchers have disputed whether Ap, or any normative statistic, is an appropriate index
from which to assess the accuracy o f judgments (Mandel & Lehman, 1998; Shaklee and
Mims, 1983). Although the rule by which Ap ’ is calculated is the same as Ap, use o f
participants’ estimates as its inputs would arguably change its status as a normative
statistic (see Mandel & Lehman, 1998 for a discussion o f normative ness). It also seems
more reasonable to assess judgment accuracy on what the individual believes they are
judging as opposed to what they are judging. The only drawback to using Ap ’ is that
obtaining participants’ estimates is very cumbersome. However, use o f Ap ’ might be even
more beneficial in situations in which larger discrepancies exists between memory and
the relevant information or when judgments are not based on information provided by the
experimenter.
Discrepancies between memory and actual information might be relevant to
illusory correlations. Illusory correlation has been defined as the tendency to perceive a
relation between events that are not related or are related to a lesser extent than that
which it is judged (Chapman, 1967). Illusory correlations might more appropriately be
viewed as judgments based on a mental representation that is quite discrepant from that
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which exists. An inaccurate mental representation o f events might be the mechanism by
which illusory correlations are formed. If illusory correlations are mediated by inaccurate
mental representations, then its definition should be broadened. The definition o f an
illusory correlation must be broadened because an inaccurate mental representation can
result in an increase or decrease in the magnitude of the perceived relation.
Hamilton and Gifford (1976; Experiment 1) has similarly argued that illusory
correlations are based on inaccurate mental representations. Their experiment
investigated stereotypic person perception, which they argue is the social equivalent to
illusory correlations. Participants rated the likeability o f members from two groups that
differed in their relative size, after members o f each group were paired with desirable and
undesirable traits. Favorable ratings were biased towards the larger group despite the
proportions o f desirable and undesirable traits being equal in the two groups. It was
concluded that because the pairings of undesirable traits with members o f the smaller
group were infrequent that their occurrences were a salient event. The salience of the
events resulted in its frequency being overestimated, which biased favorable ratings
towards the larger group. This finding suggests that perhaps illusory correlations, at least
their social equivalents, are accompanied with a similarly biased mental representation of
the relevant events.

Summary of Phase I
The first phase o f the current investigation collectively addressed five hypotheses.
First, cell estimates were examined to determine whether participants differentially made
errors when recalling their frequencies. Second, event state duration was manipulated to
determine whether it impacted the magnitude o f errors. Third, the impact of the event
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state duration was examined on participants’ perceived difficulty when recalling cell
frequencies. Fourth, the impact o f participants’ knowledge o f the total number of event
states was examined on their cell estimates. Last, Ap and Ap ’ were correlated with
contingency judgments to determine their relative dependence on memory o f causal
information. The following segment summarizes the main results and conclusions
relevant to these five hypotheses.

Differential Pattern of Errors
Three variables were used to assess differences across cells. First, the mean
absolute cell deviations were used as an index of the magnitude o f errors. Shaklee and
Mims’ (1982), using the same variable indicated that the magnitude o f errors increased
across cells a, b, c, and d in Experiments 1 and 2. The magnitude o f errors were only
found to increase across cells a, b, and c in the current experiment. The magnitude of
errors for cell d never once exceeded that for cell c. It is believed that the differential
pattern in the magnitude o f errors is not a robust effect.
Second, the mean signed cell deviations were used as an index o f whether the
magnitude o f errors were greater for under- or overestimations. The current investigation
is the first that used the mean signed cell deviations to characterize cell estimates and, as
a result, no specific hypotheses were proposed. However, this variable did produce a
reliable pattern across Experiments 1 and 2. The magnitude o f errors were greatest for
cell a, while the exact opposite was true for cells b, c, and d. It is believed that cell a is a
more salient cue, which increases the likelihood that its frequency is overestimated (see
Hamilton & Gifford, 1976 for a similar argument).
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Last, signed unit errors were used as index o f the tendency to over- or
underestimate cell frequencies. Originally, the signs o f the mean signed unit errors and
means signed cell deviations were consistent with one another (Experiment 1). However,
in Experiment 2 their signs were different for cell d. It is not clear, at this point, whether
either pattern is an indication of a real tendency to under- or overestimate cell
frequencies. The similarities across experiments for cells a, b, and c do suggest that the
tendencies to under- and overestimate cells frequencies are systematic (cf. Smedslund,
1968).

The Effect of Slide Duration
In Experiment 1, the event state duration was manipulated. I concluded that the
shorter duration interfered with participants’ use o f strategies to aid recall. The
magnitudes o f errors were significantly greater in the condition with the shorter event
state duration. It is believed that the longer event state duration permitted more efficient
use of strategies, which resulted in there being no differences in the magnitude of errors
across cells.

Relative Difficulty of Recall
Participants viewed 12 problem set using the same event state duration; however,
a Comparison Set was also viewed that used a different event state duration. Participants
indicated whether an increase or decrease in the time to view each event state impacted
the perceived difficulty o f recalling cell frequencies. In Experiment 1, responses
indicated that more time resulted in a relatively easier task (i.e., 5 s vs 3 s) and that less
time resulted in a relatively harder task (i.e., 3 s vs 5 s). Only one event state duration was
used in Experiment 2. However, participants indicated that additional time was more
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beneficial when provided earlier in the experiment. It is believed that the limited range of
the relative difficulty item, a 5-point Likert scale, contributed to the failure to support this
hypothesis with significant differences.

Sum of Estimates
Experiment 2 further addressed whether participants used strategies to aid their
recall. Evidence suggested that participants made an effort to ensure that their estimates
totaled the correct number o f events (Experiment 1). Therefore, whether participants had
such knowledge was manipulated in Experiment 2. The sum o f participants’ estimates
provided strong evidence suggesting that, when available, participants used the total
number of event states to ensure that their estimates summed to that number. However,
the data did not suggest that knowledge o f the total number o f events impacted the
accuracy o f participants’ cell estimates. The differential patterns o f errors were similar
whether participants had knowledge o f the total number o f events, which suggests that
the patterns are not due to this particular strategy.

Judgment and Memory
Finally, Ap ’ was used to determine whether its use could compensate for errors in
contingency judgments. Participants’ misuse o f the unidirectional judgm ent scale
Experiment 1 did not permit an assessment o f this hypothesis. The bidirectional judgment
scale was appropriately used in Experiment 2, which permitted an assessment of the
stated hypothesis. Judgments and Ap ’ were more highly correlated with one another than
judgments and Ap, which supported the notion that judgments are more highly correlated
with memory o f the contingency (i.e., Ap ’) than with the actual contingency (i.e., Ap).
This finding was extensively discussed.
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CHAPTER III

EXPERIMENT 3: KNOWLEDGE OF JUDGMENT TASK

The relationship between memory and contingency judgments might be further
understood if a judgm ent task distinction is acknowledged. Hastie and colleagues (Hastie
6 Park, 1986; Hastie & Pennington, 1989) argue that there are at least two types of
judgment tasks, which differ in their dependence on memory. The two types o f judgment
tasks, on-line and memory-based, also differ in how people form their judgments. On-line
judgment tasks occur when participants are aware o f the task at hand and are able to form
their judgment as the relevant information is encountered. On the other hand, memorybased judgment tasks occur when participants are made aware o f the task after having
previously viewed the relevant information and, as a result, are forced to form their
judgment on that which can be recalled. Memory and judgments are related on memorybased judgment task, while they are not as highly related on on-line judgm ent tasks7.
The work o f Hastie and colleagues (Hastie & Park, 1986; Hastie & Pennington,
1989) deals with social judgments. Social judgments refer to inferences made about other
people that include, but are not limited to, the following: judging the likely causes of
another’s behavior (e.g., Hastie, 1984), rating aspects o f another’s personality (e.g.,

7 Hastie and colleagues’ (Hastie & Park, 1986; Hastie & Pennington, 1989) task distinction is only relevant
to contingency judgment experiments that utilized a trial-by-trial procedures, which presents information
serially. Experiments that utilize a summarized procedure are not relevant to the current discussion because
in those situations judgments are based on the readily available information, not that which was
experienced and/or stored in memory.
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Hastie & Kumar, 1979), and evaluating another’s suitability for a given task (e.g., Hastie
& Park, 1986). The social judgment and contingency judgment literatures differ in a
number o f ways; their most important difference, at least for this investigation, is how
judgment accuracy is traditionally assessed. The contingency judgm ent literature
typically quantifies the extent that two variables are related through the use o f a statistic
(Ap is the most frequently used statistic; e.g., Jenkins & Ward, 1965; Wasserman &
Shaklee, 1984). As a result, contingency judgments accuracy has frequently been
assessed considering its approximation to the statistic’s value (e.g., Allan & Jenkins,
1980; 1983; Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Erlick & Mills, 1967; cf. Shaklee, 1983). On the
other hand, social judgments are subjective impressions which often cannot be
objectively determined as correct, incorrect, or expressed by a precise statistic. Therefore,
it is not known whether the judgment task distinction will be supported by differences in
contingency judgments. If the judgment task distinction does apply to contingency
judgments, it might account for the failure to obtain a relationship between memory and
judgment in previous research (Jenkins & Ward, 1965; Wasserman, et al., 1993).
The contingency judgment literature has almost exclusively examined on-line
judgments and no experiment has compared memory-based and on-line contingency
judgments; several factors might explain such absences. First, several experiments have
failed to find a relationship between memory and contingency judgments (e.g., Jenkins &
Ward, 1965; Wasserman, et al., 1993). However, the failed experiments contained on-line
judgment tasks in which no relationship is expected. Second, the Associative Model
(Shanks, 1985; Shanks & Dickinson, 1987) and judgm ent task distinction (Hastie & Park,
1986; Hastie & Pennington, 1989) were introduced around the same time. The
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Associative Model, which has dominated modem thinking about contingency judgment,
assumes that memory of causal information is not necessary forjudging contingency
(Baker, Murphy, & Vallee-Tourangeau, 1996) and may have halted the limited number of
investigations dedicated to the role o f memory forjudging contingency. Third,
conventions in the contingency judgment literature might be partly responsible for the
almost exclusive use o f on-line judgment tasks. For example, the experimental procedure
and judgment scale are often explained to participants prior to viewing the first problem
set. Explaining the judgment scale or task would inform participants of the later task and,
by definition, result in an on-line judgment. Fourth, experimenters became reluctant to
state that participants mentally compute rule-based strategies to judge contingency (see
Wasserman, 1990; and cf. Wasserman, 1993). Investigating the relationship between
memory and contingency judgments is, in a way, accepting the notion that participants
attempt to mentally compute judgments via rule-based strategies.
To the best o f my knowledge, only one experiment claims to have investigated
memory-based judgments o f contingency. In that experiment, Arkes and Rothbart (1985;
Experiment 1) presented names on slides that varied according to two dimensions: (1)
gender (i.e., male or female name) and (2) relative placement in the alphabet (i.e., begins
with a letter from the first [letters a-m] or second [letters n-z] halves o f the alphabet).
Labeling the rows and columns o f a contingency table (e.g., row 1: male names, row 2:
female names, column 1: first half of alphabet, column 2: second h alf of alphabet)
permits any name to be appropriately categorized by the two dimensions. Names were
selected so that no relation existed between the two dimensions. Participants estimated
the frequencies of either a specific row or column o f the contingency table (e.g., recall
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the number o f female names). Judgments were biased by the information that participants
were asked to recall (i.e., the specific row or column).
Several aspects o f Arkes and Hothbart’s (1985) experiment raise doubts as to
whether participants actually judged contingency. First, only the frequencies o f two cells
were recalled. Contingency requires the frequencies o f all four cells; one might argue that
to obtain a true contingency judgment that the entire summary table should have been
estimated. Second, judgments were not predicted by the use o f any known rule-based or
associative account o f contingency judgment. Instead, judgments were predicted by
simple inferences made about other cells (see design o f Arkes & Rothbart, 1985;
Experiment 1). Last, judgments were not o f contingency but o f the relative likelihood of
events (i.e., who are more likely to have names beginning with a letter in the second h a lf
o f the alphabet, males or females?). Judgments o f contingency require an estimation of
the extent that variables are related, while judgments o f relative likelihood ask which of
two variables is most likely (see Waldmann & Holyoak, 1997 for a similar argument).
These criticisms are intended to express that memory-based contingency judgments have
yet to be adequately addressed, not to challenge the results o f the experiment.
The current experiment will compare judgments o f contingency formed in
memory-based and on-line judgment tasks. Shaklee and M ims’ (1982) procedure will
again be used. However, the points at which participants are informed o f the judgment
task will differ across the three experimental conditions. Participants in the on-line
condition will be informed o f the judgm ent task before viewing the problem set, as
typically done. Participants in the two memory-based conditions (i.e., memory-based-PE
and memory-based-PR) will both be informed o f the judgment task after viewing the
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problem set. Participants in the memory-based-PE (Post Encode) condition will be
informed after the viewing problem set (i.e., after encoding cell frequencies), while those
in the memory-based-PR (Post Recall) condition will be informed after completing the
summary table (i.e., after encoding and recalling cell frequencies).
Previous research has demonstrated that the magnitude o f errors increases across
cells a, b, and c when recalling cell frequencies (Experiments 1 and 2; Shaklee & Mims,
1982). The differential pattern in the first three cells is consistent with the notion that
subjective cell importance influences the magnitude o f errors. Subjective cell importance
refers to beliefs about the relevance o f each cell forjudging contingency (e.g.,
Wasserman, Domer, & Kao, 1990). Therefore, it might be that subjective cell importance
influences either the recall or encoding of causal information in a way that the accuracy
of the more important cells are higher than the lesser important cells. The current
experiment may prove useful in determining the source o f the differential pattern in the
magnitude o f cell errors.
It may be that subjective cell importance influences the amount o f resources one
dedicates to the encoding o f causal information. If the differential pattern is due to biased
encoding it should only occur in the on-line condition. No differential pattern should
occur in either memory-based condition because beliefs about cell importance would not
have the opportunity to bias encoding; that is, participants are not aware o f the judgment
task until after the encoding o f causal information.
It may be that subjective cell importance influences the retrieval o f causal
information (Crocker, 1982). If the differential pattern is due to biased encoding it should
not occur in the memory-based-PR condition. However, the pattern should emerge in
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remaining two conditions. No differential pattern should occur in the memory-based-PR
condition because subjective cell importance will not have the opportunity to bias
retrieval; that is, participants are not aware o f the judgment task until after the encoding
o f causal information.
The results o f Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that the type o f scale used to record
judgments might influence judgment competency. The current experiment will use
multiple measures to assess judgments o f contingency. Participants will judge the relative
likelihood o f the output variable given the presence o f the input variable, which, in
essence, asks participants whether the presence o f the output variable is more or less
likely when the input variable is also present. Participants will also judge the extent that
the two events are related, which will consist o f a scale ranging from -100 to +100 that
request an estimation o f both the strength and direction o f the relation. Although both
judgments are o f the same contingency, previous research suggests that participants
might interpret the questions differently and, as a result, answer them with differing
degrees of accuracy (Shaklee & Tucker, 1980). Shaklee and Tucker (1980) used betweengroups comparisons, while the current experiment will use within-subjects comparisons
to determine judgm ent scales impact judgment competency.
Several hypotheses are proposed in the current experiment. First, it is expected
that the magnitude o f errors will increase across cells a, b, and c and replicate previous
research (Experiments 1 and 2; Shaklee & Mims, 1982). No hypotheses are proposed
about the presence o f the differential pattern in the judgment task conditions; however,
differences between conditions, as discussed above, might provide insights about its
likely source. Second, it is expected that the mean signed cell deviations will be positive
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for cell a and negative for cells b and c. Third, it is expected that participants’ responses
on the two judgment scales will differ in judgment accuracy.

Method
Participants
Seventy-six students (26 males and 50 females, mean age = 19.41) enrolled in
lower-level psychology courses at the University o f New Hampshire participated in the
current experiment. All participants received course credit for their participation. More
than 90% o f the participants were freshman and sophomores (i.e., 41 and 51%s,
respectively). Eight percent were upperclassmen (i.e., 6.6 and 1.3 %s were juniors and
seniors, respectively).

Design
A mixed design was used that consisted of a within-subjects factor (Cell) and two
between-subjects factors (Event Sequence and Type o f Judgment). All slides in the
current experiment were presented using a 5 s event state duration.
Cell (4 levels), the within-subjects factor, refers to participants’ estimates o f the
four forms o f causal information. Participants’ estimates were subtracted from the actual
frequencies to determine the absolute cell deviations, and signed cell deviations, and
signed unit errors for each cell. Participants judged one problem set and its frequencies of
the causal information totaled 24 events and were as follows: 10a, 4b, 2c, 8d.
Event Sequence (2 levels) refers to the orders that event states were presented:
forward and backward. The order o f the forward condition was determined by a quasi-
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random process ; its resulting order was as follows: cadaadbdbadbadadacbadada. The
quasi-random order was reversed for the backward condition.
Type o f Judgment (3 levels) refers to the point at which participants were made aware
of the judgm ent task. Participants in each condition (1) viewed the event states, (2)
estimated the frequencies o f causal information, and (3) judged the portrayed
contingency. The point at which the judgment task instmctions were read, which
informed participants o f the judgment task, varied across the three conditions. In the on
line condition, the judgment task instructions were read at the start o f the experiment. In
the memory based-PE condition, the judgment task instructions were read after viewing
the problem set. In the memory based-PR condition, the judgm ent task instructions were
read after completing the summary table.
The cues that depicted the event states were different from those used in
Experiments 1 and 2. The cues were still asymmetric (Allan, 1993) but they were
displayed adjacent to a line that partitioned the right and left halves o f the slide. The input
and output variables depicted the relation between Variables X and Y. Variable X, if
present, was depicted to the left o f the partition, while Variable Y, if present, was
depicted to its right. Microsoft PowerPoint software displayed the slides via a PC
compatible LCD projector.

Measure and Items
Participant estimated the frequencies o f causal information, judge the relative
likelihood of events, indicate their contingency judgments on a line scale, and indicate

8The four coats o f a traditional deck o f cards were assigned to one o f the four forms o f causal information
(i.e., ♦, * , *, and V for cells a, b, c, and d, respectively). Cards appropriately representing each event state
was entered into a hat and sampled without replacement. The order by the cards were removed from the hat
determined the order o f events in the forward condition.
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the certainty in their estimates. Cell estimates, judgments o f the relative likelihood, and
the certainty ratings were recorded as explained in Experiment 1.
Contingency judgments were recorded on a line judgment scale similar to that
used in Experiment 2. However, the labels and ticks were removed with the exception of
the mid- and endpoints. The line judgment scale ranged from +100 {much more likely) to
-100 {much less likely) and read as follows:
On the scale below ranging from +100 to -100, draw a mark on the line that best characterizes
the effect of Variable X on Variable Y.
+100

0

-100

I__________________ I___________________ I
Upon completing the line judgment scale, participants were asked to state the intended
numeric value and sign o f their line judgment.

Procedure
A t the start o f the experiment, participants were given a packet o f materials. The
experimenter began the session by reading the following instructions:
In this experiment you will be presented with two sequences of slides containing
abstract information. The first sequence will include 8 slides and will be used as
a practice set to familiarize you with the experimental procedure. The second
problem set will include 24 slides. The length of this experiment is expected to
be a little over an hour. We ask that you do not attempt to work ahead of the rest
of the group. Please remember to enter the last six-digits of your social security
number in the top right hand comer of each sheet. This ID number will be used to
keep information anonymous and confidential.
Throughout this experiment, the slides will present information in one of the
following four event forms.
Variable X and Variable Y may both be present: [Insert Cell a]
Variable X may be present while Variable Y may be absent: [Insert Cell b]
Variable X may be absent while Variable Y may be present: [Insert Cell c]
Variable X and Variable Y may both be absent: [Insert Cell d]
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These four forms of information can all be represented in and summarized in the
following table: [Insert Summary Table]
After viewing the slides, your task will be to fill-in the summary table with the
frequency of each of the event forms shown during the sequence. Please free
your hands of any pens or pencils during the presentation of the slides. The
experimenter will inform you when it is okay to use your pen or pencil to fill in
the summary table. The first will be a practice set consisting of 8 events, while
the second problem sets will contain 24 events.
If you have any questions concerning the procedure described thus far, please ask
them now. This is not a competition and you should not talk to, consult with or
observe the work of others. You will have 10 minutes to complete each summary
table and the follow-up questions.
Each packet also included the judgment task instructions that informed
participants o f the later judgment task, which read as follows:
Given that the two variables are presented together, a possible relationship may
exist between the two variables. In the sequence of slides, it may be the case that
Variable Y is either more likely, just as likely, or less likely to occur in the
presence of Variable X. Following the completion of the summary table, your
task will be to form a judgment of the strength and direction of the relation
between Variable X and Variable Y.
To asses your judgment of the relation between Variable X and Variable Y
several follow-up questions will be used. Among other things, you will be asked
to judge the relation between Variable X and Variable Y on a scale ranging from
+3 to -3 (i.e., as shown below) and to mark a line on a scale corresponding to the
strength and direction of the relation. In the completion of the follow-up
questions you are free to view the contents of the summary table.
Examples of the rating scales:
Example A: [Insert judgment of relative likelihood scale]
Example B: [Insert line judgment scale]
If you have any questions concerning the procedure described thus far, please ask
them now. This is not a competition and you should not talk to, consult with or
observe the work of others. You will have up to 10 minutes to complete each
summary table and the follow-up questions.
The judgment task instructions were inserted into the packet at points to accommodate
the three experimental conditions. The consent form, demographic items, and closing of
the experiment were conducted in the same manner described in Experiment 1.
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Results
Cell Deviations
As explained in Experiments 1 and 2, the discrepancies between participants’
estimates and the actual cell frequencies were used to create three variables that provide
different information about the data: mean absolute cell deviations, mean signed cell
deviations, and signed unit errors (A more detailed discussion o f the differences between
the three forms o f data can be found in the Results section o f Chapter I).
Mean Absolute Cell Deviations. To determine whether any differences existed in
the magnitude o f errors between cells, a series o f paired-samples t tests were performed
on the mean absolute cell deviations (top panel o f Table A17). Previous research suggests
that the increase in the magnitude o f errors across cells is not a robust effect
(Experiments 1 and 2; Shaklee & Mims, 1982). Therefore, two sets o f test compared
differences in the mean absolute cell deviations. The first set o f tests assessed differences
between cell a and each o f the three remaining cells, while the second set assessed
differences between the top and bottom rows o f the summary table. Tests were conducted
on the data when collapsed across all conditions and separately for each judgment task
condition.
The first set o f tests did not reveal any significant differences between cells.
When data were collapsed across all conditions, the analysis revealed that the mean
absolute cell deviation for cell a was not different than those obtained for either o f the
remaining three cells, cell b, t{16) = 1.18; cell c, t(16) = -1.73; cell d, t{76) = -0.94; allps
> .09. In the on-line condition, the mean absolute cell deviation for cell a was not
different from those obtained for either o f the remaining three cells, cell b, t(25) = 0.68;
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cell c, t(25) = -1.85; cell d, t(!5) = -.75; all ps > .08. In the on-line condition and when
data were collapsed across all conditions, the difference in the mean absolute cell
deviation between cells a and c approached but failed to reach conventional significance
(i.e., p = .09 when data were collapsed; p = .08 in the on-line condition). In the memory
based-PE condition, the mean absolute cell deviation for cell a was not different from
those obtained for the remaining three cells, cell b, t(27) = 1.10; cell c, t{27) = 0.00; cell
d, t(27) = -0.56; all p s > .29. In the memory based-PR condition, the mean absolute cell
deviation for cell a was not different from those obtained for either o f the remaining three
cells, cell b, t(22) = 0.00; cell c, t(22) = -1.31; cell d, t{22) = -0.37; all p s > .20.
The second set o f tests only indicated a significant difference for one o f the
analyses. When the data were collapsed across all conditions, the difference between the
cells in the top row and bottom row was significant, t(76) = -2.60, M se = 0.09,p = .01.
However, the difference between cells in the top and the bottom rows did approach
statistical significance in the on-line condition, t(25) = -1.94, MSE = 0.169,p = .064. All
other ps were > .14.
Mean Signed Cell Deviations. To determine whether any differences existed in
the magnitude of over- or underestimations, the mean signed cell deviations were
examined (see bottom panel o f Table A 17). The current investigation has reported
evidence that the mean signed cell deviations are positive for cell a, negative for cells b
and c, and either negative (Experiment 1) or positive (Experiment 2) for cell d. Therefore,
the paired-samples t test assessed differences between cell a and each o f the three
remaining cells. The planned comparisons were conducted on the data when collapsed
across all conditions and separately for each judgment task condition.
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For the most part, the difference in the mean signed cell deviations was significant
when cell a was contrasted with cells b and c. When collapsed across conditions, the
mean signed cell deviation for cell a was significantly different than those for cells b and
c, cell b, t(76) = -3.29, M se = 0.16; cell c, t(76) = -4.45, M se = 0.24, all p s < .05.
However, the mean absolute cell deviations for cells a and d were not significantly
different from one another, t il 6) = 0.00, M se = 0.16,p = .99. In the on-line condition, the
mean signed cell deviation for cell a was again significantly different than those for cells
b and c, t{25) = -2.82, M se ~ 0.19; t(25) = -2.87, M se = 0.40, all p s < .05. The mean
absolute cell deviations for cells a and d were also not significantly different from one
another, t(25) = 0.00, M se = 0.22, p = .99. However, the memory-based-PE condition
failed to produce significant difference between cells a and those for cells b and d, cell b,
t{27) = -1.41, M se = 0.35; t i l l ) = 0.48, M se = 0.37; all p s > .17. The mean signed cell
deviations for cell a in the memory-based-PE condition was significantly different than
that obtained for cell c, t(27) = -2.19, M se = 0.46,p < .05. In the memory based-PR
condition, the mean signed cell deviation for cell a was again significantly less than those
for cells b and c, cell b, t{22) = -2.65, M se = 0.26; cell c, t(22) = -2.74, M se ~ 0.40, all ps
< .05. The mean absolute cell deviations for cells a and d were again not significantly
different from one another, cell d, t i l l ) = -1.16, M se = 0.19, p = .26.
Signed Unit Errors. Signed unit errors were calculated, as explained in
Experiment 1. The percentage o f participants that over-, under-, or correctly estimated the
cell frequencies are shown in Tables A17 and A18. Table A18 displays the percentages
of each type o f signed unit error when collapsed across all experimental conditions (top
panel), for the forward condition (middle panel), and for the backward condition (bottom
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panel). A t test indicated that there was no difference in the percentages of correct
estimations in the event sequence conditions, t( 6) = -0.73, DiffsE = 5.37, p = .46.
Table A19 displays the percentages o f each type o f signed unit errors separately
for the judgm ent task conditions: on-line judgment condition (top panel), memory basedPE condition (middle panel), and memory based-PR condition (bottom panel). Several t
tests compared the percentages o f correct estimations between judgm ent task conditions.
There was no difference in the percentages of correct estimations in the on-line and
memory based-PE conditions or between the two memory based conditions, on-line vs.
post-encode, t(6) = 0.62, DiffsE = 5.12; post-encode vs. post-recall, t{ 6) = 0.50, DiffsE =
3.88, all jos > .1 3 . Elowever, the percentage of correct estimations in the on-line and
memory based-PR condition were significantly different from one another, t(6) = 1.39,
DiffsE = 3.68,/? < .05.

Mean signed unit errors were also calculated because they permit can serve as an
index o f participants’ tendency to over- (M > 0.00) or underestimate (M < 0.00) cell
frequencies. Means are also displayed in Tables A17 and A18. In all o f the reported
analyses, participants were more likely to underestimate confirming cases and
overestimate disconfirming cases.

Judgments
Judgments o f Relative Likelihood. Table A20 lists the frequency and cumulative
percentage o f participants that selected each option on the judgm ent o f relative likelihood
scale. The sign o f participant’s responses were used to determine judgment accuracy, as
previously done for the rule-analysis technique (See Experiments 1 &2). As displayed in
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Table A20, more than 50% of the participants correctly judged the problem set using the
judgm ent o f relative likelihood scale.
Line Judgments of Contingency. The value o f line judgments were determined by
dividing the distance o f each response from the scale’s midpoint by the total distance of
the scale’s corresponding endpoint (i.e., 0 to +100 positive responses or from 0 to -100
for negative responses). Negative line judgments (i.e., between -100 and 0) were
multiplied by negative one to distinguish them from positive judgments. All positive line
judgments were considered correct (i.e. 74.7% o f the total responses), while those that
were either negative or equal to zero were considered incorrect (i.e., 16 & 9%s o f the
total responses, respectively).
Numeric Estimate o f Contingency. Judgments accuracy was also determined
according to participants’ numeric estimates o f the strength and direction o f the
contingency. Again, all positive numeric estimates were considered correct (i.e. 71% of
the total responses), while those that were either negative or equal to zero were
considered incorrect (i.e., 18 & 1 l% s o f the total responses, respectively).
Inter-Judgment Agreement. Pearsons correlation coefficients (r) were calculated
on participant’s responses on the three judgment scales. The resulting r values are
displayed in Table A21 across all conditions and for each judgm ent task condition. The
correlations between responses on each o f the judgment scales were all significant at the
p < .01 level. Due to the design o f the current experiment, r values could not be
calculated between judgments and Ap 9.

9 The design o f the current experiment only consisted o f one problem set. For Pearsons correlation
coefficients (r) to be calculated, both variables must vary to some extent. The inclusion o f only one
contingency (Ap ) in the current experiment will not permit the calculation o f r because the value o f the
contingency will be constant. This problem is typically overcome by requiring that participants judge
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Judgment accuracies, as defined by the three judgment scales, were compared to
determine whether o f the judgment scale impacted judgment competency. Thirteen
instances were identified in which a discrepancy existed between judgments on either of
the three judgment scales (see Table KIT).

Event Sequence
A multivariate analysis o f variance (MANOVA) was used to determine whether
event sequence had an effect on either of the dependent measures reported above. There
were no reliable effects found for any o f the reported variables (all p s > .25).

Discussion
Cell Deviations
Mean Absolute Cell Deviations. Previous research has suggested that the
differential pattern in the magnitude o f errors is not a robust effect (Experiments 1 and 2;
Shaklee & Mims, 1982). Therefore, the lack o f significant differences between the mean
absolute cell deviations is not o f great concern. However, there was no evidence that the
magnitude o f errors increased across cells in any o f the reported analyses (see Table
A17). The current experiment only had one problem set, while previous experiments have
all contained 12 problem sets (i.e., Experiments 1 and 2; Shaklee and Mims, 1982).
Therefore, it might have been that the differential pattern in the magnitude o f errors
emerges after repeated exposure to the experimental procedure (see Experiment 1 for a
similar argument).
The failure to obtain the differential pattern in the magnitude o f errors in either
condition will not permit any conclusions about its likely source, as planned. If the

multiple contingencies or, more appropriate for this design, requiring that participants judge different
contingencies.
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differential pattern only occurs after repeated exposure, as suggested by the current data,
the proposed procedure can not determine its source. It is not possible to contain cell
estimates from multiple problem sets in which subjective cell importance only biases the
encoding or recalling o f cell frequencies.

Mean Signed Cell Deviations. The planned comparisons conducted on the mean
signed cell deviations categorized the effect well. However, the signs o f the first three
cells o f the summary table (i.e., cells a, b, and c) were opposite o f what was predicted.
The data indicated that the magnitude o f underestimations for confirming cases were
greater than that for overestimations and the exact opposite was true for disconfirming
cases (see bottom panel Table A 17). Again, the current experiment only included one
problem set which explain the different trend obtained in the mean signed cell deviations.

Mean Signed Unit Errors. The means of the percentages o f correct estimations,
calculated across the four cells o f each condition, were examined to determine whether
differences existed between the experimental conditions. No differences in the
percentages o f correct estimations existed between the two event sequence conditions,
which suggest that the order o f presenting event states had no effect on the likelihood of
correctly estimating cell frequencies.

The rank order o f the mean percentage o f correct estimations in the judgment task
conditions was as follows: on-line (M = 69.22, SD = 7.03), memory-based-PE (M =
66.08, SD = 7.45), and memory-based-PR conditions (M = 69.22, SD = 7.03). It may be
that knowledge o f the judgment task prompted purposeful encoding and recalling, which
resulted in an advantage when estimating cell frequencies. Participants’ knowledge o f the
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judgment task might have heightened the perceived importance o f the recall task to
ensure satisfactory performance on the later judgment task. Participants in the on-line
judgment condition purposefully encoded and recalled the event states, while those in the
memory-based-PE condition only purposefully recall them. Participants in the memorybased-PR did not purposefully encode or recall the event states, which might explain its
ranking with respect to the judgment task conditions. If purposefully encoding and
recalling do separately improve the accuracy of cell estimates, then it could account for
the rank order obtained across conditions (see Saitoh, 1981 for comments on the benefits
of meaningful learning).

The mean signed unit errors were also examined to assess participants’ tendency
to over- or underestimate cell frequencies. The mean signed unit errors indicated that
participants were more likely to underestimate confirming cases and to overestimate
disconfirming cases, which was also the opposite o f what was predicted (see Mean
Signed Cell Deviations in Results). The directions (i.e., signs) o f the mean signed unit
errors and mean signed cell deviations were identical in the current experiment. Again,
the current experiment only included one problem set which might explain the different
trend obtained in the mean signed unit errors.

Inter-Judgment Agreement. Bivariate correlations were performed to assess the
extent that participants’ judgments were similar on the judgm ent scales. The r values
between line judgments and numeric estimates o f contingency were stronger than all
other correlations (r > .97). High levels between the line and numeric estimates might
have occurred because the latter were judgments o f the former. The relative likelihood
scale was highly correlated with both the line and numeric estimates of contingency but
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to a lesser extent than they were correlated with one another (.48 > r > .78). The lower r
values between the relative likelihood scale and the other scales suggest that participants
did not use it as appropriately to judge contingency. Judgment accuracy, determined by
the sign o f participants’ judgments, also suggested that the relatively likelihood scale was
not as appropriately used as the line judgment and numeric estimate scale (i.e., 56, 71,
and 75%s o f participants’ judgments were deemed correct, respectively). On several
occasions responses on the judgment scales were inconsistent with one another (i.e.,
judgments made by the same participants contained conflicting signs; see Table A22).
Differences in judgm ent accuracy between scales suggest that individuals do perceive
them as asking different questions (see Shaklee & Tucker, 1980) and that the line
judgment and numeric estimate scales are more appropriately used to judge contingency.

Conclusions
The current experiment set out to replicate the differential pattern in the
magnitude o f errors and determine whether it was due to biased encoding or recalling of
causal information. The current experiment failed to produce a differential pattern in the
magnitude o f errors in any of the judgment task conditions. A re-analysis of Experiment
2 ’s data, reported here for the first time, suggested that the differential pattern in the
magnitude o f errors is due to averaging data across multiple problem sets. As displayed
in Table A23 (see note), the differential pattern was only present in 4 o f the 12 problem
sets. The emergence of the differential pattern only when the data are averaged is
consistent with the notion that it is not a robust effect.
The current experiment failed to produce a differential pattern in the three
judgment task conditions because it contained only one problem set. Therefore, the
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current design cannot determine whether subjective cell importance influences the
differential pattern in the magnitude o f errors. In the current design, cell estimates can
only be obtained once because subjective cell importance will likely influence of
additional estimates. However, other manipulations might provide insights into whether
subjective cell importance influences the differential pattern. Experiments typically
consists o f measures that ask questions that direct participant’s attention to cell a when
judging contingency (e.g., Benassi, Knoth, & Mahler, 1985; Dennis & Ahn, 2001; Kao &
Wasserman, 1993; Lopez et al., 1998; Mandel & Lehman, 1998; Shaklee & Mims, 1982;
Ward & Jenkins, 1965). Several experiments have demonstrated that redirecting
participant’s attention to a different cell alters participants’ beliefs about cell importance
accordingly (Crocker, 1982; White, 2003). If subjective cell importance impacts the
magnitude o f errors, then shifting participants’ attention should also alter the differential
pattern.

Differences in the mean signed cell deviations across cells were also not as
expected. The magnitude o f underestimations was greater than the overestimations for
confirming cases, while the exact opposite was true for the disconfirming cases. The
signs for cells a, b, and c were opposite o f what was found in Experiments 1 and 2, which
might be accounted for by several factors. First, the trend might have been due to the use
o f only one problem set. A similar argument was also made for the mean absolute cell
deviations. Second, it might be that the make-up o f the contingency resulted in the
following pattern. For example, the judged contingency was defined by the following
frequencies of causal information: 10a, 4b, 2c, M . The majority o f the frequencies were
confirming cases, which were consistently underestimated in the current experiment. It
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may be that participants are more likely to underestimate cells that are frequent and
overestimate cells that are relatively infrequent.

Experiment 2 ’s data was re-analyzed to determine whether the actual cell
frequencies influenced the tendency to over- or underestimate cell frequencies, reported
here for the first time. The re-analysis indicated that the magnitudes o f underestimations
were greatest for high cell frequencies (i.e., i f / > 5, then M > 0.00) and that the
magnitudes o f underestimations were greatest for those that are low (i.e., i f / > 5, then M
> 0.00). When means were calculated for each problem set, the sign o f most cells could
be predicted by assessing its frequency (i.e., 43 o f 48 cases were predicted; see Table
A24). The mean o f the cell frequencies that defined the problem sets increased across
cells a, b, c, and d in both Experiments 1 and 2 (5.08, 5.50, 6.25, & 7.17 in Experiment 1;
5.33, 5.42, 6.00, & 7.07 in Experiment 2, respectively). Therefore, the increase in the
mean cell frequencies across cells a, b, c, and d can account for the differential pattern in
the mean signed cell deviations. The same argument can be made for the differential
pattern of errors in the mean signed unit errors because their signs have, for the most part,
been the same across experiments.

To address the possibility that the increase in the magnitude o f errors might also
be accounted for by an increase in the magnitude o f errors, the mean absolute cell
deviations from Experiment 2 were also re-analyzed (Table A23). In only 5 o f the 12
problem sets was the magnitude o f errors lowest for the most infrequent cell and only on
three occasions was it the second lowest cell that had the second lowest frequency (see
Table A23 note). Therefore, it is unlikely that the cell frequencies also accounted for the
increase in the mean absolute cell deviations. In addition, the mean cell frequencies
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increased across all four cells and the magnitude of errors for cell d was never found to
be higher than that for cell c (cf. Shaklee & Mims, 1982).

Last, the current experiment also provided evidence that the structure o f the
judgm ent scale might influence the obtained judgment. There has been limited research
dedicated to the impact o f judgment scales on the likelihood o f obtaining accurate
judgments o f contingency (Arkes & Rothbart, 1985; Shaklee & Tucker, 1980). If
judgment scales do affect judgm ent accuracy, then further questions must also be asked.
Researchers might wish to determine the judgment scale that is most likely to produce
veridical judgments. Researchers might also wish to identify the judgm ent scale that is
interpreted by participants as the equivalent to definition used in the contingency
judgment literature.
In closing, the failure to support both the first and second proposed hypotheses
was beneficial to the current investigation. As a result, it became evident that the
differential pattern in the magnitude o f errors is a by-product o f averaging data. It also
became evident that the differential pattern in the mean signed cell deviations and the
mean signed unit errors are influenced by the cell frequencies used to define the problem
sets. The third hypothesis, however, was supported and it suggested that different
judgment items can be interpreted by participants as asking different questions that
warrant vastly different responses. Although the majority o f the current’s experiments
were null, they contributed greatly to the current investigation and has benefited this line
of research.
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CHAPTER IV

EXPERIMENT 4: THE SURPRISE ELEMENT

Research comparing on-line and memory-based judgment is limited in the number
o f problem sets that can be used to facilitate between-groups comparisons. Only one
memory-based judgm ent can be obtained from each participant because additional
inferences are likely to be on-line judgments. On-line judgments occur, by definition,
when the individual is aware o f the judgment task and updates his or her judgment as the
relevant information is encountered. Memory-based judgments occur when the relevant
information is encoded for another purpose; therefore, it must be recalled to form a
judgment after the fact (Arkes & Rothbart, 1985; Hastie, Park, & Weber, 1984).
Experiment 3 compensated for the limited number o f judgments with a practice
problem set and practice slide. The practice problem set consisted o f 8 event states (i.e.,
3a, 2b, 2c, 1d) and the practice slide re-introduced them, in the same order, on a timeline.
As the event states completed the once blank timeline, the cells o f an adjacent summary
table were simultaneously updated to reflect the causal information that had been
introduced. At the end o f the practice slide, the cells o f the summary table were
consistent with that which defined the practice problem set.
The practice problem set and practice slide were intended to familiarize
participants with the recall task. Task familiarity was a concern because of the limited
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number o f problem sets can be used10. In retrospect, the practice problem set and practice
slide may have suggested a means by which to remember the cell frequencies. Therefore,
the practice problem set and practice slide might also account for the absent differential
patterns in Experiment 3 (see Experiment 3 for additional arguments).
A more elaborate technique will be used in the current experiment to ensure task
familiarity that does not also suggest a means by which to complete the task. Participants
in the memory-based and on-line conditions will view 5 problem sets. Participants in the
memory-based condition will be told that the experiment is concerned with their ability to
recall the cell frequencies, while those in the on-line condition will be told that it is
concerned with their ability to judge the relation between events. After observing the
fourth problem set, participants in both conditions will, for the first time, be informed of
their second task. Participants in the memory-based condition will judge the relation
between the events, while those in the on-line condition will be asked to recall the cell
frequencies. This procedure is also limited in the number o f problem sets that can be used
to facilitate between-groups comparisons; however, participants should be familiar with
the experimental task when the data are obtained.
Two hypotheses are proposed in the current experiment. First, it is expected that
there will be a stronger relationship between judgments and inferred contingency (Ap ’)
than between judgments and actual contingency (Ap) in both judgm ent task conditions.
Both Ap and Ap ’ are calculated using the same equation; however, actual cell frequencies
10 Two observations from previous experiments also suggested that some percentage o f participants might
not have been completely familiar with the experimental task upon starting the first problem set. First, on
occasions participants have asked questions about the experimental task after having viewed the first
problem set. Questions were asked even though the experimenter previously had asked, prior to starting the
first problem set, whether anyone had any questions. Second, several participants in previous experiments
did not provide estimates for the first problem set (i.e., 1 and 4 participants in Experiments 1 and 2,
respectively). Although only a speculation, it might be that participants that did not provide estimates for
the problem set were not familiar with the task after viewing it.
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serve as inputs for Ap and participants’ estimates o f the cell frequencies are used for Ap
The Ap statistic is frequently used as an index of the extent that variables are related,
while I have argued that Ap ’ is an index o f the perceived contingency (Note that Ap ’
oftentimes differs from Ap due to memory error; see Experiments 1-3). Second, it is
expected that there will be a stronger relationship between participants’ judgments and
Ap ’ in the memory-based condition than in the on-line condition.

Method
Participants
Ninety-six students (20 males and 75 females, mean age = 19.43) enrolled in
lower-level psychology courses at the University o f New Hampshire participated in the
current experiment. All participants received course credit for their participation. Sixty
and 24%s o f the participants were freshman and sophomores, respectively. Sixteen
percent were upperclassmen (i.e., 12.6 and 3.4%s were juniors and seniors, respectively).

Design
The design consisted o f a within-subjects factor (Cell) and a between-subjects
factor (Type of Judgment). Cell (4 levels) refers to participants’ estimates o f the actual
cell frequencies, which are displayed in Table A25 with the Ap for each problem set.
Type o f Judgment (2 levels) refers to the judgment task that distinguished the two
experimental conditions. Abstract and contextual cues represented the event states, which
were identical to those used in Experiment 2. Microsoft PowerPoint software displayed
the slides via a PC compatible LCD projector at a rate o f 1 event state every 4 s.
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Measure and Items
Participants, when appropriate, estimated the frequencies of causal information
(i.e., the recall task), judged the contingency (i.e., the judgment task), and indicated their
certainty in the previously completed recall task and/or judgment task. All measures were
identical to those used in Experiment 2.

Procedure
Participants received a packet that contained the instructions, consent form, five
multiple-item measures, and debriefing form. The consent form was administered after
the instructions; the instructions in the memory-based condition read as follows:
In the current experiment you will view five Problem Sets that portray the Event
States of two variables. Event States provide distinct information about the
absence or presence of the two variables. Consider the case in which two
variables correspond to Cows (Variable 1) and Grass (Variable 2). It may be the
case that either the Cows and Grass are present on a farm (Event State 1 - Cell 1)
or that Cows are present and there is No Grass (Event State 2 - Cell 2), It might
also be the case that there are No Cows and Grass is present (Event State 3 - Cell
3) or that there are No Cows and No Grass (Event State 4 - Cell 4) on the farm.
The five Problem Sets will each consist of 24 Event States and will be defined by
any combination of the four Event States, as described above.
[Insert Summary Table]
During the viewing of each Problem Set, you must put down your writing utensil
and rest your hands. After viewing each Problem Set, you will be prompted to
recall the number of instances that each of the four Event States occurred. With
your pen or pencil, please enter the number of times that each Event State
occurred in the appropriate cells of a blank table, like the one above.
If you have any questions concerning the procedure described thus far, please ask
them now. This is not a competition and you should not talk to, consult with, or
observe the work of others.
The instructions for the on-line condition differed from those listed above. The
differences informed participants o f the judgment task instead o f the recall task and read
as follows:
During the viewing of each Problem Set, you must put down your writing utensil
and rest your hands. After viewing each Problem Set, you will be prompted to
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judge the relationship between the set of Event States. With your pen or pencil,
please mark on the provided the extent that the two variables are related as
portrayed by the event states.
[Insert Contingency Scale]
In the two experimental conditions, the task order for Problem Sets 4 and 5
differed. Participants in the on-line condition viewed the problem set, completed the
recall task, judged the extent that the two variables are related, and then completed the
two certainty ratings. Participants in the memory-based condition viewed the problem set,
completed the judgment task, estimated the frequencies o f causal information, and then
completed the two certainty ratings.
The demographic items and closing o f the experiment were conducted in the
manner described in Experiment 1.

Results
Judgments
Bivariate Correlations. Pearsons correlation coefficients (r) were calculated
between judgments o f contingency, Ap, and Ap ’ when the data were collapsed across all
conditions and separately for each judgment task condition (see Table A29). When the
data were collapsed across all conditions, judgments were significantly correlated with
Ap, r = 0.37, n = 327,p < .01. Judgments o f contingency were also significantly
correlated with Ap ’, r= 0.29, n = 153,/? < .01. The difference between the two previously
mentioned correlations was not significant, t(327) = 1.88, p = .97. Last, Ap andp ’ were
significantly correlated with one another, r= 0.66, n = 330, p < .01.
A similar pattern was found in the on-line condition. Judgments were again
significantly correlated with Ap, r = 0.25, n = 232, p < .01. Judgments o f contingency
were also significantly correlated with A p ’,r = 0.62, n = 90, p < .01. The difference
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between the two previously mentioned correlations was also significant, t{229) = -10.45,
p < .05. Last, Ap andp ’ were also significantly correlated with one another, r - 0.73, n 95,p < .01.
A similar pattern was also found in the memory-based condition. Judgments were
again significantly correlated with Ap and A p ’, Ap, r = 0.67, n = 95; A p ',r = 0.55, n = 93;
all p s <.01. The difference between the two previously mentioned correlations was not
significant, t{92) = 2.11 , p = .98. Last, Ap andp ’ were also significantly correlated with
one another, r= 0.73, n = 95,p < .01.
To test the second hypothesis, the difference in the correlations between
judgments and Ap ’ in the memory-based and on-line conditions was tested for
significance. The difference between judgments and A p ’ in the judgm ent task conditions
was not significant, 2dxff— .71, p = .76.
Judgment Accuracy. Mean judgments are displayed for all problem sets in Table
A25. Only the resulting mean judgments for Problem Sets 4 and 5 are discussed because
they were the only two judged by all participants. Mean judgments for Problem Set 4 in
the memory-based condition (M = .27, SD = .26, Mdn = .30, Mode = .30) and on-line
condition (M = .21, SD = .36, Mdn = .20, Mode = .00) were both appropriately positive.
Mean judgments for Problem Set 5 in the memory-based condition (M = -.28, SD = .34,
Mdn = -.30, Mode = .00) and on-line condition (M = .27, SD = .36, Mdn = -.30, Mode = .30) were both appropriately negative.
Judgment accuracy was also determined by the sign o f participants’ resulting
judgments, as done for the rule-analysis technique (see Shaklee, 1983). Problem Set 4
was correctly judged by 60% o f the participants in the memory-based and 75% and those
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in the on-line judgment conditions. Problem Set 5 was correctly judged by 64% of the
participants in the memory-based and 77% o f those in the on-line judgment conditions.

Cell Deviations
The discrepancies between participants’ estimates and the actual frequencies of
causal information were used to create three variables that provide different information
about the data: mean absolute cell deviations, mean signed cell deviations, and signed
unit errors (see Chapter I for more details).
Mean Absolute and Signed Cell Deviations. There were no hypotheses or planned
comparisons proposed for the mean absolute or signed cell deviations (see Tables A26
and A27, respectively). Therefore, the data will be reviewed in the Discussion.
Mean Signed Unit Errors. Table A28 displays the percentage o f correct
estimations for each problem set, separately for each cell. Figure B2 displays the trend in
the mean percentage o f correct estimations (listed as % Correct), calculated across the
four cells, for each problem set. The trend across problem sets was not expected;
therefore, paired-samples t tests were conducted to assess the differences across problem
sets post hoc (i.e., Problem Set 1 ^ 2, 2 ^ 3, 3 ^ 4, 4 ^ 5). In the memory-based condition,
differences in the mean percentage o f correct estimations between Problem Sets 1 and 2,
3 and 4, and 4 and 5 were significant, 1 vs. 2, t(3) = -3.51, M se —4.17; 3 vs. 4, t{3) =
6.70, M se = 4.53; 4 vs. 5, t(3) = -4.53, M se = 3.70; all p s < .05. No other differences in
either condition reached statistical significance.
Table A28 also displays the mean signed unit errors from the current experiment,
which will also be reviewed in the Discussion.
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Discussion
Judgments
Bivariate Correlations. As was the case in Experiment 2, the correlations between
judgments and Ap as well as between judgments and Ap ’ were all significant. To test the
first hypothesis, the difference in the correlations between judgments and Ap and
judgments and Ap ’ was calculated. The difference was only significant the on-line
condition, in which the relation between judgments and Ap ’ (r = .62) was significantly
stronger than that for judgments and Ap (r = .25). Not only was there not a significant
difference between the correlations in the memory-based condition, but the values were
not in the expected direction. That is, the correlation between judgments and Ap (r = .67,
p < .05) was slightly lower than that between judgments and Ap ’ (r = .55, p < .05).
A number o f factors may have contributed to the reported results. First, the task
order in the memory-based condition differed from that used in previous experiments.
Forming a judgment prior to declaring the estimates of causal information may have
impaired cell accuracy (i.e., due to forgetting and/or interference). Evidence suggests that
cell accuracy for Problem Set 4 in the memory-based condition was affected as a result of
forming their judgm ent first. As displayed in Figure B2, the mean percentage of correct
estimations increased across the first three problem sets; however, it decreased on
Problem Set 4 (M = 19.48, SD = 3.10) to levels comparable to that on the first problem
set (M = 19.70, SD = 1.93). It may be that the mental representation stored in memory
was rapidly deteriorating as time passed. The deterioration might also have been
exacerbated by the introduction of the judgment task n . Introducing the judgment task

11 In the current and previous experiments, participants have been observed declaring their frequency
estimates very quickly at the end o f the problem set and being told to complete the multi-item measure.
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prolonged the declaring o f the frequency estimates, which may have resulted in the
declared estimates being quite different from that which was used to form their judgment.
Judgment Accuracy. Judgment accuracy was assessed using two techniques.
Mean judgments were calculated and the percentages of correct judgments were
compared. Mean judgments in the on-line (M = .27, SD = .26) and memory-based
conditions (M = .21, SD = .36) for Problem Set 4 were similar in sign and strength, which
suggests that regardless o f the judgment task condition participants arrived at similar
judgments.
The data indicated that a slightly higher percentage o f participants in the on-line
condition correctly judged Problem Sets 4 and 5 (i.e., 75 and 77%s, respectively) than in
the memory-based condition (60 and 64%s, respectively). I have argued that perhaps Ap ’
is a more appropriate statistic from which to determine judgment accuracy, which seems
even more appropriate for the memory-based condition. A re-analysis of the data
obtained for Problem Set 4 indicated that five participants perceived (i.e., according to
their Ap ’) a negative contingency and provided a negative judgment. In addition, three
participants perceived a noncontingent relation (i.e., -.05> Ap ’> .05) and judged it as
noncontingent. The same analysis for Problem Set 5 indicated that three participants
perceived a noncontingent relation (i.e., -.05> Ap ’ > .05) and judged it as noncontingent.
No participant perceived the relation as negative and judged it accordingly. Judgment
accuracy improves in both the memory-based (i.e., 71 and 77% for Problem Sets 4 and 5,
respectively) and on-line conditions (i.e., 81 and 67%s for Problem Sets 4 and 5,

Participant’s eagerness to complete the measure may have been due to their own knowledge that the
accuracy o f their recall is greatly reduced as time passes.
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respectively) if judgments consistent with A p’ are also considered correct, which further
supports the notion that it can be used to assess judgment accuracy.

Cell Deviations
M ean Absolute Cell Deviations. The lack o f a general trend in the magnitude of
errors might have been due to several factors (Table A26). First, it might have been that
the current experiment did not contain enough problem sets for the differential pattern to
emerge (see Experiment 3 for an extended argument). Second, the mean percentage of
correct estimations was impaired by the introduction o f the judgment or recall task during
Problem Set 4. Introducing a novel task may have interfered with the emergence of the
differential pattern. Last, judgments were not required for Problem Sets 1 through 3 in the
memory-based condition. I have argued throughout this investigation that the differential
pattern in the magnitude o f errors might be due to beliefs about each cell’s importance for
judging contingency. Therefore, Problem Sets 4 and 5 in the memory-based condition are
the only problem sets in which beliefs about subjective cell importance could have biased
participants’ cell estimates.
In Experiment 3, the increase in the magnitude o f errors across cells was affected
by an increase in the mean cell frequencies. The mean cell frequencies did not increase
across cells in the current experiment: 6.2, 5.4, 7.8, and 5.2 for cells a, b, c, and d.
Therefore, differences in the mean absolute cell deviations across cells might prove
relevant. When data were calculated across the entire experiment, there was no evidence
that the magnitude o f errors increased as the mean cell frequencies increased (see last row
of Table A26). The magnitude o f errors did increase as cell frequencies increased within
problem sets (i.e., in 20 o f the possible 48 cases; see note in Table A26), which is
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extremely damaging to the results first reported by Shaklee and M ims’ (1982). Future
research is needed to determine whether the increase in the magnitude o f errors is due to
10

an increase in the mean cell frequencies .
Mean Signed Cell Deviations. There also were no proposed hypotheses for the
mean absolute cell deviations (Table A27). As was the case with the data obtained in
Experiments 2 and 3, the directions (i.e., signs) of the mean signed cell deviations were
well predicted by the actual cell frequencies (i.e., 33 of 36 cells were correctly predicted;
see note in Table A27). Participants underestimated cell frequencies to a greater extent
when they were high (i.e., i f / > 5, then M > 0.00) and overestimated them to a greater
extent when they were low (i.e., i f / > 5, then M > 0.00; see Table A27); this tendency
will hereafter be referred to as the cell estimation rule. Ironically, the cell estimation rule
was not successful predicting the sign of the mean signed cell deviations in the memorybased condition; that is, when calculated across problem sets (Ms = 6.2, 5.4, 7.8, and 5.2
for cells a, b, c, and d). The cell estimation rule did predict the signs o f the mean signed
cell deviations when calculated across all problem sets in the on-line condition13.
Signed Unit Errors. When the signed unit errors were calculated, three trends
were identified in which the percentage o f correct estimations increased across
consecutive Problem Sets (Figure B2). There was an increase across the first three
problem sets in the memory-based condition and, after a significant decrease between

12 The problem sets in the current experiment were not designed to assess whether an increase in the
absolute value o f the cell frequencies resulted in an increase in the magnitude o f errors. As a result, the
difference in the mean cell frequencies between cells b and d was very small. A larger discrepancy in the
mean cell frequencies between cells b and d would have permitted this hypothesis to be fully addressed.
13 Note that the means averaged across all problem sets in the on-line condition were not based on five
problem sets because estimates were only required following Problem Sets 4 and 5. Therefore, the mean
cell frequencies in the on-line condition were different for cells a, b, c, and d (i.e., 6.5, 6.5, 5, and 6,
respectively). This signs o f the mean signed cell deviations were well predicted in the on-line condition by
the cell estimation rule.
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Problem Sets 3 (M = 50.03, SD = 8.82) and 4 (M = 19.70, SD = 1.93), it again increased
in both the memory-based and on-line conditions. The increase in the percentage of
correct estimations suggests that correctly estimating cell frequencies improves with
practice, which is consistent with the notion that strategies are used to aid recall (see
Experiments 1 and 2). The decrease in the percentage o f correct estimations in the
memory-based condition was argued above to have been due to either the introduction of
the judgment task or the order o f the two experimental tasks (see Bivariate Correlations
in Discussion).
The mean signed unit errors were also calculated (Table A28). As with previous
experiments, there was a high level o f consistency between the signs o f mean signed unit
errors and the mean signed cell deviations. Therefore, the cell estimation rule could also
predict the sign o f the mean signed unit error. There was one discrepancy in the signs
between the mean signed unit errors and mean signed cell deviations occurred for cell d
in Problem Set 1, in which the cell estimation rule predicted a negative sign and the mean
signed unit error was positive (M = .02, SD = .90). The high level o f consistency
between the two variables implies that when participants are more likely to overestimate
cell frequencies their magnitudes are greater than the underestimations. The exact
opposite can be said for the underestimations.

Conclusions
To summarize, contingency judgments were more highly correlated with Ap ’ than
with Ap. The one exception occurred in the memory-based condition, in which the
correlation between judgments and Ap was not different from that between judgments
and Ap ’. As a result, the first hypothesis was partially supported.
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The second hypothesis was clearly not supported. The difference in the
correlations between judgments and Ap ’ in the memory-based and on-line conditions was
not significant. In fact, the difference was in the opposite direction from that which was
expected. The results o f the current experiment suggest that judgments are more highly
correlated with memory in the on-line condition than in the memory-based condition,
which is the exact opposite o f what was predicted. However, the order in which the recall
and judgment task were completed differed in the on-line and memory-based conditions.
Perhaps if they were equated, the second hypothesis would have been supported.
The current experiment provided further support for the use o f Ap ’ to assess
judgment accuracy. The percentages of judgment accuracy were also improved when the
sign o f Ap ’ was used instead of Ap (cf. Shaklee & Mims, 1982; Shaklee & Tucker, 1980).
It seems reasonable to assess judgment accuracy with what the individual remembers o f
the contingency (Ap ’) rather than with the actual contingency (Ap). The use o f Ap ’ seems
even more justified when time has elapsed between the viewing o f the events and the
forming of the judgm ent or when the frequencies o f causal information are unknown (i.e.,
to the experimenter and to the individual). Future research should attempt to quantify the
benefits of using Ap ’ over Ap when assessing judgment accuracy (see Experiment 3 for a
more detailed discussion).
The current experiment did not intend to address the impact o f the actual cell
frequencies on cell deviations and, as a result, strong conclusions can not be made.
However, the mean absolute and mean signed cell deviations were both influenced by the
actual cell frequencies. The influence o f the actual cell frequencies on the cell deviations
is independent o f beliefs about subjective cell importance. To the best o f my knowledge,
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no body o f psychological research has documented tendencies to estimate frequencies in
the manners reported in the current experiment. Therefore, the impact of each cell’s
frequency on the cell estimates may be an artifact o f the experimental task.

Summary of Phases I and II: General Discussion
The current investigation has documented several important contributions to the
contingency judgment literature. The following discussion summarizes the main
contributions o f the second phase o f the current investigation, while mentioning related
areas that will benefit from further research.

Cell Deviations
Mean Absolute Cell Deviations. The current investigation set out to determine
whether participants differentially make errors when recalling cell frequencies, as
suggested by Shaklee and Mims (1982). Initially, it was argued that the differential
pattern in the magnitude o f errors were due to beliefs about subjective cell importance.
For example, the rank order of participants’ beliefs about cell importance (i.e., a > b> c>
d) might have influenced the magnitude o f errors when recalling cell frequencies (i.e., a <
b < c < d). The current investigation never found that the magnitude o f errors increased
across all four cells (cf. Shaklee & Mims, 1982). However, the magnitude o f errors did
increase across the first three cells (see Experiments 1 & 2). Evidence suggested that the
differential pattern in the magnitude o f errors is a weak effect that is not promoted by
beliefs about subjective cell importance, but by the cell frequencies used to define
problem sets. In Shaklee and Mims’ (1982) experiment and Phase I o f the current
investigation, the increase in the magnitude o f errors was confounded by an increase in
the mean cell frequencies. However, the mean cell frequencies did not increase across
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cells in Experiment 4 and, within problem sets, increases in the magnitude o f errors
tracked the increase in cell frequencies (see Table A26 note). Further research is needed.
However, the evidence gathered thus far challenges the results first reported by Shaklee
and Mims (1982).
M ean Signed Cell Deviations. Originally, there were no proposed hypotheses
about the mean signed cell deviations and it was unknown whether they would provide
any useful insights about the data. Data throughout the current investigation suggested
that the actual cell frequencies influenced whether the magnitude of errors was greater for
over- or underestimations. If the cell frequency was less than or greater than 5, then the
magnitude o f errors was greater for over- or underestimations, respectively. The
influence of the actual cell frequency on the magnitude and direction o f estimation errors
was referred to as the cell estimation rule. The one limitation o f the cell estimation rule is
that it can not predict the sign o f the mean signed cell deviations for cells that contain 5
events. If a cell contained 5 events the magnitude o f errors were equally as likely to be
either under- or overestimations.
The cell estimation rule might be explained by a ceiling and floor effect. The
greater magnitude o f overestimations for cell frequencies less than 5 might be explained
by a floor effect. The range of possible estimates on the lower end is restricted because a
negative frequency is not possible, which might permit the unrestricted range of the upper
end (i.e., overestimations) to be o f a greater magnitude and result in a positive mean
signed cell deviation. While a real ceiling does not exist on the upper end for cell
frequencies greater than 5, it could be argued that participants are aware that the problem
sets are not exclusively defined by one event state. Therefore, knowledge of the
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distribution o f events might similarly serve as a ceiling and restrict the upper-end of
participants’ estimates.
Mean Signed Unit Errors. The signed unit errors served two purposes throughout
the current investigation. First, signed unit errors permitted an assessment o f the
percentages o f estimates that were over-, under-, and correct estimations. The signed unit
errors permitted an indication o f the likelihood o f errors when estimating cell
frequencies, which was absent from the work reported by Shaklee and Mims (1982).
Close to 50% o f the total estimations were correct. Shortening the event state duration
(Experiment 1) and introducing a surprise task (Experiment 4) decreased the percentage
o f correct estimations. Second, the mean signed unit error served as an index o f the
tendency to over- or underestimate cell frequencies. The signs o f the mean signed unit
errors and mean signed cell deviations were, for the most part, consistent with one
another; however, occasionally their signs were different and on each o f those occasions
the latter variable was better predicted by the cell estimation rule. Therefore, the mean
signed cell deviations are better characterized by the cell estimation rule. The tendency to
over- or underestimate actual cell frequencies was systematic, which differed from that
concluded by Smedslund (1963). The cell estimation rule, when applied to the data
reported by Smedslund (1963; see Table II in Smedslund on pp. 168), could not predict
the tendency to over- or underestimate cells in his experiment. However, numerous
differences exist between the two procedures which might not warrant such a
comparison.
Final Reflections on Cell Estimates. The current investigation demonstrates that
cell estimates are influenced by a variety of situational factors. First, knowledge o f the
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total number o f event states influenced the sums of participant’s estimates (see
Experiment 2). Second, knowledge o f the distribution o f causal information is thought to
influence the upper end o f participant’s estimates; that is, when cells contain more than 5
events (see Experiment 4). The two previously mentioned influences suggest that
knowledge o f the situation promotes cognitive reasoning that affects reports o f that stored
in memory. Similar types o f reasoning might always aid memory and pure indications of
that stored in memory are never obtained, especially when reporting on complex or
ambiguous events. Similar plausible forms o f reasoning have been found to influence
discourse processing (e.g., Lea, 1995; Lea, Mulligan, & Walton, 2005), memory o f
pictures (e.g., Allport, 1954; Seamon, et al., 2002), and eyewitness testimonies (e.g.,
Tuckey & Brewer, 2003). Perhaps there is a natural tendency to incorporate logical
reasoning into the interpreting o f information stored in memory (see Bartlett, S. F. C.,
2003; Von Hecker, 2004).

Memory and Judgment
The primary purpose o f the current investigation was to illuminate the role o f
memory for judging contingency, which has not received much attention in the
experimental literature. The current investigation documented evidence that warrants the
continued investigation o f the role o f memory forjudging contingency, which will be
discussed below.
First, the current investigation suggests that contingency judgments are based on
individuals’ memory o f the contingency. Contingency judgments were more highly
correlated with Ap ’, which uses estimates o f cell frequencies, rather than Ap, which uses
the actual cell frequencies. I argue that judgments are more highly correlated with Ap ’
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because participants crudely attempt to judge contingency from the frequencies of causal
information. Participants’ estimates of the cell frequencies often differ from that which
actually occurred. Experiments 2 and 4 suggest that compensating for each participant’s
discrepant mental representation (i.e., calculating Ap ’) improved the ability to predict
contingency judgments; that is, with respect to the ability to predict judgments from Ap.
In other words, errors in judgment can partially be accounted for by errors in memory.
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the information stored in memory is used to
judge contingency.
Second, the current investigation suggests that judgments are formed by rulebased strategies or some rough approximation o f them because the only difference
between Ap, a rule-based strategy, and Ap ’ are its inputs. Therefore, the higher
correlation obtained when correlating judgments with Ap ’, instead o f Ap, suggests that
judgments are formed in a manner that approximates the delta rule. Shaklee (1983)
pointed out that the outputs of all of the rule-based strategies are highly correlated with
one another. Therefore, suggesting that the current experiment provides evidence for one
specific rule is not warranted. The marked improvement in the correlations when using
Ap ' also suggests that some computational process is at work when judging contingency.
Both the Rule-Based and Belief-Revision Models have computational components in
their accounts o f contingency judgment; therefore, the results are more in favor with their
accounts than with the Associative Model.
Third, the current investigation suggests an alternative means by which to assess
the accuracy o f contingency judgments. There has been some debate as to the
appropriateness o f using a normative statistic to assess the accuracy of participants’
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judgments (Mandel & Lehman, 1998; Shaklee, 1983). I have argued that perhaps Ap ’ is a
more appropriate means by which to compare judgment accuracy. Further research is
needed to quantify the benefits o f using Ap ’ over Ap; however, the arguments proposed
here have been promising. For example, it has been argued that Ap ’ might be more
beneficial when the relevant information is not controlled or known to the experimenter.
It may also be that causal knowledge, preconceived notions, stereotypes, illusory
correlations, and biases are the result o f inaccurate Ap
Final Reflections on Judgment and Memory. The current investigation has
demonstrated that the role o f memory forjudging contingency deserves experimental
attention. The issues discussed within the current investigation have investigated two
possible applications of the role o f memory forjudging contingency. That is, the memory
of causal information and the dependence o f judgments on memory under different task
conditions. There are many other components of memory that are relevant to contingency
judgments. For instance, the frequency estimates were more than likely stored in short
term memory. While forming the contingency judgm ent is likely to occur in working
memory, which many believe is different from short-term memory (Baddeley, 1995;
Baddeley, 2000). The Belief-Revision Model holds that past causal knowledge impacts
contingency judgments, which is more than likely stored in and retrieved from long-term
memory. Therefore, all three major structures o f memory (i.e., short-term, working, long
term memory) are worthy o f investigation.
Future directions in the current line o f research will explore the naturalistic
applications o f the current investigation’s finding. For example, the contingencies used
throughout the current investigation were defined by, on average, 24 event states.
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Judgments made in naturalistic settings are often based on much larger samples. It must
be determined whether the relationship between judgment and memory exist when
frequencies are unknown or are high in quantity. Consider the relationship between
memory and judgments in free-operant procedures. Free-operant procedures permit
participants to respond on an operandum as many times as they wish throughout a set
period o f time and their responses either will or will not produce an outcome (Allan,
1993). High rates of responding are frequently observed using free-operant procedures
(Benassi, Knoth, and Mahler, 1985; Wasserman, Chatlosh, & Neunaber, 1983).
Therefore, it is unlikely that a participant would form a judgm ent on the actual
frequencies o f causal information. However, participants would be capable o f estimating
the percentage o f each o f the four forms o f causal information. The delta rule produces
the exact same output when the percentages o f each event state are used as inputs instead
of its actual frequencies14. It may be that participants use a similar process when judging
contingency when the total number o f frequencies are unknown or are abundant.
Future research should also address the major limitation encountered in the
current investigation. In Experiment 4, the data did not indicate that judgments in the
memory-based condition were more highly correlated with Ap ’ than with Ap. The failure
was argued to have been the result o f switching the task order, which intended to rule out
an alternative explanation for the results obtained in Experiments 1, 2, and 3. Switching
the task order intended to demonstrate that declaring cell estimates before forming a
judgment did not increase the likelihood that judgments were based on their frequencies,

14 Consider the following contingency: 1 la, 4b, 8c, Id. The percentages o f the causal information are .46,
.33, .16, and .04, respectively. That is, if the frequencies are divided by the number o f event that defined the
problem set (i.e., 24). The output o f the delta rule based on the percentages (.46/[.46+.33])- (. 14/[. 16+.04])
= -.22) is identical to its output when the frequencies are used (1 1/[1 l+ 4])-(8/[8+ l]) = -.22).
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which might not have occurred otherwise. Fortunately, there are other ways to reduce the
likelihood that declaring cell estimates influences the following judgment. First, the order
in which the event states are requested might be counterbalanced. The order in which cell
estimates were declared might have suggested a ranking o f their importance or a means to
integrate them to judge contingency (see Wasserman, Dorner, & Kao, 1990 for a similar
argument). Second, the request for estimates o f the frequencies o f causal information
might be listed in sentence form (see Crocker, 1982). As argued earlier (see
Introduction), the presence of the contingency table might elicit a greater tendency for
participants to a use rule-based strategy when judging contingency. Third, upon declaring
each frequency estimate they can immediately be removed from the participants’
presence. Any combination o f the above stated manipulations might compensate for the
concern that motivated changing the task order in Experiment 4. The most logical
progression o f this line o f research is to address the previously mentioned concerns,
which will serve to strengthen the arguments stated throughout this investigation.
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APPENDIX A
Table A l.
Means an d Standard Deviations o f Each Judged Problem Set in Experiment 1.

Block

1

2

3

CS

Causal Information

Contingency
(Ap)

Judgment
M

SD

11a, 4b, lc, 8d

.62

.62

.23

4a, lb, 3c, 16d

.64

.54

.26

4a, 4b, lc, 15d

.44

.54

.27

2a, 12b, 0c, lOd

.14

.50

.29

6a, 6b, 6c, 6d

.00

.52

.26

4a, 4b, 8c, 8d

.00

.46

.21

8a, 5b, 9c, 2d

-.20

.53

.24

la, 5b, 3c, 15d

.00

.51

.30

la, 8b, 11c, 4d

-.62

.51

.26

4a, li b , 8c, la

-.62

.51

.21

4a, 4b, 15c, Id

-.44

.51

.25

12a, 2b, 10c, Od

-.14

.60

.23

6a, 6b, 6c, 6d

.00

.54

.27

Note. Judgments o f strength were divided by 100 to facilitate comparisons with
contingency. Ap = delta p; SD = standard deviations; CS = comparison set.
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A2.
Number o f Participants in Each Experimental Condition in Experiment 1.

Slide
Duration

Block
Order

3 sec

5 sec

Type o f Cue
Abstract

Context

1-2-3

7

11

2-3-1

11

12

3-1-2

11

9

1-2-3

11

10

2-3-1

10

10

3-1-2

8

10
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A3.
Means and Standard Deviations o f Absolute and Signed Cell Deviations in Experiment 1.

Contingency Table Cell

Slide Duration
a

b

c

d

All Cells

Mean Absolute Cell Deviations
3 Second

0.95 (0.83)

1.15 (0.79)

1.20 (1.01)

1.10(0.98)

1.10(0.05)

5 Second

0.60 (0.65)

0.65 (0.60)

0.59 (0.55)

0.65 (0.62)

0.62 (0.02)

All Conditions

0.78 (0.76)

0.90 (0.74)

0.90 (0.87)

0.88 (0.85)

0.87 (0.03)

Mean Signed Cell Deviations

3 Second

.21 (.73)

-.17 (.53)

-.15 (.48)

-.03 (.64)

-.04 (.09)

5 Second

.19 (.48)

-.09 (.43)

.01 (.42)

-.01 (.46)

.03 (.06)

All Conditions

.20 (.61)

-.13 (.48)

-.07 (.45)

-.02 (.56)

-.03 (.08)

Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations (for cells a, b, c, and d) and the
standard error o f the means (for All Cells).
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A4.
Percentage o f Recalled Frequencies that were Overt, Correct, and Under Estimations o f
the Contingency Table Cells in Experiment 1.

Contingency Table Cell

Type of
S ul Xll 3X1011

a

b

c

d

All Conditions (n = 1433)
% Over
% Correct
% Under
Mean

21.4

19.2

20.0

21.4

61.9

56.5

58.3

60.0

16.7

24.4

21.8

18.6

.05 (.62)

-.05 (.66)

-.02 (.65)

-.03 (.63)

3 S Slide Duration Only (n = 731)
% Over
% Correct
% Under
Mean

25.7

23.3

23.9

25.4

54.6

46.9

48.4

51.8

19.7

29.8

27.6

22.7

.06 (.67)

-.07 (.73)

-.04 (.72)

-.03 (.69)

5 S Slide Duration Only (n = 702)
% Over
% Correct
% Under
Mean

17.0

15.0

15.8

17.1

69.5

66.4

68.5

68.5

13.5

18.7

15.7

14.4

.03 (.55)

-.04 (.58)

.00 (.56)

.03 (.56)

Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A5.
Percentage o f Participants Using Various Rule-Based Strategies in Experiment 1.

Rule-Based Strategy
Condition

Zero

Cell A

A Vs B

dD

dP

Unclassifiable

Percentage o f Participants

3 s (n = 61)

14.8

27.9

8.2

11.5

0.0

37.7

5 s (n = 59)

10.2

13.6

13.6

28.8

1.7

32.2

All (n = 120)

12.5

20.8

10.8

20.0

0.8

35.0

Note. Percentages are based on the total number o f participants in their respective groups;
therefore, percentages only sum to 100 percent when added across individual rows.
Strategies used by participants were determined by the Rule-Analysis Technique.
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A6.
Intercorrelations Between the Absolute Values o f Judged Strength, Judged Contingency,
and Inferred Contingency in Experiment 1.

Judgment

Contingency

Inferred
Contingency

--

a.057*

.055**

—

c.832**

Judgment
Contingency
Inferred Contingency

an = 1420. Dn = 1415. cn = 1431.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A7.
Descriptive Statistics fo r the Sum o f Deviations fo r Each Problem Set in Experiment 1.

Problem Set

Range of
Sums
Min

Max

1

15

38

2

19

3

% Correct Sum
(Sum of Events)

Mean Sum of Deviations
r /s

^Deviations

SD

74.8 (24)

23.95

-.05

2.06

28

79.2 (24)

23.87

-.13

1.03

19

27

79.2 (24)

23.86

-.14

0.88

4

19

30

83.3 (24)

24.00

.00

1.10

5

17

30

77.8 (24)

23.88

-.12

1.41

6

17

50

80.7 (24)

24.07

.07

2.85

7

20

30

77.5 (24)

24.10

.10

1.12

8

19

29

86.7 (24)

23.91

-.09

1.01

9

20

40

83.8 (24)

24.25

.25

1.87

10

19

33

87.5 (24)

24.03

.03

1.18

11

19

26

84.2 (24)

23.86

-.14

0.85

12

17

28

88.3 (24)

23.93

-.08

1.09

CS

20

32

84.8 (24)

24.07

.07

1.17

Note. Numbers in parentheses are the sum o f event states that define each Problem Set.
CS = comparison set.
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A8.
Means and Standard Deviations o f Each Judged Problem Set in Experiment 2.

Problem Set

Type o f
Cue

Causal Information

Judgment
Ap

Cell Frequencies

Z

M

SD

1

Context

la, 8b, 12c, 4d

25

-.64

-.17

.52

2

Abstract

4a, 4b, 9c, 9d

26

.00

-.30

.33

3

Context

4a, 4b, lc, 14d

23

.43

-.22

.43

4

Abstract

11a, 2b, 9c, Od

22

-.78

.52

.30

5

Context

6a, 6b, 6c, 6d

24

.00

.04

.23

6

Abstract

5a, lb, 3c, 13d

22

.65

.13

.53

7

Context

4a, 4b, 14c, Id

23

-.43

-.25

.48

8

Abstract

la, 5b, 3c, 15d

24

.00

-.43

.60

9

Context

13a, 4b, lc, 8d

26

.65

.54

.32

10

Abstract

4a, 10b, 7c, Id

22

-.59

-.41

.30

11

Context

9a, 5b, 7c, 3d

24

-.06

.26

.32

12

Abstract

2a, 12b, 0c, 9d

23

.14

-.62

.41

CS

Context II

8a, 5b, 9c, 2d

24

-.20

.12

.31

Note. Judgments o f strength were divided by 100 to facilitate comparisons with
contingency. Ap = delta p; SD = standard deviation; CS = comparison set.
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A9.
Number o f Participants in Each Experimental Condition in Experiment 2.

Number of Events
Known

Unknown

Total

Early

15

13

28

Late

14

15

29

29

28

57

Set Placement

Total
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A10.
Means and Standard Deviations o f Absolute and Signed Cell D eviations in Experiment 2.

Contingency Table Cell

Condition
a

b

c

d

All Cells

1

Mean Absolute Cell Deviations
Known

1.09 (.71)

1.26 (.69)

1.45 (.90)

1 .2 0

(.90)

1.25 (.07)

Unknown

1.23 (.83)

1.24 (.67)

1.34 (.81)

1.27 (.6 8 )

1.27 (.02)

All Conditions

1.16 (.76)

1.25 (.67)

1.39 (.85)

1.23 (.79)

1.26 (.05)

.03 (.16)

Mean Signed Cell Deviations
Known

.42 (.58)

.15 (.55)

-.28 (.52)

-.26 (.58)

Unknown

.56 (.83)

-.21 (.73)

-.32 (.61)

-.19 (.76)

.48 (.71)

-.03 (.67)

-.30 (.56)

-.2 2

All Conditions

(.67)

-.0 2

(.2 0 )

.00 (.17)

Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations (for cells a, b, c, and d) and the
standard error o f the means (for All Cells).
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A l l .
Percentage o f Recalled Frequencies that were Over, Correct, and Under Estimations o f
the Contingency Table Cells in Experiment 2.

Contingency Table Cell

Type o f
jDSumduon
a

c

b

d

All Conditions (n = 735)
% Over
% Correct
% Under
Mean

31.8

27.3

25.0

28.7

48.8

43.3

45.0

45.8

19.4

29.3

29.9

25.5

.12 (.71)

-.02 (.75)

-.05 (.74)

.03 (.74)

Known Condition Only (n = 344)
% Over
% Correct
% Under
Mean

29.3

31.2

24.5

25.9

49.3

41.1

45.3

49.9

21.3

27.7

30.1

24.3

.08 (.71)

.03 (.77)

-.06 (.74)

.02 (.71)

Unknown Condition Only (n = 361)
% Over
% Correct
% Under
Mean

34.3

23.3

25.6

31.6

48.3

45.7

44.7

41.6

17.4

31.0

29.7

26.9

.17 (.70)

-.08 (.73)

-.04 (.74)

.05 (.76)

Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.

139

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

APPENDIX A continued
Table A12.
D escriptive Statistics fo r the Sum o f Deviations fo r Each Problem Set in Experiment 2.

Problem Set

Range of Sum
o f Estimates

Mean Sum o f Estimates

% Correct Sum

Min

Max

1

1 0

25

79.3 (25)

2

24

27

3

23

4

Absolute

SD

24.91

-0.81

3.00

89.7 (26)

25.93

-0.07

0.46

30

79.3 (23)

23.55

0.55

1.48

2 1

23

93.1 (22)

2 2 .0 0

0 .0 0

0.27

5

2 2

25

93.1 (24)

23.97

-0.03

0.42

6

2 2

24

89.7 (22)

22.14

0.14

0.44

7

2 2

26

86.2 (23)

23.07

0.07

0.65

8

24

26

96.6 (24)

24.07

0.07

0.37

9

25

30

8 6 .2

(26)

26.10

1 .1 0

0.82

1 0

2 0

23

89.7 (22)

21.93

-0.07

0.46

11

2 2

24

96.6 (24)

23.93

-0.07

0.37

1 2

23

32

89.7 (23)

23.38

0.38

1 .6 8

CS

24

25

86.2 (24)

24.14

0.14

0.35

Actual
Known Set Information

Unknown Set Information
1

1 2

35

21.4(25)

23.42

-1.58

5.20

2

2 2

40

14.3 (26)

26.93

0.93

4.23

3

17

25

28.6 (23)

22.50

-0.50

1.84

4

15

26

39.3 (22)

2 2 .1 1

0 .1 1

2.59

5

16

33

32.1 (24)

23.75

-0.25

4.23

6

15

28

32.1 (22)

22.61

0.61

3.04

7

17

31

25.0 (23)

23.07

0.07

2.78

8

2 1

30

39.3 (24)

24.22

0 .2 2

1.97

9

19

35

25.0 (26)

25.36

0.36

3.18

1 0

15

27

42.9 (22)

21.57

-0.43

2 .6 6

11

13

29

21.4 (24)

22.93

-1.07

3.51

1 2

13

30

46.4 (23)

23.57

0.57

2.78

CS

2 0

28

21.4(24)

24.19

0.19

2 .0 2

Note. Numbers in parentheses are the sum o f events that define each problem set. CS =
comparison set.
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A13.
Percentage o f Participants Using Various Rule-Based Strategies in Experiment 2.

Rule-Based Strategy
Condition

Zero

Cell A

A Ys B

dD

dP

Unclassifiable

7.1

0 .0

30.4

Percentage of Participants

All (n = 57)

8.9

19.6

33.9
Set Information

Knowna

10.3

Unknown 13

7.4

17.2

34.5

6.9

0 .0

31.0

2 2 .2

33.3

7.4

0 .0

29.6

Set Placement

Earlyb

7.4

18.5

40.7

3.7

0 .0

29.6

Late 0

10.3

20.7

27.6

10.3

0 .0

31.0

Note. Percentages are based on the total number o f participants in their respective groups;
therefore, percentages only sum to 1 0 0 percent when added across individual rows.
Strategies used by participants were determined by the Rule-Analysis Technique.
= 29 and 28.
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A14.
Intercorrelations Between Judged Strength, Judged Contingency, and Inferred
Contingency in Experiment 2.

Judgment

Contingency

Inferred Contingency

All Conditions (n = 679)
Judgment

a.255*

Contingency

b.285*
.818*

Inferred Contingency

Known Only (n = 346)
Judgment
Contingency

b.213*

c.270*

—

.807*
—

Inferred Contingency

Unknown Only (n = 333)
Judgment
Contingency
Inferred Contingency

d.239*

e.312*

—

.834*
—

a> ,c’ ^Participants’ judgments and/or recall frequencies were incomplete, which resulted
in 22, 5, 7, 17, or 20 data points being excluded from the r statistic, respectively.
*p < .0 1 .
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A15.
Intercorrelations Between Judged Strength, Contingency, and Inferred Contingency in
Experiment 2 Listed Separately For Each Subset o f the Rule-Analysis Technique.

Judgment

Contingency

c ’^ n c y

Cell A Subset: Problem Sets 1, 5, 9 (n = 167)
Judgment

—

a.609**

Contingency

b.650**
.773**

Inferred Contingency

—

A Versus B Subset: Problem Sets 2, 6 , 10 (n =171)
Judgment

—

°.476**

Contingency

c.508**
.923**

Inferred Contingency

—

Sum Diagonals Subset: Problem Sets 3 ,7 , 11 (n= 171)
Judgment

—

d-.013

Contingency

d. 184*
.832**

Inferred Contingency

—

Conditional Probabilities (Ap) Subset: Problem Sets 4, 8 , 12 (n = 170)
Judgment

—

e-.696**

Contingency

a.

3 5 9

4 3 4

Inferred Contingency

**

**

—

^Participants’ judgments and/or recall frequencies were incomplete, which resulted
in 6 ,10, 7,4 , or 5 data points being excluded from the r statistic, respectively.
*p < .05; **/?<.01.
a, ,c,
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A16.
Number o f Participants in Each Experimental Condition in Experiment 3.

Experimental Condition

Event Order
Online

Post-Encode

Post-Retrieve

Forward

19

15

14

Backward

7

13

9

26

28

23

Total Participants
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A17.
Means and Standard Deviations o f Absolute and Signed Cell Deviations in Experiment 3.

Contingency Table Cell

Condition
a

b

c

d

All cells

Mean Absolute Cell Deviations
On-Line

.38 (0.75)

.27 (0.53)

.77(1.45)

.54 (0.90)

.49 (0.11)

Post-Encode

.71 (1.15)

.43 (0.92)

.71 (1.30)

.89(1.42)

.69 (0.10)

Post-Recall

.48 (0.73)

.48 (0.67)

.70(1.26)

.52 (0.95)

.53 (0.06)

All

.53 (0.91)

.39 (0.73)

.73 (1.32)

.66(1.13)

.58 (0.08)

Mean Signed Cell Deviations
On-Line

-.38 (0.75)

.04 (0.60)

.77(1.45)

-.38 (0.98)

.12(0.27)

Post-Encode

-.36(1.31)

.14(1.01)

.64(1.34)

-.54(1.59)

-.03 (0.27)

Post-Recall

-.48 (0.73)

.2 2

(0.80)

.61 (1.31)

-.26(1.05)

.02 (0.24)

All

-.40 (0.98)

.13 (0.820

(1.35)

-.40(1.25)

.0 0

.6 8

(0.26)

Note. Numbers in parentheses are the standard deviations (for cells a, b, c, and d) and the
standard error o f the mean (for All cells).
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A 18.
Percentage o f Recalled Frequencies that were Over, Correct, and Under Estimations o f
the Contingency Table Cells in Experiment 3.

Contingency Table Cell

Type o f
j^siinidiioii
a

b

c

d

All Conditions (n = 77)
% Over
% Correct
% Under
Mean

03.9

16.9

31.2

11.7

67.5

71.4

6 6 .2

61.0

28.6

11.7

0 2 .6

27.3

-.25 (.52)

.05 (.54)

.29 (.51)

-.16 (.61)

Forward Event Sequence Only (n ==48)
% Over
% Correct
% Under
Mean

2 .1

14.6

37.5

10.4

70.8

70.8

58.3

60.4

14.6

14.6

04.2

29.2

-.25 (.48)

.00 (.55)

.33 (.56)

-.19 (.61)

Backward Event Sequence Only (n = 29)
% Over
% Correct
% Under
Mean

6.9

20.7

20.7

13.8

62.1

72.4

79.3

62.1

31.0

6.9

0 .0

24.1

-.24 (.58)

.14 (.52)

.21 (.41)

-.1 0

(.62)

Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A19.
Percentage o f Recalled Frequencies that were Over, Correct, and Under Estimations o f
the Contingency Table Cells fo r Each Judgment Task Condition in Experiment 3.

Contingency Table Cell

Type o f
.e stim a tio n

a

b

c

d

On-Line Judgment (n = 26)
% Over

0 .0

11.5

34.6

7.7

% Correct

73.1

76.9

65.4

61.5

% Under

26.9

11.5

0 .0

30.8

-.27 (.45)

.00 (.49)

.35 (.49)

-.23 (.59)

Mean

Memory ]Based - Post Encode Condition Only (n = 28)
% Over

10.7

14.3

28.6

14.3

% Correct

64.3

75.0

67.9

57.1

% Under

25.0

10.7

3.6

28.6

-.14 (.59)

.04 (.51)

.25 (.52)

-.14 (.65)

Mean

Memory Based - Post Recall Condition Only (n = 23)
% Over

0 .0

26.1

30.4

13.0

% Correct

65.2

60.9

65.2

65.2

% Under

34.8

13.0

4.3

21.7

-.35 (.49)

.13 (.63)

.26 (.54)

-.09 (.60)

Mean

Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A20.
Frequency (f) and Cumulative Percentage (Cum %) o f Participants that Selected Each
Alternatives o f the Judgment o f Relative Likelihood Scale in Experiment 3.

Rating

F

Cum %

3

3

4.0

2

24

36.0

1

15

56.0

0

4

61.3

-1

15

81.3

-2

13

98.6

-3

1

1 0 0 .0

n = 75b
Two subjects did not complete the relative likelihood scale and were not included in this
analysis.
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A21.
Intercorrelations Between Inferred Contingency, Judgments o f Relative Likelihood, Line
Judgments, and Numeric Estimates o f Contingency in Experiment 3 Listed Separately
For Judgment Tasks Condition.

Relative
Likelihood

Line
Judgment

Numeric
Estimate

All Conditions
Relative
Line Judgment

.620

.600

—

.963

Numeric Estimate

—
On-Line Condition

Relative
Line Judgment

.631

.621

—

.952
—

Numeric Estimate
Memory-Based Post Encode Condition
Relative
Line Judgment

.479

.516

—

.966

Numeric Estimate

—

Memory-Based Post Recall Condition
Relative
Line Judgment

.781

.669

—

.977

Numeric Estimate

—
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A22.
Participants ’ Judgments o f Relative Likelihood, Line Judgments, and Numeric Estimates
o f Contingency That H ad at Least One Discrepancy in Judgment Accuracy.
Relative
Likelihood

Line Judgment

Numeric
Estimate

2 2 0 2

-la

0.96

0.98

5885

-2 a

0.51

0.5

4804

-la

0.16

-0 . 1 a

0397

-2 a

0.56

0 .6

6203

-la

0.54

0.45

0169

-2 a

0.81

0 .8

7206

-la

0.52

4918

-2 a

0 .6 8

0.65

2004

-2 a

0.29

0.25

8005

-la

0 .6

0.62

6995

-la

0.37

0.3

5694

-2 a

0.75

0 .8

Subject ID

8400

2

—

—

- 0 .2 a

Note. Judgments are incorrect in that they were perceived as noncontingent or negative.
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A23.
Mean Absolute C ell Deviations Calculated Separately For Each Problem Set in
Experiment 2.

Contingency Table Cell

Causal
Information

PS

a

b

c

d

1

la, 8 b, 12c, 4d

3.35 (3.60)

2.15(2.03)

3.25 (3.36)

1.66(1.33)

2

4a, 4b, 9c, 9d

1.32 (1.45)

1.53 (1.69)

1.26 (1.34)

1.44(1.41)

3a

4a, 4b, lc, 14d

0.74 (0.88)

1.26(1.38)

1.30(2.05)

1.47(1.96)

4a

11a, 2b, 9c, Od

0.63 (1.11)

1.21 (1.74)

1.72 (2.22)

0.67(1.90)

a, 6 b, 6 c, 6 d

1.16(1.36)

1.39 (1.60)

1.23 (1.28)

1.53 (1.62)

6

5a, lb, 3c, 13d

1.02(1.53)

0.67 (1.55)c

0.70 (1.15)b

1.60 (2.50)

T

4a, 4b, 14c, Id

0.98 (1.73)

1.19(1.37)

1.74(2.85)

1.04(1.87)

la, 5b, 3c, 15d

0.40 (1.13)b

0.51 (0.76)

0 .6 6

(0 .8 6 )

0.88 (1.73)

1.11 (1.19)

1.49(1.71)

1.77 (2.03)

5

8

a

6

9

13a, 4b, lc, 8 d

1 0

4a, 10b, 7c, Id

0.63 (1.01)c

0.95 (1.48)

0.82(1.03)

0.47 (1.20)b

11

9a, 5b, 7c, 3d

1.37 (1.33)

1.30 (1.18)c

1.32(1.36)

0.93 (1.05)b

12

2a, 12b, 0c, 9d

1.35 (2.70)

1.75 (2.73)

1.30 (1.99)b

1.33 (1.98)

Mean

—

1.17(0.22)

1.25 (0.13)

1.40 (0.20)

1.23 (0.12)

1

.1

2

( 1 .8 6 )

Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations (Problem Sets 1-12) and standard
errors o f the mean (Mean). The means across all problem sets were calculated from the
numbers included in this table and differ from that previously reported due to rounding.
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A24.
Mean Signed Cell D eviations Calculated Separately For Each Problem Set in
Experiment 2.

Contingency Table Cell

Causal
Information

PS

a

b

c

d

-1.58(2.51)

-3.09 (3.50)

0.15 (2.13)

1

la, 8 b, 12c, 4d

3.28 (3.67)

2

4a, 4b, 9c, 9d

0.83 (1.78)

1 .1 1

(2 .0 0 )

-0.77(1.68)

-0.74(1.89)

3

4a, 4b, lc, 14d

-0.35 (1.09)a

0 .1 1

( 1 .8 8 )

1.23 (2.10)

-0.95 (2.26)

4

11a, 2b, 9c, Od

0.04 (1.28)a

0.96(1.89)

-1.61 (2.30)

0.67(1.90)

5

6

a, 6 b, 6 c, 6 d

0.49(1.72)

0.23 (2.11)

-0.63 (1.67)a

-0.23 (2.22)a

6

5a, lb, 3c, 13d

0.63 (1.73)

0.63 (1.57)

0.32(1.31)

-1.21 (2.71)

7

4a, 4b, 14c, Id

0.42(1.95)

0.07 (1.82)

-1.28 (3.09)

0.86(1.96)

8

la, 5b, 3c, 15d

0.37(1.14)

-0.16 (0.90)a

0.41 (1.01)

-0.49(1.88)

9

13a, 4b, lc, 8 d

-0.70 (2.06)

0.26(1.61)

1.35 (1.83)

-1.18(2.43)

10

4a, 10b, 7c, Id

0.18(1.18)

-0.67(1.63)

-0.19(1.30)

0.44(1.21)

11

9a, 5b, 7c, 3d

-0.25 (1.90)

0.14(1.76)

-0.75 (1.75)

0.30(1.38)

12

2a, 12b, 0c, 9d

1.04(2.83)

-1.54 (2.85)

1.30(1.99)

-0.32 (2.37)

Mean

—

0.44 (0.31)

-0.04 (0.25)

-0.31 (0.38)

-0.23 (0.21)

Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations (Problem Sets 1-12) and standard
errors o f the mean (Mean). The means across all problem sets were calculated from the
numbers included in this table and differ from that previously reported due to rounding.
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A25.
Mean Judgments and Inferred Contingency (A/? ’) o f Each Judged Problem Set in
Experiment 4.
Ap ’
PS

Condition

/

Ap

Judgment

■
M

SD

M

SD

—

-.11

.41

4a, 4b, 9c, 9d

1

On-Line

.0 0

—

Memory Based

.0 0

.08

All conditions

.0 0

—

—

—

On-Line

-.43

—

—

.03

Memory Based

-.43

-.25

All conditions

-.43

—

—

—

On-Line

.0 1

—

—

.11

Memory Based

.0 1

.04

.09

—

All conditions

.0 1

—

—

—

.1 2

—

5a, 5b, 13c, Id

2

.2 0

.56

—

9a, 5b, 7c, 4d

3

.41

9a, 3b, 3c, 8 d

4
On-Line

.47

.2 0

.2 1

.21

.36

Memory Based

.47

.14

.23

.27

.26

All conditions

.47

.17

.2 2

.24

.32

On-Line

-.35

-.2 1

.16

-.27

.36

Memory Based

-.35

-.2 1

.23

-.28

.34

All conditions

-.35

-.2 1

.2 0

-.28

.35

4a, 10b, 7c, 4d

5

Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A26.
Means and Standard Deviations o f Absolute Cell Deviations in Experiment 4.

Contingency Table Cell

PS
Condition

a

b

c

d

All cells

1.68 (1.59)

2.03 (0.21)

Mean Absolute Cell Deviations
1

Memory-Based

2.11 (1.99)

Memory-Based

1.90 (2.29)b 1.42 (1.46)b 3.15 (3.36)d

1.34 (1.76)a

1.96 (0.42)

Memory-Based

1.27(1.48)

0.56 (0.85)

0.83 (0.93)

1.00(1.50)

0.92 (0.15)

On-Line

2.85 (1.96)

1.17 (1.28)a

1.29 (1.18)b

3.23 (2.03)

2.14(0.53)

Memory-Based

2.19(1.72)c 2.06 (1.76)b 2.04 (1.57)a 2.63 (1.82)d

2.23 (0.14)

All Conditions

2.52(1.86)°

1.61 (1.59)a

1.67 (1.43)b 2.94 (1.94)d

2.19(0.33)

On-Line

1.40(1.61)

1.96(2.29)

1.15 (1.17)

0.92 (1.03)a

1.36 (0.22)

Memory-Based

1.65 (1.66)

2.38 (2.30)

1.10(1.26)

1.19(1.78)

1.58 (0.29)

All Conditions

1.52(1.63)

2.17(2.29)

1.13 (1.21)

1.05 (1.45)a

1.47 (0.26)

On-Line

1.82 ( 1 .8 6 )°

1.63 (1.77)b

1.94 (2.20)d

1.56 (1.78)a

1.74 (0.09)

Memory-Based

2.12(1.92)

1.56(1.89)

1.22(1.17)

2.07 (1.98)

1.74 (0.22)

All Conditions

1.90(1.88)

1.61 (1.80)

1.74(1.99)

1.71 (1.85)

1.74 (0.06)

1.75 (1.66)

2.58(2.14)

z

D

AH

<
D

Note. Numbers in parentheses are the standard deviations (for cells a, b, c, and d) and the
standard error o f the mean (for All Cells).

154

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

APPENDIX A continued
Table A l l .
Means and Standard Deviations o f Signed Cell Deviations in Experiment 4.

Contingency Table Cell

PS
Condition

a

b

c

d

All cells

Mean Signed Cell Deviations
1

Memory-Based

1.68 (2.37)

1.29 (2.04)

-2.12(2.61)

-0.28 (2.31)

0.14(0.86)

Memory-Based

1.23 (2.72)a -0.12 (2.04)a -2.98 (3.51)

1.30 (1.79)

-0.14(1.00)

Memory-Based

-0.56(1.88)

0.19 (1.00)a -0.63 (1.08)

0.79 (1.62)

-0.05 (0.34)

On-Line

-2.47 (2.43)

0.92(1.47)

0.50(1.69)

-3.15 (2.16)

-1.05 (1.03)

Memory-Based

-1.81 (2.13)

1.89(1.95)

1.75 (1.90)

-2 . 0 2 (2.50)

-0.05 (1.08)

All Conditions

-2.14(2.29)

1.40(1.78)

1.13 (1.89)

-2.60 (2.38)

-0.55 (1.06)

On-Line

1.19(1.77)

-1.83 (2.40)

-0.40 (1.60)

0.38 (1.33)

-0.17(0.64)

Memory-Based

1.19(2.02)

-2.13 (2.54)

-0.27(1.66)

0.40 (2 . 1 1 )

-0.20 (0.71)

All Conditions

1.19(1.89)

-1.98 (2.46)

-0.33 (1.62)

0.39 (1.76)

-0.18(0.67)

On-Line

-0.62 (2.80)

-0.46 (2.41)

0.05 (1.69)

-1.39 (2.52)

-0.61 (0.30)

Memory-Based

0.35 (2.58)

0.22 (2.40)

-0.85 (2.81)

0.05 (2.36)

-0.06 (0.27)

All Conditions

0.07 (2.68)

0.02 (2.42)

-0.59 (2.57)

-0.36 (2.49)

- 0 . 2 2 (0.16)

'I

A

J

Note. Numbers in parentheses are the standard deviations (for cells a, b, c, and d) and the
standard error o f the mean (for All Cells).
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APPENDIX A continued
Table A28.
Percentage o f Recalled Frequencies that were Correct Estimations o f the Contingency
Table Cells fo r Problem Sets Four and Five o f Experiment 4.

Contingency Table Cell
PS

Statistic
a

b

d

c

Memory-Based Condition (n = 48)

1

% Correct
Mean

17.0

2 2

.9a

16.7a

21.3

.49 (.78)

.40 (.79)

-.50 (.77)

.02 (.90)

33.3

29.2

27.1

46.8a

.25 (.79)

-.04 (.85)

-.65 (.57)

.49 (.55)

41.7

60.4

43.8

54.2

-.17 (.75)

.06 (.63)

-.40 (.64)

.25 (.64)

.3a

18.8

17.4b

(.60)

.65 (.64)

-.48 (.78)

2

% Correct
Mean
3
% Correct
Mean
4
% Correct
Mean

2 1

.3a

-.57 (. 6 8 )

2 1

.6 6

<
D
% Correct
Mean

35.4

29.2

43.8

37.5

.35 (.73)

-.54 (.65)

-.15 (.74)

-.08 (.80)

4

On-Line Condition (n =48)
% Correct
Mean

1 2 .8

33.3

29.2

8.3

-.70 (.62)

.42 (.71)

.29 (.80)

41.7

41.7

33.3

41.7

.42 (.65)

-.46 (.62)

-.08 (.82)

.13 (.76)

- .8 8

(.39)

Js

% Correct
Mean

Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
a,bRecalled frequencies were missing and one or two estimations were not included in this
analysis, respectively.

156

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

APPENDIX A continued
Table A29.
Intercorrelations Between Judged Strength, Judged Contingency, and Inferred
Contingency in Experiment 4.
Judgment

Contingency

Inferred
Contingency

All Conditions (n = 330)
Judgment
Contingency

a.374*

b.581*

—

.661*

Inferred Contingency
On-Line Condition (n = 232)
Judgment
Contingency

.247*

c.616*

—

d.734*

Inferred Contingency

—

Memory Based Condition (n = 235)
Judgment
Contingency

e.674*

c.550*

—

.618*

Inferred Contingency

—

On-Line Condition (Problem Sets 4 and 5; n = 95)
Judgment
Contingency
Inferred Contingency
a.b.c.d.e.t.s-r>

•

f.560*

g.616*

—

.734*
—

... ? • _ _i _ _

in 3,147, 142, 137, 140, 4, or 5 data points being excluded from the r statistic,
respectively.
*p < .0 1 .
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APPENDIX B

OUTPUT

INPUT

NO
INPUT

NO OUTPUT

a

b

c

d

Figure B l. A summary table depicting the four event states, their labels, and the unique
information about the input and output that each cell represents. This table is typically
referred to as a contingency table.
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APPENDIX B continued

60.00
On-Line □ Memory-Based

B 40.00

§ 20.00

0.00
1

2

3
4
Problem Set

5

Figure B2. The mean percentages o f correct cell estimations across each problem set in
Experiment 4. Means were calculated across all four cells o f the problem set. Empty and
black bars represent the percentage o f correct estimations obtained by participants in the
on-line and memory-based conditions, respectively.
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APPENDIX C

University of New Hampshire
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research
Departmental Review Committee Exemption Classification Sheet
Pro|ect D irector.
D e p a rtm e n t.
Project Title

—

|RB # _ ______

M

Reviewer

35

li

fan

'IDT

—

Reviewer Pleese writecomments orcontingencies of approval, ifany, onaseparatesheet ofpaper, andattachtothis form. Placethe
completedform onHiewiththe applicationforreview, in theDepartmental ReviewCommitteefiles. Protocol applicationsandreviewforms
willbeforwardedtotheOfficeof SponsoredResearcheachsemesterforreportingpurposes.
l / t ~ Protocol quallflee a t EXEMPT under the following subsection (check one) - s a t reverte for detailed category
deacrlp tlo n :

~~]

46.101(b)(1)

R esearch co n d u cted In established educatlonel selling using norm al educational procedures

46.101(b)(2)

Educational te sta, surveys,

46.101(b)(3)

Educational te sts, surveys,
interviews, observation ofpublic
it public official or if confidentiality m andated by federal statu tes

46.101(b)(4)

Study of existing d a ta

46.101(b)(6)

Study of public benefits or service program s

46.101(b)(6)

T aste an d food studies

Refer protocol to the regular IRB for

- —

Interviews, observation ofpublic behavlor/no risk

EXPEDITED

behavior notexem pt under Subsection 2, above,

review under the following subsection (check one):

46.110(b)(1) Clinical studies of drugs/m edlcal devices not requiring investigational new drug/device applications.
46.110(b)(2)

Collection of blood sam ples by finger, heel or ear stick, or venipuncture in healthy adults >110 lbs., or others
and children, considering age, weight, health, collection procedure, frequency and am ount of collection.

4 6 .1 10(b)(3)

Prospective collection of biological specim ens for research p u rp o ses by nonlnvaslve m eans, and In a
non-dlaflgurlng m a n n e r hair and nail clippings, teeth, sw eat, saliva, placenta (after delivery), amnlotic fluid (at
m em brane rupture/labor), dental plaque/calculus, m ucosal/skln cells, sputum (after saline nebullzatlon)

4 6 .1 10(b)(4)

Collection of d ata through nonlnvaslve m eans routinely em ployed in clinical practice (excluding x-rays and
microwaves, a n d d ev ices not approved for marketing): physical s en so rs applied to the skin, weighing, tests
of visual acuity, Mfll, EKQ, EEG, ultrasound, etc., an d m oderate exercise by healthy volunteers.

4 6 .1 10(b)(5)

Non-exempt research involving data, docum ents, records or sp ecim en s that have been/win b e collected solely for
nonresearch p u rp o ses (e.g., medical treatm ent or diagnosis).

46.110(b)(6) Collection of d ata from voice, video, digital, or Image recordlnge m ad e for research purposes.
—

4 8 .1 10(b)(7) Non-exempt research on Individual or group behavior or characteristics of individuals, such a s studies of
perception, cognition, motivation, Identity, language, communicetlon, cultural beliefs or practices, and
social behavior, or research employing surveys, Interviews, oral histories, focus groups, program
evaluation, hum an factors evaluation, or quality assu ran ce m ethodologies.

- 46.110(b)(6)

46.110(b)(9)

i

|

Continuing review of research such a s studies permanently closed to enrollment of new subjects, or for which
ressaich-related Interventions are com pleted, or for which only long-term follow-up of subjects remains, or for which
no subjects h ave b een enrolled and no additional risks have b een identified, or for which data analysis Is the only
remslning researc h activity.
Continuing review of research (not conducted under Investigational drug/device applications or exemption) where
categories 2 through 8, above, do not apply, and for which the IRB h as determined th at the research involves no
greater than minimal risk, and no additional hsks have been identified.

Refer protocol to the regular IRB for FULL BOARD action (cite reason on separate shset)

i I Protocol cannot be approved a s presented (cite reason on separate sheet)
IRB R eview er

—■?

Date:

^7 ( / &
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APPENDIX C continued

University of New Hampshire
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research
Departmental Review Committee Exemption Classification Sheet
IRB#:

Name:

TzsLteLtikfeExempt Review
Research conducted in established or commonly accepted educational settings, Involving normal
educational practices, such as:

46.101(bXl)

(I) research on regular or speciBl educational instructional strategies, or
(g) research on the effectiveness of or comparison among instructional techniques, curricula, or
classroom management methods.
«.101(bX 2)/

Research Involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey
procedures, Interview procedures or observation of public behavior unless:
(I) Information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be Identified, directly or
through Identifiers linked to the subjects; and
(1) any disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the
subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to subjects' financial standing, employability, or
reputation.

46.101(b)(3)

Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey
procedures, interview procedures or observation of pubic behavior that is not exem pt under category
(bX2) *
(I) the human subjects are elected or appointed public officials or candidates for public office; or
(II) federal statute(s) requlre(s) without exception that confidentiality of the personally identifiable
information wiH be maintained throughout the research and thereafter.

46.101(bX4)

Research involving the collection or study of existing data, dooxnents, records, pathological specimens,
or dfagnostlc specimens, If these sources are publicly available or E the information is recorded by the
Investigator In such a manner that subjects cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to
the subjects.

46.101{bX5)

Research and demonstration projects which are conducted by or subject to the approval of department or
agency heads, and which are designed to study, evaluate, or otherwise examine: (0 pubfic benefit or
service programs; (H) procedures for obtaining benefits or services under those programs; (R) possible
changes in or alternatives to those programs or procedures; or (iv) possible changes in methods or levels
of payment for benefits or services under those programs.

46.101(bX6)

Taste and food quality evaluation and consumer acceptance studies, (I) if wholesome foods without
additives are consumed or (il) or if a food is consumed that contains a food ingrerfient a t or below the
level and for a use found to be safe, or agricultural chemical or environmental contaminant at or below
the level found to be safe, by the Food and Drug Administration, or approved by the Environmental
Protection Agency, or the Food Safety and Inspection Service of the U.S. Department o f Agriculture.

Protocol la approved as presented in the category checked
Protocol Is approved wWi the Honouring conttngencies/coinmeiits (attach shee ts If nrresaary)
Protocol Is referred to the IRB for Expedited or Full Board review
Protocol carwoj: be approved as presented (cite reasons on separate sheet)
DRC Reviewer
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APPENDIX C continued

University of New Hampshire
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research
Departmental Review Committee Exemption Classification Sheet

Bo(ZOP^~

Name:

IR B #:

-foe

{Jttn

&1 Cu

Exempt Review
46.101(b)(1)

Research conducted In established or commonly accepted educational settings, involving normal
educational practices, such as:
(I) research on regular or special educational erstructtonel strategies, or
(it) research on the effectiveness of or comparison among Instructional techniques, curricula, or
dassroom management methods.

46.101(bX2)

Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey
procedures, Interview procedures or observation of public behavior unless:
(!) Information obtained Is recorded In such a manner that human subjects can be identified, directly or
through, identifiers linked to the subjects; and
(i) any disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the
subjects a t risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to subjects' financial standing, employability, or
reputation,

46.101(b)(3)

Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey
procedures, interview procedures or observation of pubic behavior th at is not exempt under category
(bX2) f t
(I) the human subjects are elected or appointed public officials or candidates for public office; or
(II) federal statute(s) require(s) without exception that confidentiality of the personally identifiable
information wilt be maintained throughout the research and thereafter.

46.101(bX4)

Research involving the collection or study of existing data, documents, records, pathological specimens,
or diagnostic specimens, if these sources are pubBdy available or if the information Is recorded by the
Investigator In such a manner that subjects cannot be Identified, directly or through Identifiers linked to
the subjects.

46.101(b)(5)

Research and demonstration projects which are conducted by or subject to the approval of department or
agency heads, and which are designed to study, evaluate, or otherwise examine: (I) pubfc benefit or
service programs; (I) procedures for obtaining benefits or services under those programs; (il) possible
changes in or alternatives to those programs or procedures; or (fv) possible changes hi methods or levels
of payment for benefits or services under those programs.

46.101(bX6)

Taste and food quality evaluation and consumer acceptance studies, (i) If wholesome foods without
additives are consumed or (ii) of if a food is consumed that contains a food ingredient A or below the
level and for a use found to be safe, or agricultural chemical or environmental contaminant at or below
the level found to be safe, by the Food and Drug Administration, or approved by the Environmental
Protection Agency, or the Food Safety and Inspection Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

Protocol is approved as presented in the category checked
Protocol Is approved with the following contingencies/comments (attach sheets If necessary)
Protocol is referred to the IRB for Expedited or Full Board review
Protocol canpot be approved as presented (cite reasons on separate sheet)
n»C Reviewer:

'V K

J*
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APPENDIX D

LABORATORY EXPERIENCE INFORMATION FORM

Experiment Number:
Experim enter

/ /
Christopher Alexander Barnet

General Area of Psychology:
Social - Cognitive Psychology: More specifically this research falls under
hum an judgm ent of covariation.

General problem or issue under investigastion:
T his experiment alms to isolate w hether the tendency to make differential errors in the
recreation of a summary table is the result of biases at the encoding or retrieval portion
of th e memory process. The m ain independent varable is the point a t w hich subjects
are Informed of the intent to form a judgm ent of the relation between the two variables.
Specific hypothesis:
1 - Subjects with informed knowledge of the intention to form a judgm ent prior to viewing
th e slides will differentially make errors.
2 - T he bias of differentially m aking errors stems h*om an encoding error influenced by the
intent to form a judgm ent prior to vieweing the causal information.
Correlational or independent and dependent variables:
Independent variable: Point at which subjects of inform ed of the task to form a judgm ent
1 - Norm al (prior to viewing) 2 - Encode-Free (after viewing) 3 - Retreival-Free (after task) 4 - Never
D ependent variable: The absolute value of the deviations from perceived and actual cell frequende

Control procedures:
To assess whether forming a judgm ent biases the memory of causal cues, the control group
(Never) will never be introduced to the bias of form ing a judgment. The Normal group will
be introduced to the bias in a m anner consistent w ith that traditionally in th e literature.

Potential implications of study:
This study plans to demonstrate that a subject's knowledge of form ing a judgm ent
may serve as a potentially biasing agent in either the encoding or retrieval of events.
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LABORATORY EXPERIENCE INFORMATION FORM

Experiment Number
Experimenter:

//)
Christopher Alexander Bam_eg________

General Area of Psychology:
Sodal - Cognitive Psychology: More specifically this research falls under
human judgment of covariation.

General problem or issue under investigastion:
The accuracy in which indiviuals are able to recalled causally relevant information from memory
when the information is presented to them in a serial fashion. It is expected that recalled
events will be inaccurate and this may serve as a potential contributor to erroneous judgments of
contingency.
Specific hypothesis:
1 - Subjects that have a longer exposure to the co-events will have better accuracy in
their recalled estimates of the actual co-events presented.
2 - Subjects that are presened the co-events in a plausible context will have produce more
errors in their recalled of the actual co-events.
Correlational or independent and dependent variables:
Independent variables: Exposure time to co-events (3s vs, 5s)
Context of the co-events (plausibly relevents events vs. abstract events)
Dependent variable: The absolute value of the deviations from perceived and actual frequencies.

Control procedures:
To assess whether previous attempts to produce differential errors in recalled error is a by
product of the extended amout of exposure time in previous work, the current study will expose
subjects to a condition which will increase the difficulty of the task.

Potential implications of study:
This study plans to demonstrate that under circumstance when strategies can not be
used to encode and recall causal information that causal information is recalled in abiased manner.
To assess whether the the context of the events influences recall.
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APPENDIX D continued

LABORATORY EXPERIENCE INFORMATION FORM

Experiment Number:
Experimenter:

Christopher Alexander Barnes

General Area of Psychology:
Social - Cognitive Psychology: More specifically this research falls under
human judgment of covariation.

General problem or issue under investigastion:
To determine whether memory-based judgments of contingency are more highly
correlated with the events recalled from memory than on-line judgments of contingency.
Memory-based judgments refer to judgm ents that must be made after viewing the relevant
information, while on-line judgments refer to those that are assessed while viewing the events.
Specific hypothesis:
1 - Participants' judgm ents of contingency on the memory-based task will be more highly
correlated with statistically inferred based on die information recalled from memory than
participant's judgments on the on-line task.
2 - In the fourth problem Set, the accuracy of recall will be better for those participants in the
memory-based condition than those in the on-line condition.
Correlational or independent and dependent variables:
Independent variable: Type of Judgmnent: Memory-Based vs. On-Line
Dependent variable: Absolute value of the deviations from perceived and actual frequencies;
Judgments of contingency.
Control procedures:
The two Type of Judgment conditions serve as the control conditions. Forewarning participants
of the judgment task (On-Line Condition) is expected to result in more accuracte judgments of
contingency, while not forewarning participants (Memory-Based) is expected to result in
judgments that are more consistent with what they recall from memory—not what was shown.
Therefore, predicted differences between conditions will serve to prove an expermental effect.
Potential implications of study:
This study will highlight the importance of recognizing task differences, on-line v b . memorybased tasks, in the contingency judgm ent literature. Real world judgments tend to be memorybased, yet experiments tend to use online procedures to investigate contingency judgm ent
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